Economic science for use : causality and evidence in policy making by Mireles-Flores, L. (Luis)
  
ECONOMIC SCIENCE FOR USE: 
CAUSALITY AND EVIDENCE IN POLICY MAKING 
 
 
Economische wetenschap voor de praktijk: over 
causaliteit en bewijs in beleidsvraagstukken 
 
 
THESIS 
 
to obtain the degree of Doctor from the 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
by command of the 
rector magnificus 
 
Prof.dr. H.A.P. Pols 
 
and in accordance with the decision of the Doctorate Board 
The public defence shall be held on 
 
Friday 2 September 2016 at 11:30 hrs 
 
by 
 
LUIS MIRELES-FLORES 
Born in Xalapa, México 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral Committee 
 
 
 
Promotors: 
 
Prof.dr. I.U. Mäki 
Prof.dr. J.J. Vromen 
 
 
Other members: 
 
Prof.dr. J.M. Reiss 
Prof.dr. R.E. Backhouse 
Dr. M.J. Boumans 
 
 
Copromotor: 
 
Dr. C. Marchionni 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To Mark Blaug 
 
 
  
  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.............. i 
PART I. THE ART OF ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING.............. 1 
CHAPTER 1. TOWARDS A METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMIC POLICY  
MAKING: THE POSITIVE-NORMATIVE DISTINCTION RECONSIDERED............... 2 
1.1. The standard version of the dichotomy.............. 4 
1.2. The classical threefold distinction.............. 7 
1.3. On the criteria of demarcation in the standard approach.............. 11 
1.4. A distinction about types of research.............. 19 
1.5. Towards a methodology of economic policy making.............. 23 
1.6. How keeping the distinction matters in methodology: an illustration.............. 26 
1.7. Concluding remarks.............. 29 
PART II. CAUSAL KNOWLEDGE AND ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING.............. 31 
INTRODUCTION TO PART II.............. 32 
CHAPTER 2. CAUSATION, PRACTICAL RELEVANCE, AND EFFECTIVENESS.............. 36 
2.1. Prediction and intervention as practical virtues.............. 36 
2.2. Practical potential and effectiveness.............. 41 
2.3. Concluding remarks.............. 46 
CHAPTER 3. CAUSAL PLURALISM AND PRACTICAL RELEVANCE.............. 47 
3.1. Pluralism about theories of causality.............. 47 
3.2. Pluralism about causal concepts.............. 50 
3.3. Concluding remarks.............. 53 
CHAPTER 4. ON THE MEANING OF CAUSAL GENERALISATIONS:  
THE OECD RESEARCH ON UNEMPLOYMENT POLICY.............. 55 
4.1. The meanings of the causal relata.............. 59 
4.2. The meanings of the causal relation ..............62 
4.2.1. Net versus component causal effects.............. 63 
4.2.2. Necessity versus sufficiency.............. 65 
4.3. Specifying the relevant population.............. 68 
4.4. Causal generalisations in terms of single-unit causal claims.............. 70 
4.5. Concluding remarks.............. 73 
PART III. EVIDENCE AND ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING.............. 75 
INTRODUCTION TO PART III.............. 76 
CHAPTER 5. INFERRING POLICIES FROM CAUSAL GENERALISATIONS.............. 81 
5.1. Two notions of causation.............. 83 
5.2. Type- and token-level causation in the probabilistic approach.............. 85 
5.3. Connecting singular and general causation: Hitchcock’s attempt.............. 89 
5.4. Saving the truth of causal generalisations is not enough.............. 94 
5.5. The potential outcomes framework of causal effects.............. 97 
5.6. Concluding remarks.............. 104 
  
 
CHAPTER 6. EVIDENCE FOR CAUSALITY AND EVIDENCE FOR POLICY.............. 106 
6.1. Deconstructing Cartwright’s view on evidence for use.............. 108 
6.1.1. On the hunting of causes.............. 109 
6.1.2. On the using of causes.............. 111 
6.2. What works and what doesn’t work in Cartwright’s account.............. 114 
6.3. Evidence for causal relations and evidence  
for policy strategies: a preliminary distinction ..............120 
6.4. Differences that matter between causal and policy claims.............. 125 
6.5. Characterising policy hypotheses: a concrete proposal.............. 128 
6.6. The basic problems of policy inference.............. 131 
6.7. Concluding remarks.............. 134 
CHAPTER 7. THE ROLE OF EVIDENCE IN ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING:  
FROM CAUSAL GENERALISATIONS TO TRADE POLICY.............. 136 
7.1. Free trade causes economic benefits:  
a scientific generalisation or a policy guideline?.............. 137 
7.2. New trade theory and the benefits of free trade.............. 139 
7.3. Empirical evidence on the benefits of free trade:  
what are the hypotheses under evaluation?.............. 141 
7.4. Making causal generalisations explicit for policy purposes.............. 143 
7.5. The meaning of changes in ‘trade liberalisation’.............. 144 
7.6. Empirical methods and implicit connotations of causation.............. 146 
7.6.1. Controlling for confounders to test causal generalisations.............. 148 
7.6.2. Different causal notions and different practical relevance.............. 152 
7.7. Study-specific hypotheses versus causal generalisations.............. 154 
7.8. On the methodological contrast between  
economic science and economic policy making.............. 158 
7.9. Concluding remarks.............. 163 
REFERENCES.............. 166 
SUMMARY.............. 180 
SAMENVATTING.............. 184 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR.............. 188 
 
 i 
 
 
 
 
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
 
This thesis has been work in progress for so long that now it is difficult for    
me to recognize the outcome in light of the plans and ideas I initially had. My 
friends and family have expressed their happiness about me finally completing 
it. I appreciate that. From a practical perspective, I also feel somewhat happy 
about getting it done. But, from an intellectual perspective, I must admit I am 
not entirely satisfied with the result. It barely touches the surface of a topic      
in the philosophy of the social sciences that needs a lot more systematic 
investigation: the methodology of economic policy-making. 
I feel I actually have worked on four different dissertations at different 
stages during these years. The first was a fantasy. Rather over-ambitiously,          
I wanted to develop a universal account of science-based policy. I would 
conceptually analyse all its elements, agents, patterns, mechanisms, disturbing 
factors, and so forth. I would then present them in a majestic philosophical 
framework that could be used to characterise and assess all policy-making 
instantiations. Mark Blaug was my main supervisor back then. He told me that 
the topic was pretty good, but that I was crazy, and that the only possible way 
to go was to use case studies.  
This led me to a different, more realistic, version of my project. Together 
Mark and I developed a plan for the whole thesis in which most of the chapters 
were cases from the history of economics related to policy issues, e.g., the 
classical theory of markets, Hume’s writings on money, the early 20th century 
debates on monetary policy, privatization, and free trade. It was a great plan.    
I still look at it and think somebody should get it done at some point. Mark used 
to tell me he would do it himself in case I wouldn’t. Anyway, I worked on that 
project for some time, until Mark had to retire for health reasons.  
I got a bit stuck after that, so I turned to my other supervisor, Uskali Mäki, 
and visited Helsinki for the first time. I started reading everything I could on 
models and scientific representation, and revised my plan again. The new 
project focused on how models in economics can be, and are used (and 
misused) for policy purposes. There are probably many interesting aspects yet 
 ii 
to be analysed about how scientific representation in the social sciences affects 
and is affected by the policy-making process, but in retrospect I think I was 
simply unprepared to give that project the treatment it deserved. Most of the 
literature on modelling and the people working on it at the time were focused 
on the epistemic virtues of models, and on whether and how they represent real 
or ideal targets. I wrote two chapters trying to connect that literature with 
notions like ‘policy relevance’ and ‘effectiveness’. They did not make it to the 
final cut. 
Then Julian Reiss arrived to teach at Rotterdam and with him the knowledge 
and motivation that got me writing the fourth and final version of my 
dissertation. The philosophical analysis of causality and causal inference       
was (not surprisingly) the missing link for my project to start making sense. 
The issue was how the findings of scientific economics can be used for 
supporting and achieving effective policy, and more generally how science     
and policy connect. As I became more familiar with the literature on causality, 
it seemed obvious that the policy-making process essentially consists in making 
use of knowledge about causal influences, causal structures, and causal 
inference, with the aim of affecting socioeconomic reality in specific ways.   
Thus the key was to analyse those notions in relation to policy. Whether 
causality is “the cement of the universe” might still be an open metaphysical 
question, yet it definitely turned out to be the cement of my project. Causality 
and causal inference play a role in policy-making that is methodologically 
distinct in a number of meaningful respects from their typical role in scientific 
practice. My whole thesis argues for this, so I won’t say more here. 
The final outcome is narrow, fairly specific, and utterly preliminary in 
several respects. Moreover, my illustrations are limited to a couple of case 
studies, each of which could provide, in my view, enough philosophically 
intriguing material to be developed into whole dissertations of their own.              
I am aware that such an outcome is the kind of highly focused analysis that is 
commonly expected in a PhD dissertation, still seeing how little my manuscript 
actually manages to uncover about such noteworthy and intricate topic is what 
inevitably makes me feel unsatisfied. In my view, this thesis mostly points 
towards what I believe to be the right account of the methodology of economic 
policy-making. Hopefully, I will have more opportunities to continue analysing 
the topic and to help promote it further for discussion at the philosophical and 
methodological arenas. 
 
§ 
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As the preceding remarks should make clear, Mark Blaug, Uskali Mäki, and 
Julian Reiss are the primary individuals that should be held responsible for     
my writing this PhD. Mark was not only the most amazing mentor anyone        
can ever wish for, but also the main reason why I came to EIPE in the first place. 
No matter how harsh he was when commenting on my ideas, he always 
managed to make me feel excited about thinking harder and about the whole 
business of doing academic research. I sat three years in a row in his history of 
economics seminar just out of pure pleasure (the very last three years he ever 
held it). Now that I come to think of it, I don’t entirely understand why he 
tolerated me and my endless babbling so gracefully and patiently. I am glad        
I had the chance to tell him in person how grateful I am to him. 
From Uskali, I have learnt not only about philosophy but also about all sorts 
of potentially relevant stuff for life. I am sure I fell short of his radically high 
standards of clarity and precision in all I have written, yet thanks to his critical 
eye and feedback, I have ended up at least being able to say what I mean clearly 
enough to get a PhD. Much more important to me than all the philosophical 
discussions, knowledge, skills, and generous support for research funding, 
which Uskali has selflessly shared with me, is the fact that throughout the years 
he has made me feel like part of his family—an extended academic family, that 
is. He knows very well how thankful I am for all he has done for me. 
I have experienced something similar with Julian. I value his guidance,        
his care for my project, all the discussions about philosophy, economics (and 
science in general), his seminars, the reading groups, workshops, and so on.  
But what I really value the most is that rather than merely becoming another 
supervisor, he became (probably entirely against his better judgement) more of 
a good friend to me. Crucial parts of my dissertation were discussed, revised, 
and probably even written during the many after-jazz-concert sessions we had 
at the old Lantaren-Venster and other music venues. The huge intellectual debt 
I have to Julian should be perfectly recognizable to anyone who reads my 
monograph and knows his work.  
The influence of these three guys on my thinking has been so significant at 
so many levels that, contrary to traditional academic disclaimers, I would feel 
quite tempted to say that most of the remaining mistakes in my dissertation 
might very well be theirs. 
In addition to my supervisors, Caterina Marchionni is the person who has 
helped me the most with developing and finishing this project. She has read 
carefully and repeatedly all of my chapters. She probably knows many, if not 
all, of my arguments by heart. On top of that, she often attended seminars and 
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conference sessions in which I would present different versions of my work.     
It felt almost as if she kept giving me a chance over and over again just hoping 
to be positively surprised one day. I know I have not yet managed to impress 
her, but I definitely cannot imagine finishing this thesis, or even being                    
a philosopher, without her continuous unconditional support, trust, and 
friendship. My whole decision to move to Rotterdam would have still been 
totally worthwhile, even if it were only because there I got to meet Caterina.  
Many people have read and commented on my work or have contributed to 
the completion of this thesis in one way or another. Some of them might not 
even remember doing so, but I do. 
Frank Hindriks has contributed a great deal to my philosophical 
development, yet perhaps much more significant has been his contribution to 
my survival in the Netherlands during the first years. He kindly provided me 
with shelter whenever I faced housing problems (which curiously happened 
more than once). My first discussion ever about the existence of a Dutch soul 
was with Frank. He claimed that humans in general have no soul. He is now one 
of my best friends and, the more I know him, the more I am convinced that      
he is the very “black swan” of his own generalisation. 
Since the first day I arrived to EIPE, Jack Vromen received me with a huge 
smile and a welcoming hug. He became a sort of professional tutor to me in all 
thinkable and unthinkable academic respects. Little did he know that he was 
going to be dealing with me for so long. I appreciate very much all his advice 
and support. 
Attilia Ruzzene and François Claveau were my main partners in the studies 
of causality. Attilia is one of the most easy-going and attentive listeners I have 
ever encountered. She is incredibly sharp even (or specially) when she seems a 
bit spacey. François is like a super-athlete of intellectual activities; he can do 
whatever he wishes seemingly with no effort. I worked on an article with him 
(chapter 4 in this dissertation) and during that process I discovered that he is 
also extremely patient and tolerant. I believe he is physically unable to swear 
and perhaps even to think of a curse word. I sincerely wish I could give back   
at least a small portion of all that I have learnt from both of them. 
Clemens Hirsch was my PhD brother. Among many other things, we shared 
the taste for Herzog’s films. We use to speculate that Herzog’s book on the 
making of Fitzcarraldo could be interpreted as describing the writing a PhD 
dissertation. In fact, in one of our most pessimistic moments, we thought that 
the title of that book, Conquest of the useless, would be perfect for a PhD thesis. 
Well, I did it! I finalised my conquest, dude! 
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Ana Bobinac is my soulmate from another life. She is also one of the best 
economists that I know in person. She introduced me to the highly policy-
oriented area of health economics, and when she was not spending time 
indiscriminately smiling around or rolling her eyes up, she shared with me          
a lot of useful insights about economics and her well-grounded understanding 
of economists’ practices in relation to policy-making.  
Jaakko Kuorikoski and Aki Lehtinen are my current colleagues in Helsinki, 
yet I know them and have been inspired by their work almost since I started 
thinking of my thesis. They have become really close (and, contrary to all 
expectations, rather talkative) friends of mine. One of my personal projects       
is to manage to surprise them one day with some pretty cool philosophical    
idea that they had not thought of already. 
More people who have directly contributed to my dissertation or to make 
my life in Rotterdam and Helsinki a fascinating and joyful experience are Kwela 
Hermanns, Paolo Palamiti, Mary Robertson, Anil Divarci, Joshua Graehl (there is 
only one TooL!), Daniel Vargas, Tyler DesRoches, Sine Bagatur, Pedro José Llosa 
(truly one of my masters of life and also one of the very best writers I know), 
Melissa Vergara (my Colombian sister!), Gerdien van Eersel, Johanna Thoma, 
René Lazcano, Tom Wells, Julie D’Hondt (she housed me and helped me out 
many times during the first years), Menno Rol (he kindly wrote the extremely 
indispensable summary in Dutch that can be found at the end of this book), 
Viktoria Edlund and Martin Skullerud (they housed me for two splendid seasons 
in Oslo), Till Düppe, Alessandro Lanteri, Job Daemen, Georgios Papadopoulos, 
Emrah Aydınonat, Michiru Nagatsu, Marion Godman, Alessandra Basso,    
Samuli Pöyhönen, Emilia Westlin (to you not only thanks, but also sorry for    
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Hakli, Rogier De Langhe, Arthur van der Laan, Ticia Herold (she was always        
so kind that I thought she was in love with me), Fred Muller, Frans Schaeffer, 
Tim de Mey, Conrad Heilmann, Constanze Binder, María Jiménez Buedo, David 
Teira Serrano, Jesús Zamora Bonilla, Federica Russo, Gustavo Marqués (and all 
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CHAPTER 1 
TOWARDS A METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING: 
THE POSITIVE-NORMATIVE DISTINCTION RECONSIDERED 
 
Until very recently, philosophy of economics had little to say about the 
particular practices and methodology involved in the process of policy making. 
Admittedly, there is a large amount of philosophical literature studying the 
scientific standards of economics indirectly motivated by policy issues or by 
the idea that policy should be based on “reliable” scientific knowledge. 
Likewise, there is a vast literature on how to evaluate whether concrete public 
goals are “desirable” for society, and on the development of methods for 
measuring and aggregating social preferences and wellbeing. So the words 
“policy” and “practical relevance” actually appear in numerous investigations 
in philosophy of economics (though sometimes only in the title, abstract, or 
concluding remarks of the texts). Still, few studies engage with a detailed 
philosophical analysis of these notions or with specific methodological aspects 
of how economic science is, can, and should be used for the achievement of 
concrete policy goals. 
The relative deficiency of methodological research on the process of 
economic policy making has been already pointed out by a few authors. David 
Colander has commented extensively on this problem (see Colander 2001; and 
2010) and argued that methodologists do not focus on the process of policy 
making because they have inherited a theory-biased attitude currently 
dominating the economics discipline as a whole.1 To Roger Backhouse, the issue 
actually “presents methodologists with an opportunity”, since they “might be 
able to help bridge this gap through helping economists understand better the 
processes whereby economic ideas are applied to policy” (Backhouse 2004, 
188). 
The lack of research on the processes whereby economic ideas are applied 
to policy, or what I refer here as the methodology of economic policy making, 
can be partially explained by the fact that philosophers of economics have 
implicitly accepted a standard understanding of the positive-normative 
dichotomy when developing their research agendas. There is no consensus 
among philosophers or economists on the precise meaning or significance of 
                                            
1 Colander is a noteworthy and exceptional case, since he has been urging for and working on 
developing a methodology of economic policy making—or what he calls ‘the lost art of 
economics’—for about 20 years already (see, e.g., Colander 1992; and Colander 1994). I will 
comment on Colander’s approach below. 
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this dichotomy. Quite the opposite, debates about the positive or normative 
nature of economics are rather unsettled (see, e.g., Blaug 1992, chapter 5; 
Dasgupta 2005; Hausman and McPherson 2006; Kincaid, et al. 2007; Douglas 
2009; Hands 2009; Putnam and Walsh 2011). But regardless of the ongoing 
disputes, the focus of authors interested in philosophy of economics shows a 
clear segregation onto two general areas of research along the lines of the 
positive-normative dichotomy. 
Broadly put, during the more or less 30 years of philosophy of economics 
as a self-standing field, there is, on the one hand, a branch including authors 
mainly interested in the methodology and epistemology of economic science 
(or of ‘positive economics’, even if probably no author would be keen to use 
that label anymore). This research focuses on topics such as, the nature of 
economics, the scope and methods of the science, problems of theory appraisal, 
representational relations between abstract economic theory and reality, the 
nature and types of economic modelling, the methods of causal inference that 
are proper to economics, the nature of economic explanations, and so forth. On 
the other hand, there is another branch in philosophy of economics that 
includes authors mainly interested in moral and political philosophy, and who 
would often explicitly label most of the topics they deal with as part of 
‘normative economics’, e.g., topics such as justice, welfare, equality, income 
distribution, poverty, and other economic issues with a significant bearing on 
ethical concerns.  
As historians of economics know well, the modern positive-normative 
distinction is the outcome of a corrupted interpretation of what was originally 
intended as a threefold distinction: scientific economics, “normative” 
economics, and the “art” of economic policy making (see, e.g., Mill 1844 [1830]; 
Keynes 1917 [1890]; Machlup 1978; Colander 1994). This threefold distinction 
was based on three different aims of research, namely 1) to find and establish 
scientific laws, 2) to evaluate the desirability of socio-economic goals, and 3) to 
help bring about concrete economic outcomes in the real world. During the 20th 
century, accounts of the distinction switched from a methodological discussion 
about different forms of enquiry to a debate about whether there could be pure 
statements of fact and whether scientific knowledge could be value-free. In 
particular, after Milton Friedman’s (1953) essay on the methodology of positive 
economics, the evaluation of the desirability of goals and the policy making 
were conflated into a single branch and labelled “normative economics”, so that 
these two branches could be more easily contrasted as a whole with the 
distinctive features of scientific “positive economics” (Friedman 1953, 4). The 
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positive-normative distinction has since then been commonly presented as a 
dichotomy between a positive branch of economics dealing with value-free 
(objective) factual statements and a normative branch studying value-laden 
(subjective) practical judgments. 
Without attempting to resolve all open issues in the current debates over 
the positive-normative distinction, in what follows, I revise the history of the 
distinction to single out a few aspects that are relevant to understanding why 
economic policy making is not generally recognised as a distinct branch of 
economic enquiry. In addition, the interpretation of the distinction that I put 
forward in this chapter highlights some of the potential topics of research 
towards a well-developed methodology of economic policy making.  
In section 1.1, I present the standard version of the positive-normative 
distinction commonly held by economists and identify three of its main 
shortcomings. In section 1.2, I introduce some key elements of the classical 
threefold version of the distinction that have been chronically ignored, and 
which I will subsequently use as the basis for my proposal. In section 1.3, I 
comment on the problem of trying to characterise statements according to the 
standard version of the positive-normative distinction. In section 1.4, I argue 
that endorsing an interpretation in line with the classical threefold distinction 
makes clear which elements of the process of economic policy making have 
remained unexplored from the philosophical and methodological perspectives. 
In section 1.5, I briefly revise David Colander’s suggestions for a “methodology” 
of economic policy making. And finally, as an illustration, in section 1.6, I 
present a study in the methodology of economic policy making, which I argue 
arrives at some mistaken conclusions precisely as a consequence of confusing 
the branch of scientific economics with that of economic policy making. 
 
1.1. THE STANDARD VERSION OF THE DICHOTOMY 
The standard interpretation of the distinction between positive and normative 
economics was made popular by Milton Friedman in his 1953 article on “the 
methodology of positive economics”. Most of Friedman’s essay is devoted to 
discuss the “methodological problems that arise in constructing the ‘distinct 
positive science’ [of economics]” (Friedman 1953, 3). But first, to make clear the 
difference with non-positive issues, in the initial pages he offers “a few remarks 
about the relation between positive and normative economics” (p. 3). 
The key distinction in Friedman’s account is about types of statements. 
Accordingly, positive statements are said to have two fundamental 
characteristics: first, they can be appraised “objectively”, which to Friedman 
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means that they are “to be accepted or rejected on the basis of empirical 
evidence” (p. 6); and second, they can be “in principle independent of any 
particular ethical position or normative judgements” (p. 4), which is usually 
interpreted as their being value-free. Once positive statements are characterised 
in this way, then by elimination any statement which could not be evaluated 
empirically or independently of value judgements is to be classified as 
normative.  
Establishing a strict dichotomy between two types of statements allows 
Friedman to distinguish then between, on the one hand, positive economics 
devoted to investigating the economic world “as it is” by formulating and 
testing positive statements; and on the other hand, normative economics 
concerned with investigating non-positive claims, or as he puts it, “questions of 
what ought to be done and how any given goal can be attained” (p. 4), which are 
taken as value-laden claims which allegedly cannot be empirically investigated.  
Notice that Friedman here puts together into the normative branch both 
“questions of what ought to be done”, i.e., evaluation of goals, and questions of 
“how any given goal can be attained”, i.e., evaluation of means. This point is 
important because commentators (concerned with other aspects of the essay) 
tend to take for granted that in Friedman’s view policy-related statements are 
supposed to (or can) be part of positive economics in as much as they can be 
empirically supported. The fact is that when one considers Friedman’s 
definitions, he explicitly keeps questions about policy making out of the 
positive branch, most likely because they are commonly not independent of 
value judgements in the way he intended. Yet the main idea he wants to convey 
is that all prescriptive and all policy making issues are ultimately dependent 
upon to the positive science: 
 
Normative economics and the art of economics […] cannot be independent 
of positive economics. Any policy conclusion necessarily rests on a 
prediction about the consequences of doing one thing rather than another, 
a prediction that must be based—implicitly or explicitly—on positive 
economics (Friedman 1953, 5). 
 
Thus “policy conclusions” from the art of economics rest upon the positive 
science, but they are not part of it. Admittedly, at the end of the day it is rather 
unclear, in Friedman’s essay taken as a whole, whether statements about how 
goals can best be attained—such as policy recommendations—should be 
understood as having a positive or a normative status (this issue will be 
discussed in more detail below in section 3). For the purposes of this chapter it 
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should suffice that, at least in principle, Friedman thought of policy making as 
being part of what he labelled ‘normative economics’. This interpretation 
explains, for instance, why he offers the following proviso: “There is not, of 
course, a one-to-one relation between policy conclusions and the conclusions 
of positive economics; if there were, there would be no separate normative 
science” (Friedman 1953, 5). Why would he offer this clear qualification if he 
thinks that policy conclusions are part of positive economics? 
It can still be argued that given the specific purposes of Friedman’s 
methodological essay, the conflation of ethical and policy issues into the 
“normative” branch of economics might not be highly problematic. After all, his 
explicit goal is to analyse the methodological aspects of the positive branch of 
economics. However, his interpretation of the distinction as a dichotomy has 
permeated without misgivings into the discussions of virtually all later 
commentators. After Friedman’s influential essay, the common way of 
understanding the distinction has been to take positive economics as dealing 
with objective (descriptive) factual statements, and normative economics as 
dealing with (prescriptive) statements involving value judgements, but with no 
straightforward account about where exactly policy-making issues are 
supposed to be located. 
Friedman’s presentation of the distinction can be especially problematic if 
taken as a categorical and rigorous distinction between economic statements 
referring to phenomena of a different nature. Without proper qualifications, the 
standard interpretation of the distinction could suggest a strict dichotomy 
between the realm of facts and the realm of values (see Blaug 1992, 112-114).  
Unfortunately, it is precisely a bold and unqualified version of Friedman’s 
distinction that has become the standard version spread among the economics 
profession as the core of the debates after the 1950s (see Hands 2009). 
Textbooks of economics certainly present the distinction in a standard and 
unqualified way (see, e.g., Samuelson and Nordhaus 1989, 9, 12; Begg, et al. 
1994, 11; Baumol and Blinder 1997, 2, 16; Mankiw 1998, 26, 32; Parkin 2000, 
12-13; Taylor 2003, 36). Not surprisingly, it is also the ruthlessly polarised 
version of the dichotomy that is usually attacked and rejected by critics of the 
distinction (e.g., Putnam 2002; Kincaid, et al. 2007; Putnam and Walsh 2011). 
There are at least three aspects of the standard interpretation of the 
positive-normative distinction that are problematic:  
1) It suggests a dichotomy between the scientific and ethical branches of 
economics, leaving no distinctive place for the specific methods and practices 
related to the endeavour of economic policy making. Yet, as I will argue, the 
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process of policy making deserves separate methodological consideration. A 
reinstatement of some essential features of the classical threefold distinction 
can contribute to a more accurate understanding of the peculiarities of 
economic policy making.  
2) It implicitly conflates different pairs of “opposite” notions, namely 
positive/normative, objective/subjective, value-free/value-laden, descriptive/ 
prescriptive, as if they could serve as unequivocal criteria for demarcating 
between the realm of facts and the realm of values. Yet, as will be clarified 
below, there is no clear way of achieving a definite twofold distinction on the 
basis of such criteria. 
3) It presupposes that a demarcation about types of statements is necessary 
as an essential foundation for a meaningful typology of distinct economic 
endeavours. As I will argue, a distinction among different types of enquiries 
requires neither a definite distinction of types of statements nor a strict 
distinction between the realms of facts and values. Positive economics, 
normative economics, and economic policy making are distinct endeavours 
mainly because of their aims and uses of evidential support are different.2 I will 
elaborate on these three (related) issues respectively in the following three 
sections. 
 
1.2. THE CLASSICAL THREEFOLD DISTINCTION 
The origins of the positive-normative distinction in economics can be traced 
back to the notions of ‘science’ and ‘art’ that were widely in vogue among 
classical economists since the beginning of the 19th century. John Stuart Mill 
in particular presented the difference between these notions in the following 
terms: 
 
Science is a collection of truths; art a body of rules, or directions for conduct. 
The language of science is, This is, or, This is not; This does, or does not, 
happen. The language of art is, Do this; Avoid that. Science takes cognizance 
of a phenomenon, and endeavours to discover its law; art proposes to itself 
an end, and looks out for sneaks to effect it (Mill 1844 [1830], 88-89; 
emphasis in the original). 
 
                                            
2 Admittedly, it might be the case that distinct types of aims somewhat relate to distinctive 
linguistic presentations. Statements could certainly be typified in various ways, for instance, 
according to their logical form. An example of this is Fritz Machlup’s characterisation of 
statements, to be commented below (see section 1.3). My argument in relation to this point is 
simply that a distinction of different branches of economics need not (and should not) be based 
primarily on a typology of statements, but rather on their different aims and the procedures 
proper to such aims. 
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Mill’s characterisation of science and art is based on two different types of 
aims: 1) investigating “truths” about phenomena, and 2) putting forward “rules” 
or “directions for conduct”. Mill uses the expressions “language of science” and 
“language of art” to illustrate an implication of the distinction, however this 
linguistic aspect is not meant as a crucial criterion—when considered in the 
context of his essay—for distinguishing between science and art. Any difference 
in the linguistic mode or in the logical form of propositions can be understood 
as a symptom (rather than a cause) of the fact that the deeds of science and the 
deeds of art are different in the first place.  
It may be the case that statements of science (axioms, premises, hypotheses, 
conclusions, and the like) are commonly presented in the indicative mode (e.g., 
“A is a B”), while statements of the art (prescriptions, advice, rules of conduct, 
and the like) are frequently presented in the imperative mode (e.g., “C should 
be D”). Since the aim of science has to do with discovering and describing 
phenomena, then no wonder that the indicative mode turns out to be 
(pragmatically) well suited to expressing its assertions. And since the aim of art 
has to do with prescribing rules of action, then it is also no surprise that the 
imperative mode is often used to express such rules. Yet these linguistic uses 
are contingent consequences of the difference in aims.  
As I will argue further below, the linguistic form of propositions cannot 
alone determine what belongs to science and what to art. For now, the 
underlying idea to be taken and reconsidered from Mill and the classics is that 
describing “the laws” of phenomena is a fairly distinct endeavour from 
prescribing which practical ends to pursue and how to attain them. And aiming 
at different goals suggests the need of using different procedures. 
A reading of the distinction on the basis of distinct aims is somewhat 
reinforced when Mill describes science and art in relation to causes and effects. 
To Mill a science is mainly concerned with the study and classification of causes, 
whereas an art is concerned with the classification and production of effects 
(Mill 1844 [1830], 117-118, n11). Hence, the goal of science is to uncover and 
describe “the laws” of the causes of phenomena, and the conditions under 
which such causes operate. Whereas the goal of art is to propose which effects 
should be attained, and to delineate precepts for action to achieve them. 
Once more, the account so far is well known by historians of economics. But 
there is an essential aspect that usually eludes most commentators of Mill’s 
account. After distinguishing between science and art in general, Mill makes a 
further distinction between two kinds of art which in turn have different aims 
(Mill 1874 [1843], 6.12.2). Being types of art, both are prescriptive and both are 
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concerned with the study of effects, yet both focus on effects from entirely 
different perspectives. 
Following Mill (1844 [1830], 95; 1874 [1843], 6.12.2), on the one hand, there 
is a type of art whose main goal is to define ends and evaluate their desirability 
(which commonly, but not necessarily, involves a strong reliance on ethical or 
moral considerations). Let us call this: Mill’s art of setting goals. On the other 
hand, there is an art whose main aim is to define “maxims of policy” for 
bringing about given desired effects based upon the causal knowledge obtained 
from one (or many) of the sciences. Let us call this: Mill’s art of determining 
means. The first type of art is concerned with defining and choosing a practical 
end to go after, whereas the second type of art deals with how a particular end 
could best be achieved or brought about in reality (in a concrete context) given 
the knowledge one possesses about its causes and the relevant background 
characteristics of the target situation. 
A crucial difference between the art of setting goals and the art of 
determining means is thus that the former is based for the most part on some 
form of assessment of reasons (including non-empirical reasons) about which 
end should be followed, whereas the latter is based on an inquiry into which 
means are the most effective in producing a given end, and its results can in 
principle be entirely grounded on empirical evidence. But then, one may ask 
here, if the art of determining means can be based on empirical (causal) 
knowledge, then how is it different from the science? Is it not the aim of science 
to investigate causal relations precisely in order to find out what works and 
what does not for the production of intended effects?  
I will elaborate on the differences in more detail below, but the essential 
contrast between Mill’s ‘science’ and ‘the art of determining means’ can be 
broadly put as follows: to find out what are the causes of phenomena, science 
requires methods of causal inference that trace in isolation one cause to its 
effects, e.g., Mill’s “methods of experimental inquiry” (see Mill 1874 [1843], 3.8); 
whereas to bring about concrete desired effects, the art of determining means 
“traces one effect to its multiplied and diversified causes and conditions”, and 
thus requires a more pluralistic methodology, one that “brings together from 
parts of the field of science most remote from one another the truths relating 
to the production of the different and heterogeneous conditions necessary to 
each [desired] effect” (Mill 1874 [1843], 6.12.5). To analyse and understand a 
causal relation in isolation (in science) is a different aim, and requires different 
procedures, from tracing all the causes and heterogeneous conditions (in the 
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art of determining means) that are relevant for bringing about a desired effect 
in a concrete situation.  
In general, no strict distinction between facts and values is required 
whatsoever for Mill’s account to hold. The basic demarcation is entirely 
methodological: three different purposes—either discovering causes, or setting 
desirable goals, or finding effective means for producing concrete desired 
effects—require distinct procedures and distinct appraisal criteria. 
In 1890, John Neville Keynes published The scope and method of political 
economy. In addition to its many merits, Keynes’s book offers a clear 
illustration of how common Mill’s understanding of the three kinds of 
enquiries—science, the art of setting aims, and the art of determining means—
was among economists up to the turn of the century. 
Keynes’s version of the distinction is essentially a rephrasing of the classical 
interpretation. Still, he can be credited with the first straightforward exposition 
of the distinction as an explicit characterisation of economics into three distinct 
types of research that he labelled: ‘positive economics’, ‘normative economics’, 
and ‘the art of economics’, which in effect map on Mill’s notions of ‘science’, 
‘the art of setting goals’, and ‘the art of practice’. 
Firstly, a positive discipline in general “may be defined as a body of 
systematized knowledge concerning what is” (Keynes 1917 [1890], 34). The aim 
of such a positive science “is the establishment of uniformities” (p. 35), such as 
“the law of supply and demand, the Ricardian law of rent, Gresham’s law, and 
the like” (p. 36n). The positive branch of economics is then concerned with the 
theoretical development of economic knowledge and such a development 
consists in formulating theoretical hypotheses, “theorems of pure reason”, and 
claims about economic causal relations. Accordingly, the traditional scientific 
activities of postulating, testing, revising, or refuting causal claims are all part 
of positive economics. 
Secondly, a normative discipline could be defined “as a body of 
systematized knowledge relating to criteria of what ought to be, and concerned 
therefore with the ideal as distinguished from the actual” (pp. 34-35). In 
Keynes’s terms, the aim of a normative enquiry is “the determination of ideals” 
(p. 35). Normative economics is then concerned with the ways of determining 
ideal economic goals, for which the main grounds of evaluation are moral 
precepts. Ethical judgements in normative economics consist in the evaluation 
of the social merit (or desirability) of particular economic effects, for instance: 
deciding whether inflation and unemployment are good or bad for society, or 
whether the consequences of the free trade of a particular commodity are 
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desirable or not, or deciding which group within a society deserves to be, or 
should not be, affected by a particular tax policy (see Keynes 1917 [1890], 32-
33).  
Finally, the art of economics can be defined “as a system of rules for the 
attainment of a given end” (p. 35). The art is also ‘normative’ in so far as it aims 
at prescribing rules for action. However, as an endeavour, the art aims at “the 
determination of maxims or precepts by obedience to which given ends may be 
best attained” (p. 32). Hence, the standards for evaluation in the art of 
economics are instrumental (rather than ethical). Practical recommendations 
are to be evaluated in terms of the effectiveness of specific practical strategies 
with regard to the production of concrete (already defined and agreed upon) 
desired effects. From the point of view of the art of economics, the ethical 
evaluation of practical ends is taken as a given, and the focus is on the 
evaluation of the effectiveness of a specific means to achieve a given end.3 
 
1.3. ON THE CRITERIA OF DEMARCATION IN THE STANDARD APPROACH 
As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, by the 1950s economics 
textbooks were already oblivious of the classical threefold distinction and of its 
original interpretation. Moreover, during the second part of the 20th century, 
the modern positive-normative dichotomy based on a distinction between types 
of statements became entangled with other alleged strict dichotomies such as: 
is/ought, facts/values, objective/subjective, descriptive/prescriptive (see Blaug 
1992, chapter 5; Hands 2009). The conflation among all these notions in the 
standard positive-normative distinction has made obscure the original meaning 
and intention of the distinction in its classical threefold version. As I will argue 
in this section, a careless mixing up of these notions has strongly contributed 
to shaping the views not only of the endorsers of the standard version of the 
dichotomy, but also of the detractors of any positive-normative distinction. 
Hume’s guillotine, that is, “the principle that only factual statements can 
follow from exclusively factual statements” (Black 1970, 24), was originally 
coined by philosopher Max Black as a warning in logic against deducing 
nonfactual statements—connected by ‘ought’ or ‘ought not’—from premises 
containing only statements about facts—connected by ‘is’ or ‘is not’.  
                                            
3 The notion of ‘effectiveness’ is a key and distinctive aspect in the art of economic policy 
making. It is also one of the central concepts studied in the present dissertation. I explore its 
definition in chapter 2, yet all of the remainder chapters can be considered as different attempts 
at characterising and illustrating the forms and conditions of effectiveness. 
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The principle is clearly a restatement of David Hume’s observation that one 
should be cautious to not infer “ought” from “is” (see Hume 1975a [1739], 
III.1.i). The image of a guillotine serves well to illustrate a severe logical slash 
between factual and non-factual statements, meaning that no ‘ought’ statement 
can logically follow only from ‘is’ statements (see Black 1964). However, the 
principle has hitherto received many different interpretations that go far 
beyond the formal distinction between normative and factual statements in 
logic.4 
As Mark Blaug has pointed out, in economics the distinction between 
positive and normative has been often tied to Hume’s guillotine “implying as it 
does a watertight logical distinction between the realm of facts and the realm 
of values” (Blaug 1992, 113). In Blaug’s view, the positive-normative distinction 
coupled with the is-ought strict divide has been further conflated with the 
following pairs of “antonyms” and used as the typical list of criteria to decide 
whether a proposition is either positive or normative:5 
 
========================= 
positive normative 
is  ought 
facts  values 
objective subjective 
descriptive prescriptive 
true/false good/bad 
========================= 
 
According to this interpretation, a statement is positive if it is about “what 
is”, refers to facts, is objective, is descriptive, and can be true or false. Whereas 
a statement is normative if it is about “what ought to be”, refers to values, is 
subjective, is prescriptive, and cannot be given a truth value on empirical 
grounds, but rather can only be assessed on the basis of ethical reasons (see 
Blaug 1992, 112-113).6 The problem with this understanding of the distinction 
                                            
4 The is-ought divide (or Hume’s guillotine) can be connected to—and it is sometimes mistakenly 
referred to as—Hume’s fork. However, the two notions refer to quite different distinctions 
motivated by Hume’s ideas. While the guillotine refers to the problem of deducing ‘ought’ from 
‘is’, Hume’s fork refers to a distinction between “Relations of Ideas” and “Matters of Fact” (see 
Hume 1975b [1777], IV.1): statements about ideas are analytic, necessary, and can be known a 
priori of any experience; while statements of fact are synthetic, contingent, and can only be 
known a posteriori. 
5 The following list describing antonyms related to the positive-normative distinction and 
Hume’s guillotine is taken from Blaug 1992, 113. 
6 Blaug’s account is not meant as a position that is explicitly held among economists. He simply 
suggests that when economists defend the positive-normative distinction as a strict dichotomy 
between statements of facts and statements of value, they usually employ one or several of 
these pairs of antonyms as the demarcation criteria (see Blaug 1992, chapter 5). 
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is that there is no unambiguous way of characterising statements as purely 
positive or purely normative using the pairs of antonyms above as criteria of 
demarcation.  
To see this, take the following generic propositions about relations between 
events A and B, as presented by Fritz Machlup (1978, 430): 
 
Positive: If A, then B; 
that is, B is the effect of cause A. 
 
Normative: B is good; 
that is, you ought to get (strive for) B. 
 
It is not difficult to find apparently uncomplicated instances of these 
generic propositions, take for example: 
 
Positive: Taxing a commodity causes a reduction in its 
consumption. 
 
Normative: Smoking is bad for society, and should be avoided. 
 
The first proposition ‘Taxing a commodity causes a reduction in its 
consumption’ is an example of what most economists would take as a positive 
statement. The claim posits that there is a causal relation, and thus it allegedly 
refers to a matter of fact, it is descriptive, it can be true or false, but perhaps 
more importantly: to be positive it should be objective and value-free in 
Friedman’s sense. Is this really the case? 
Recall that according to Friedman, the two requirements for a statement to 
be positive are: A) that they can be evaluated on empirical grounds, and B) that 
they can be assessed independently of any value judgement (see Friedman 
1953, 4-6). In the example at hand, whether it is true that ‘taxing a commodity 
causes a reduction in its consumption’ can indeed be decided on the basis of 
empirical evidence (e.g., on the basis of historical data, natural experiments, 
statistical studies, case studies, expert opinion, and so on). Of course, the 
conventions upon which the available empirical evidence is interpreted as 
adequate and decisive for supporting the validity of a scientific statement are 
inescapably based on value judgments of sorts.  
Richard Rudner’s (1953) original version of this argument goes as follows: 
whenever the truth of a scientific hypothesis is to be evaluated on the basis of 
empirical evidence, a subjective judgement has to be made about how much 
evidence is proper and sufficient for accepting or refuting the hypothesis. Since 
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there is no such thing as absolute certainty, there is no way of setting an 
ultimate evidential benchmark for the empirical appraisal of any posited 
hypothesis. Still in practice scientists “as scientists” do accept and reject 
hypotheses after considering the available empirical evidence. Thus, whenever 
a scientist decides that a certain amount of evidence is enough to establish the 
truth of a hypothesis, such decision is not based on empirical grounds, but it is 
the result of a subjective evaluation. This in turn could be an evaluation at least 
indirectly founded on ethical considerations, e.g., considerations about how 
bad the consequences of an erroneous appraisal of the posited hypothesis 
could be (see Rudner 1953; Sen 1981; Dasgupta 2005; Douglas 2009).  
According to Rudner’s argument, then, the notions of objective/subjective 
as a demarcation criterion for statements do not necessarily coincide with a 
demarcation based upon the notions of value-free/value-laden. In Friedman’s 
version of the distinction positive statements must be ‘objective’, meaning 
empirically grounded; but they also must be value-free. However, if Rudner is 
correct, value considerations are inescapable in the empirical evaluation of 
scientific (positive) hypotheses. And hence it would seem that the set of 
scientific statements satisfying Friedman’s positive standards strictly 
understood would be empty.7  
Consider now the proposition ‘Smoking is bad for society’. As presented 
above (and according to Friedman’s criteria) this is a normative statement. It is 
a claim about the “desirability” of smoking (i.e., whether it is good or bad) for 
society, and accordingly it is to be founded explicitly on certain value 
considerations, it is subjective in as much as the reasons behind the judgement 
are not only empirical (e.g., reasons determining what “bad for society” means), 
and it is also prescriptive given that undesirable ends are to be avoided. But can 
these features be taken as consistent and definite criteria for normative 
statements?  
Without going too deep into the existing debates on how different theories 
of morality account for the assessment of value judgements (e.g., utilitarianism, 
Kantian ethics, virtue ethics, and the like),8 there is one particular issue 
                                            
7 It can be argued that Friedman’s (1953) standards for positive statements actually leave 
enough room for subjective judgement (see Mäki 1986, 132-136; and Mäki 2009, 109-112). In 
this section I intend to illustrate an (admittedly) extreme position in which the criteria for 
positive statements include that they be entirely independent of value judgements, which is 
precisely the type of extreme belief or hope that Rudner’s argument was intending to refute. 
For a much more balanced and refined position on the interactions between scientific empirical 
standards and values, see Koertge 2000. 
8 In this chapter I am taking for granted that there is no substantive theory of morality that can 
offer an unambiguous appraisal of all ethical propositions. There seem to be qualms and 
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concerning the standard characterisation of normative statements on which I 
will focus here: It is not at all clear that the ethical appraisal of so-called 
normative claims such as ‘Smoking is bad for society’ is (or can be) done 
independently of any empirical consideration. Even if the appraisal of the claim 
is to be mainly grounded on ethical reasons or morals norms, there is some 
“factual” information about smoking that is included into the social assessment 
of the desirability of smoking. For instance, claims such as ‘smoking causes 
cancer’, ‘smoking causes coughing’, ‘smoking causes stained teeth’, ‘smoking 
affects the health of smokers and non-smokers in such and such way’, and so 
on and so forth, which are all empirically testable claims. 
Deliberations about whether an economic outcome is desirable for society 
usually consist of an evaluation of the reasons presented in support the posited 
end. These reasons could be non-empirical, e.g., based on mystical, or 
traditional, or irrational beliefs, yet especially in relation to social ends 
commonly some empirical reasons take part into the evaluation of the 
desirability of ends. That unemployment is not desirable for society is not only 
justified by arguing that it generates evil and suffering to society, but by 
offering reasons referring to empirical facts and causal implications of 
unemployment. That education is good for society is only true given a certain 
set of reasons, which may range from non-empirical claims such as ‘education 
enriches the human soul’ to empirical ones such as ‘education increases 
economic income’. 
I do not mean to claim here that the evaluation of normative statements 
necessarily implies or requires empirical considerations. I am just making the 
weaker suggestion that—especially in relation to socioeconomic ends—many 
value judgements are inferentially connected with (implicit or explicit) 
empirical claims. In this sense, supporting or rejecting value propositions often 
commits one to a certain stance about other propositions which can be 
empirical (see Brandom 2007; Peregrin 2012). Understood in this way, 
normative statements in economics can be, and often are, not only ethically but 
also empirically grounded. Differently put: empirical considerations can be, and 
are often, included among the reasons given to support the desirability a 
posited social outcome. 
                                            
counterexamples affecting all existing proposals (see Baron, et al. 1997). I also take for granted 
that any kind of value judgement is justified or supported by reasons, and thus that the method 
for appraising a value judgement (broadly conceived) consists in evaluating how “good” its 
reasons are. These ideas are essentially in line with James Rachels’s proposal of a “minimum 
conception of morality” (see Rachels 2003). 
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Indeed, the ethical evaluation of whether smoking is bad for society has 
historically been based on a huge amount of empirical research (see, e.g., Doll 
and Hill 1950; Levin, et al. 1950; Doll and Hill 1954; White 1990; Brandt 2007; 
Peto, et al. 2012). And it seems that the same has happened in most debates on 
the desirability of social outcomes traditionally discussed in economics, such 
as: unemployment, poverty, inflation, recessions, economic growth, economic 
competition, trade liberalisation, financial crises, and the like. But if normative 
statements are value-laden as well as (at least to a certain extent) empirically 
based, and positive statements are also empirically established and (to a certain 
extent) value-laden, then what exactly is the difference between positive and 
normative statements?  
One of the main points I want to make in this chapter is that there is no 
clear-cut way to base the positive-normative distinction on a strict demarcation 
about types of statements. Thus instead of trying to answer the previous 
question, I will show in the next section why I think this is an unnecessary 
question, at least from a methodological point of view. In this section, my claim 
so far is simply that positive and normative statements cannot be 
unambiguously told apart using the fact/value, the objective/subjective, or the 
value-free/value-laden dichotomies as demarcation criteria. 
The project of demarcating positive and normative statements becomes 
even more convoluted when one tries to find a place in the purported standard 
dichotomy for yet another sentential form that Machlup labels ‘instrumental’. 
In such a case, events A and B relate as follows (Machlup 1978, 430):  
 
Instrumental: If you want B, A will get it for you; 
that is, A will be the means for the end B. 
 
And thus—still following Machlup—the three kinds of statements phrased 
in terms of the same example used before would look like this: 
 
Positive: Taxing a commodity causes a reduction in its 
consumption. 
 
Normative: Smoking is bad for society, and should be avoided. 
 
Instrumental: Given that avoiding smoking is a desired goal in a society 
and given that taxing causes reductions in consumption, 
an effective way to achieve this goal is to tax the 
consumption of cigarettes. 
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Do instrumental statements of the form “If you want B, A will get it for you” 
belong to positive or to normative economics? Are they empirically or ethically 
grounded? Are they about the realm of facts or about the realm of values? 
The statement “An effective way to reduce smoking is to tax the 
consumption of cigarettes” can indeed be treated as a scientific hypothesis. As 
such, it requires evidential support in order to be accepted or refuted; therefore, 
Rudner’s argument also applies to it. Subjective evaluations are ultimately what 
determines how much evidence is enough to take the instrumental hypothesis 
as a true claim or, in other words, to trust that the recommendation is reliable. 
In this sense, the instrumental claim is not value-free. 
Are the values involved in the appraisal of instrumental claims ethical 
values? In so far as instrumental claims presuppose claims about the 
desirability of ends (e.g., that smoking is bad for society), and in so far as ethical 
values were involved in the deliberation about the desirability of the proposed 
end, then instrumental claims presuppose ethical considerations about the 
“goodness” of the intended practical end. Nevertheless, the appraisal of the 
instrumental claim need not be an ethical evaluation of the given desired end, 
but only an evaluation of the effectiveness of the proposed strategy to achieve 
the desired end. 
In as much as hypotheses refer to strategies that are to be implemented in 
(and will affect) real and concrete situations, the evidential standards for 
accepting or rejecting the claims—as Rudner also explicitly suggests—are 
dependent on the practical consequences that the posited strategies are 
expected to have for society. Thus if taxing smoking would have no expected 
disturbing effects for society apart from its intended effect on smoking, then 
the evidential standards for accepting the hypothesis could be set at a relatively 
low level (since from a subjective perspective there would not be much to lose 
if the hypothesis is mistaken). In contrast, if it is the case that there are many 
potential negative by-products that can obtain in a society after the 
implementation of the taxing policy, then the evidential standards for the 
appraisal of the hypothesis had better be high (since, again from a subjective 
perspective, there would be much more to lose if the hypothesis is mistaken). 
So an instrumental hypothesis of the form ‘If you want B, A will get it for 
you’ can be empirically tested. Supposing that B is a desired end, empirical 
evidence can be used to support the claim that A is effective for the 
achievement of B in a concrete situation. Nevertheless, values enter the process 
of evaluation as a subjective decision has to be made about which and how 
much evidence is enough to take the instrumental claim as true. Furthermore, 
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the values involved in such subjective decision can include ethical 
considerations about the practical relevance (or practical risks) related to a 
mistaken assessment of the instrumental proposition. Thus what type of 
statements instrumental statements are supposed to be? Again, there is no 
clear way to strictly classify instrumental statements as either positive or 
normative by using the criteria of the standard distinction. Instrumental 
statements are value-laden (to a certain extent), but also objective (to a certain 
extent) and empirically testable. 
To sum up, the fact/value distinction, the subjective/objective distinction, 
the descriptive/prescriptive distinction, the value-free/value-laden distinction, 
and so on, cannot properly serve as criteria for unambiguously classifying 
distinct types of statements as belonging to positive or normative economics. 
Moreover, value considerations and empirical considerations enter the 
evaluation of all sorts of hypotheses at different stages and in different ways 
depending on the particular purpose of the hypotheses. 
It is noteworthy that most attacks against the positive-normative distinction 
commonly consist in attacking (or finding counterexamples to) one or a few of 
the pairs of antonyms related to the is-ought divide (Blaug 1992, 116-118). 
Philosophical debates have especially focused on the value-free/value-laden 
dichotomy and are often phrased in terms of the possibility or impossibility of 
a value-free science (also called the value-free ideal). Then criticisms against the 
value-free ideal usually proceed by arguing that subjective or ethical 
judgements (e.g., Rudner 1953; Douglas 2009) are unavoidable elements in the 
process of establishing scientific statements, and thus that a strict fact/value 
dichotomy is simply not tenable (e.g., Putnam 2002). 
A common feature among the approaches against the positive-normative 
distinction is to argue that there are no pure value-free statements or that there 
is no definite fact/value dichotomy (see, e.g., Sen 1981; Solomon 2001; Putnam 
2002; Dasgupta 2005; Kincaid, et al. 2007; Putnam and Walsh 2011). But notice 
that the arguments I have reviewed in the course of this section are actually 
against the following two ideas: A) that it is possible to single out positive 
statements that are entirely independent from value considerations, and B) that 
ideally science should consist in investigating and establishing value-free 
empirically grounded statements. To show that A and B are false is problematic 
for a positive-normative distinction only if such distinction is to be founded on 
a strict categorisation of individual statements. 
In general, most participants in the debate presuppose that a distinction 
between positive (scientific) and normative (non-scientific) endeavours in 
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economics is necessarily dependent upon the possibility of a demarcation 
between value-free and value-laden statements. But one can also hold a view 
outside this 20th-century standard framework that tends to either support 
strict demarcations or reject any distinction that is not definite enough. For 
instance—and this is another central claim I want to make in this chapter—one 
could hold a distinction similar to the classical distinction which, as explained 
in the previous section, need not be dependent on a strict demarcation of types 
of statements or on any harsh disconnection between facts and values.  
 
1.4. A DISTINCTION ABOUT TYPES OF RESEARCH 
As noticed above, focusing on classifying statements rigorously as a basis for 
the positive-normative distinction is the wrong approach. In this section, I argue 
that one can get a better picture of economic practice by focusing on distinct 
types of research, and then on what roles all sorts of propositions play in each 
of them. The impossibility of rigorously demarcating statements as belonging 
to either the realm of facts or the realm of values need not be in conflict with 
characterising distinct types of endeavours in economics.  
My proposal amounts to restating the classical threefold distinction while 
avoiding any emphasis on a strict categorisation of statements in isolation, and 
rather focusing on particular methodological features related to each of the 
three classical kinds of endeavour, namely: establishing scientific knowledge, 
defining and setting economic goals, and designing and assessing economic 
policy prescriptions. The basic features that characterise each of these types of 
enquiry can be elucidated by asking on which basis, how, and why their 
respective posited hypotheses are investigated or—to be more specific—by 
answering the following three questions: a) What are the testing criteria for 
assessing the hypothesis under investigation given its semantic content? b) 
What is the logic of the testing methodology that conforms to such criteria? 
And c) what is the connection between the purposes of the investigation and 
the hypothesis under investigation? By looking at these features (on which I will 
elaborate below), the investigation of hypotheses in economics can be classified 
at least into three broad branches that can be labelled: ‘economic science 
development’, ‘ethical or normative economics’, and ‘economic policy making’. 
This understanding of the threefold distinction allows for the body of 
knowledge comprised in each of the branches to interact and overlap without 
getting into any big muddle. Empirical claims, subjective claims, ethical claims, 
prescriptive claims, and so on, can all occur intermingled whenever a 
hypothesis is being assessed within each of the three types of enquiry. What 
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distinguish the inquiries are the distinct aims and the use of different 
assessment criteria and methodologies. In as much as one keeps clear the 
particular purposes of each investigation, it will be clear which type of 
economic endeavour one is doing. To see this more in detail, consider again the 
three claims previously presented as an example: 
 
1. Taxing a commodity causes a reduction in its consumption. 
 
2. Smoking is bad for society, and should be avoided. 
 
3. Given that avoiding smoking is a desired aim in a society and given that 
taxing causes reductions in consumption, an effective way to achieve this 
goal is to tax the consumption of cigarettes. 
 
These propositions are three different types of hypotheses, but not in the 
standard-distinction sense, i.e., in terms of some underlying or more 
fundamental fact-value dichotomy. They are different types of hypotheses 
viewed from a methodological perspective: the content of these claims differs 
such that rather distinct criteria and testing procedures are required for their 
assessment.9 
The first proposition is about causation, the second is about the goodness 
of a social feature or outcome, and the third is about the effectiveness of a policy 
recommendation. The specifics of what they are about—even if the distinction 
need not be absolutely precise—are relevant to understand the differences in 
the research required for their evaluation. Causality, goodness, and 
effectiveness are notions that call for different assessment criteria. As a 
consequence, the methodologies for testing either a causal relation, the 
goodness of an end, or the effectiveness of a practical strategy present 
significant differences in their logic. 
A causal hypothesis states that there is a genuine causal connection (rather 
than a spurious relation) between the posited causal relata. Criteria for genuine 
causation are usually embedded in the specific account of what causation 
amounts to (e.g., regularities, probabilistic relations, counterfactuals, 
                                            
9 It might seem that I intend to trick the reader by stating on the one hand (in the previous 
section) that it is not possible to strictly and unambiguously demarcate types of statements, 
and on the other (in the present section) that there are different types of hypotheses. To be 
clear, a threefold distinction of economic endeavours is compatible with a distinction of types 
of hypotheses, as long as the criteria for classifying hypotheses have nothing to do with any 
fixed intrinsic nature of facts and values. As it will become clear, the classification of the three 
hypotheses considered here is rather pragmatic, conventional, and mutable. 
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mechanisms, manipulations),10 however the general logic involved in the 
appraisal of causal hypotheses is well captured by Mill’s methods of causal 
inference (see Mill 1874 [1843], 3.8). Broadly put, most methods of causal 
inference consist in controlling or fixing all causal factors relevant to the causal 
outcome of interest, except of the posited cause under evaluation, so as to 
shield or isolate the operation of the causal relation from all potential sources 
of disturbance. In the philosophy of economics, this method has been referred 
to as the method of isolation (see Mäki 1992a). As will be made clear in 
subsequent chapters, the general gist of the method of isolation is analogous 
to the logic of empirical methods for causal inference commonly employed in 
economics, i.e., methods that control for (as many as possible) sources of error 
to test for causality (see Reiss 2008). 
In contrast, a hypothesis of the second type states the goodness of an 
outcome and thus requires a criterion that allows for the discrimination 
between good and bad. Again, the specifics of the criterion depend on the 
particular theory of goodness that is adopted. For instance, whether good is 
what brings happiness, or good is what is compelled by moral categorical 
imperatives, or good is what is virtuous, and so on. For the purposes of this 
chapter, the methodology employed to evaluate hypotheses about the goodness 
of things can be broadly characterised as an argumentative method: a method 
in which a set of reasons are put forward in an argumentative way so that they 
are considered together to either justify or undermine the posited hypothesis 
(see Rachels 2003). Moral hypotheses can certainly be true or false (see Lynch 
2009, chapter 8), yet the logic of the argumentative method employed in their 
appraisal is nothing like the method of isolation or the inferential methods of 
controlling all potential sources of error which are used in order to assess the 
truth of causal hypotheses.  
Finally, a hypothesis of the third type states that, given a desired practical 
end, there is a strategy that is effective in order to attain it. This is the type of 
hypotheses that concerns the “art” of economic policy making. Just like in the 
previous cases, these hypotheses can be true or false. So what is the proper 
appraisal criterion? And what are the proper methods to test them? 
Since the main content of the present dissertation can be taken as a book-
length elaboration on the answers to these two latter questions, here I will just 
briefly introduce a few distinctive characteristics of the policy making 
                                            
10 In subsequent chapters, I will elaborate in more detail on the different accounts of causality 
and their relation to practical relevance (chapter 3), as well as on how causal accounts implicitly 
suggest a particular testing criteria (chapters 5 and 6). 
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endeavour. One part of economic policy making consists in using the results of 
science to ground reliable recommendations, hence causality also plays an 
important role in the process of policy making. Nevertheless (as I will explore 
further in the following chapters), the main criteria for the truth of a policy 
hypothesis is not primarily meant to discriminate between genuine causation 
and spurious relations, but rather between effective and ineffective practical 
strategies. Even if a policy hypothesis (or policy recommendation) involves 
usually a causal concept, testing for causation is not the same as testing for 
effectiveness. Causation can be tested in relation to no specific practical end, 
whereas effectiveness always has to be tested in relation to a given and concrete 
intended outcome. 
As J. S. Mill also suggested (1874 [1843], 6.12.5), the art of policy making 
brings together causal knowledge from as many scientific sources as necessary, 
and takes into account all disturbing factors that are relevant to the case at 
hand with the exclusive aim of securing the production of the intended practical 
end. As I will argue (especially in chapters 3, 4, and 6), the methods proper to 
testing the effectiveness of concrete practical strategies involve a different and 
often much more complex logic than the one characterising the appraisal of 
scientific causal claims or the evaluation of hypotheses about the goodness of 
social ends. For instance, instead of isolating a single causal relation to evaluate 
whether it is causally efficacious, policy making requires (at least in principle) 
the inclusion and consideration of all relevant causal and non-causal factors 
that can affect in any way the occurrence of the intended practical outcome (as 
well as potential by-products).  
I take it that the difference between testing causal relations (the scientific 
endeavour) and assessing the goodness of practical ends (the normative 
endeavour) is not controversial. Furthermore, as suggested in the introduction 
of this chapter, economists and philosophers of economics have no problem in 
studying separately the methodology of the scientific branch of economics (that 
investigates causal relations) and the methodology of the moral branch of 
economics (that investigates the goodness of socioeconomic outcomes). The 
claim I made at the beginning of this chapter—that there is not much systematic 
research on the methodology of policy making—can now be understood more 
precisely as the statement: there is a shortage of methodological research on 
the branch of economics that investigates hypotheses about the effectiveness 
of practical economic prescriptions and about the specifics of its appraisal 
procedures. 
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1.5. TOWARDS A METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING 
During the last two decades, David Colander has undoubtedly been the most 
forceful advocate of reviving the classical threefold distinction in order to 
better understand economics (Colander 1992; 1994; 2001). He has explicitly 
endorsed J. N. Keynes’s distinction of three kinds of enquiry, namely the 
science, the ethics, and the art of economics. According to Colander, the art of 
economics is in modern terms “applied economics” (1992, 20), which he sees 
as “the engineering branch of economics” (1994, 36). Following the classical 
interpretation, the art of economic policy making “relates the lessons learned 
in positive economics to the normative goals determined in normative 
economics” (1992, 20). 
There is no elaboration on how Colander exactly interprets the classical 
distinction, yet he openly favours Keynes’s threefold distinction over 
Friedman’s strict dichotomy, essentially because the latter leaves out “what 
most economists do, which is applied policy economics” (Colander 1994, 35). 
Yet, the most important reason for distinguishing among the three branches “is 
that different methodological rules apply to each” (p. 36). This is very much in 
line with my argument in the previous sections, i.e., that enquiries with different 
aims require different methods.  
An important difference with my view, however, is that Colander thinks that 
the methodology of the art of economics consists of a set of general normative 
rules. In his view, the methodology of economic policy making amounts to the 
stipulation of “methodological rules for the art of economics […] meant as 
rough guides to approaching issues of applied policy” (1994, 41). Then he offers 
a list of six of such methodological rules (pp. 41-45):  
 
1. Try not to violate the law of significant digits. 
2. Be objective and use the rational person criterion to judge policy. 
3. Use the best economic theory available. 
4. Take in all dimensions of the problem. 
5. Use whatever empirical work sheds light on the issue at hand. 
6. Do not be falsely scientific and present only empirical tests that are 
convincing to you. 
 
Colander’s approach is indeed an interesting step towards trying to show 
why stressing some methodological aspects of the distinct art of economics 
might be expedient. Supplementary methodological studies of actual cases of 
economic policy making (such as those presented in chapters 3 and 6 of this 
thesis) could serve to explore in more detail the actual practical conveniences 
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or inconveniencies of following his rough proposed guides for applied policy. 
Nevertheless, Colander goes no further than presenting this list of six rules. 
Overall, there is no further explanation in Colander’s approach about the 
empirical or philosophical foundations of the rules proposed. There is no 
suggestion about how they follow from any specific alleged characteristic of the 
art of economics in general. The only justification for them seems to be 
Colander’s lengthy experience as an economic practitioner and common sense. 
Consider, for instance, the rule of “take in all dimensions of the problem”; 
it sounds intuitively like the right thing to do, but there is no elaboration on 
why and how it should be done. Moreover, why is this rule stated as if it were 
specific to the art of policy making? Would not it be recommendable as well to 
take in all relevant dimensions in the scientific and the normative endeavours? 
Or is there perhaps a special way of doing so in relation to the art of economics? 
Again, a more detailed analysis of actual cases of economic policy making 
focusing on how theoretical claims are enriched with policy experience and then 
used along the relevant dimensions of a practical problem can help to get more 
meaningful methodological guidelines (see chapter 5 in this thesis). 
Rules like “use the reasonable person criterion” or “do not present false or 
biased results” seem to be somewhat common sense recommendations 
adequate for any branch of economics (or any other scientific discipline for that 
matter). In any case, Colander does not offer any explanation of why these 
particular rules would be more important for policy purposes than for scientific 
or normative purposes. 
The rule of “use the best economic theory available” is also a bit ambiguous 
as it stands. To which type of investigation does the appraisal of economic 
theories correspond? The rule seems to imply that economic policy 
practitioners should seriously consider the problems of theory choice or theory 
appraisal before using any theoretical claim as a basis for practical 
recommendations. But those are problems to be considered by the scientific (or 
positive) branch of economics, as Colander himself is eager to argue:  
 
In the art of economics one accepts the general laws and models that have 
been determined by the profession and one tries to apply the insights of 
economic models to real-world problems. Applied policy economics has 
nothing to do with testing a theory; it has to do with applying the insights 
of that theory to a specific case (Colander 1994, 36). 
 
To be fair, Colander’s approach has two clearly established goals. One is to 
make the developers of economic theories in the positive branch of economics 
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more conscious about the character and the practical needs of applied 
economists and economic policy makers. And the second (perhaps the main 
objective of his overall project) is to modify economics education so as to 
reshape “the way economics is taught”, since the “appropriate methodology for 
the art of economics is much broader, more inclusive, and far less technical 
than the methodological approach for positive economics that underlies 
current teaching practices” (Colander 1992, 23).11  
My own proposal can be considered as an elaboration on Colander’s 
methodological approach. The following chapters are an attempt to offer a 
more substantive philosophical account of the ideas, methods, and interactions 
involved in at least two issues about policy making hinted at by Colander. To 
illustrate the issues, I rephrase two of Colander’s guidelines in the form of 
research questions: 
 
1. How can policy makers take in all the relevant dimensions of a policy 
problem? 
 
2. How can empirical evidence be properly used to shed light on the policy 
issue at hand? 
 
I answer the first question by exploring the different roles that causal 
relations play in economic policy making. Different types of causal claims 
confer different sorts of practical power. When causal relations are studied and 
established in the scientific branch of economics, they usually follow a method 
that isolates the relations from all other potential disturbing causal factors. 
Thus, in principle, all relevant dimensions are controlled for in order to achieve 
a reliable causal inference. In economic policy making the way of “taking in all 
relevant dimensions of the problem” follows a different procedure: it consists 
in finding a way of evaluating which are all the potential disturbing causes in 
relation to a particular concrete effect, and then proposing a way of 
understanding the concurrent interactions of all the relevant causes for the 
production of the effect. Causal pluralism and some forms of causal modelling 
offer some philosophical answers to these issues. Understanding the meaning 
of so-called causal generalisations and their relation to particular instances is 
also relevant in order to understand how causal knowledge can be used to 
effectively bring about effects in the real social world (I elaborate on these 
topics in chapters 2, 3, and 4). 
                                            
11 On the reform of economics education, see also Colander 2005; 2008; Ñopo and Colander 
2007. 
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I answer the second question by exploring the distinct roles that empirical 
evidence can play in supporting policy claims, in contrast to the particular role 
evidence plays in supporting causal claims. The main point to be stressed in 
this part of my project is that the evidence that properly supports a causal 
generalisation (in the positive branch of economics) is not necessarily sufficient 
(or the same) as the evidence that is required to support a particular policy 
recommendation. It is not any general type of evidence what is required if one 
wants to shed light on a policy issue, but the “right kind” of evidence in relation 
to the specific dimensions of the particular policy goal (I argue for this in 
chapters 5, 6, and 7).  
The issues of the methodology of economic policy making that I explore in 
this thesis are not exhaustive at all, but they are central for understanding the 
particular features of the process whereby scientific economic knowledge is 
(and can be) used to generate reliable economic policy recommendations. 
 
1.6. HOW KEEPING THE DISTINCTION MATTERS IN METHODOLOGY:  
AN ILLUSTRATION 
There are already some few cases in the literature which can be taken as 
instances of methodology of economic policy making (e.g., Milberg 1996; 
Klemperer 2003; Angner 2006; Swann 2006; Reiss 2008; Grüne-Yanoff 2011; 
Hansen 2011; Svetlova 2013). A fairly good illustration occurs in a relatively 
recent article by Anna Alexandrova (2006) on the use of economic knowledge 
for economic policy design. I will focus on this case because it shows how one 
might arrive at potentially mistaken methodological conclusions by conflating 
the scientific branch of economics with the art of economic policy making. And 
so this example illustrates why it is helpful to do philosophy of economics with 
a proper interpretation of the threefold distinction in mind. 
Alexandrova’s article is meant to challenge the next two claims: Firstly, that 
“economics, when successful, is necessarily done according to the method of 
isolation” (2006, 174); and secondly, that “models in economics supply claims 
about tendencies” (p. 174). In order to reject these claims, she uses as a case 
study “perhaps the most successful case of the application of game theory to 
date” (p. 174): the construction of the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) spectrum auctions. 
Alexandrova starts by briefly describing the general ideas behind the 
method of isolation in economic science, with reference to the work of Uskali 
Mäki (see, e.g., Mäki 1992a; 2004a; 2004b; 2006). According to Alexandrova’s 
interpretation, contemporary economic theory assumes that economic 
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modelling “help us isolate important portions of social reality” (p. 174), and 
that the “essential elements isolated in an idealized model can help us to 
explain actual real world phenomena” (p. 174). Additionally:  
 
This view is often supplemented with (something like) John Stuart Mill’s 
account of political economy as a science of tendencies, studying the 
behaviour of economic agents in the absence of disturbing factors and then 
combining these tendencies for the purposes of explanation and prediction 
(Alexandrova 2006, 174). 
 
After such introductory remarks on the method of isolation in economics, 
Alexandrova proceeds to argue against the first claim she sets up at the 
beginning of her article. Her claim is that economics “when successful” is not 
necessarily done according to the method of isolation. And to show this, she 
uses the case of the FCC spectrum auctions as an example. The main steps of 
her argument matter so I summarise them in what follows. 
First, she describes auction theory—a branch of game theory—as the kind 
abstract economic theory that is usually considered as providing the relevant 
economic knowledge for policy recommendations in order to design an actual 
auction. The basic theoretical auction model in relation to the FCC auctions case 
is the so-called “private value auction with two bidders” (pp. 174-176). In theory, 
this model postulates two players competing for a good in a first-price sealed-
bid auction. They both know their own valuation of the good in question, but 
not the valuation of the other player, and the bids are simultaneously 
submitted. 
This theoretical setting is complemented with some additional standard 
game theoretical assumptions about distribution of values, probabilities, and 
information. The question to be investigated by the economic theorists is then: 
how should the players bid? The mathematical optimization of the problem 
leads to a solution in which each player bids half of his own valuation of the 
good. As Alexandrova puts it: “Since both players are maximizing their expected 
utility given their beliefs about actions of the other, we have a Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium” (p. 175). 
Such is the way in which game theorists build up their scientific knowledge: 
by developing “a typology of auctions (open sealed bid, second or first price, 
with or without reserve price, etc.) and types of information known to bidders 
(e.g., whether or not they receive it from the same source)” (p. 176) in order to 
solve theoretical games. In other words, game theorists build up their theories 
employing the method of isolation.  
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According to Alexandrova a rather different picture accounts for the case 
of the FCC design: “In 1993, the FCC commissioned the help of game theorists 
and experimentalists to design an auction that would privatize licenses for 
bands of electromagnetic spectrum in accordance with Congress’s 
requirements” (p. 186). The aim of the team was to design “an actual institution 
that would satisfy the government’s constraints” (p. 186). Alexandrova argues 
that the method followed by this team of experts “was different from the 
method of isolation” (p. 186). Instead of using the method of isolation, the 
designers “sought to find out facts about one material system as a whole” (p. 
186). The method they actually used is depicted as follows: 
 
The process by which these facts were established was a mixture of 
modelling and experimentation, where the former provided only indications 
of possible causal relations and the latter revealed a material 
implementation of the desirable effects within the environment of the 
auction (Alexandrova 2006, 186). 
 
Alexandrova’s account of the whole process of designing the auction is 
intended to point out that: theoretical results from the positive branch of 
economics could serve as a basic material to start working with, but when “it 
comes to advising a policy maker, the most difficult task is to figure out the 
implications of all these different theoretical results for the actual task at hand” 
(Alexandrova 2006, 188), and then a mixture of alternative “highly applied, 
local, and empirical” procedures had to be used (p. 191) instead of the method 
of isolation. Alexandrova then hastily jumps to the conclusion that such a case 
study constitutes “a methodological benchmark” because it presents an 
instance of successful economics that was not “necessarily done according to 
the method of isolation” (p. 174).  
There is a confusion here that springs from taking the process of designing 
the FCC spectrum auction as a methodological benchmark in the positive 
branch of economics, when it is actually a clear example of the complex 
methodology proper to economic policy making. The whole point of restating 
the classical threefold distinction is precisely to make clear (among other 
things) that the method used when aiming at assessing theoretical hypotheses 
is quite different from the methods required when the aim is the formulation 
and evaluation of economic policy recommendations. The latter case is 
precisely what Alexandrova’s study supports and illustrates. 
 29 
The method employed in the FCC policy making process actually echoes J. 
S. Mill’s speculations about the different types of knowledge, in addition to 
scientific knowledge, that the method proper to the art of practice requires: 
 
No one who attempts to lay down propositions for the guidance of mankind, 
however perfect his scientific acquirements, can dispense with a practical 
knowledge of the actual modes in which the affairs of the world are carried 
on, and an extensive personal experience of the actual ideas, feelings, and 
intellectual and moral tendencies of his own country and of his own age. 
The true practical statesman is he who combines this experience with a 
profound knowledge of abstract political philosophy (Mill 1844 [1830], 109). 
 
As long as everybody involved in the methodological analysis of economics 
clearly understands the distinction between the positive branch of economics 
and the art of formulating practical recommendations, then it is possible to 
consistently hold that the method of isolation is the method of successful 
economic theorising, and to hold simultaneously that a more complex 
procedure involving the consideration of the very same theoretical insights, 
plus additional empirical data, experience in doing policy, non-economic 
knowledge, heuristic procedures, and so forth, is required in cases of successful 
performance of the art of economics, just as it seems to have been the case in 
the design of the FCC spectrum auctions. 
 
1.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The lesson to be learnt from the classical approach is that it is not necessary to 
come up with an ultimate and pure characterisation of statements as positive 
or normative, or as value-free or value-laden, or as objective or subjective. The 
classical distinction was essentially a distinction about types of inquiry with 
different aims, rather than about statements with distinct natures. 
Furthermore, the three types of inquiry have enough distinctive methodological 
features, so that it is useful to retain a properly qualified version of the classical 
threefold distinction—instead of the two-fold standard version—rather than to 
dismiss the distinction altogether, as some authors have suggested (e.g., Sen 
1981; Solomon 2001; Putnam 2002; Dasgupta 2005; Kincaid, et al. 2007; Putnam 
and Walsh 2011).  
The issue at stake is to properly identify the purpose of the investigation 
that is being carried out: whether it is an investigation into economic causes 
and the ways and conditions in which they obtain (positive economics); an 
investigation about the goodness or desirability of economic outcomes to 
society (ethics of economics); or an investigation into the most effective ways 
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for attaining a given economic end (economic policy making). A proper 
methodological appraisal of economics requires this identification, since any 
posited hypothesis (either causal, moral, or instrumental) is to be evaluated 
using different criteria and testing procedures depending on the type of inquiry 
in which they occur. 
Once the distinction between the three branches of economics has been 
interpreted in the proposed way, it becomes obvious that philosophy of 
economics has not been paying enough attention to the methodological study 
of the art of economic policy making. Some basic ideas about how this 
methodology of the art could be developed and what type of issues it is 
supposed to engage with have been also put forward. There seems to be a huge 
and complex (and interdisciplinary) area which is still highly unexplored from 
a methodological point of view: investigations about how to use scientific 
economic knowledge to make given normative goals happen, i.e., investigations 
on the art of economic policy making. 
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PART II 
CAUSAL KNOWLEDGE AND ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART II 
 
The idea that knowledge about causal relations can be exploited for the 
attainment of practical goals seems uncontroversial: knowing that oxygen is a 
cause of fire can be used to produce or to extinguish fire; knowing that 
exposure to asbestos is a cause of cancer can be used to provoke or to prevent 
cancer; knowing that excess demand is a cause of price increases can help 
determine whether it is lucrative to sell or to buy certain commodities; or 
knowing that education is a cause of economic growth can be used to guide 
private or public policy.  
This insight about the practical usefulness of causal knowledge has been 
commonly taken for granted in the literature on causation. For instance, Nancy 
Cartwright has explicitly justified her probabilistic account of causality with a 
formalised version of this basic intuition. In “Causal laws and effective 
strategies” (Cartwright 1979), she writes that there is “a natural connection 
between causes and strategies that should be maintained: if one wants to obtain 
a goal, it is a good (in the pre-utility sense of good) strategy to introduce a cause 
for that goal” (p. 431). By ‘the pre-utility sense of good’ she means “effective” 
(p. 420). In line with this view, the way causal knowledge can be exploited for 
practical purposes is condensed as follows: if ‘X causes G’ is true, then bringing 
about X “will be an effective strategy for G in any situation” (p. 432). 
Bert Leuridan, Erik Weber, and Maarten Van Dyck (2008) have labelled this 
position the “standard view on the practical value of causal knowledge” (p. 298). 
According to them: 
 
[The standard view stands for] the thesis that the practical value of 
causal knowledge lies in the fact that manipulation of causes is a good 
way to bring about a desired change in the effect (Leuridan, et al. 2008, 
299). 
 
As these authors also point out, many philosophers working on causation 
have simply taken the standard view as given (pp. 298-299). It is one of the key 
motivations behind the scientific aim of distinguishing genuine causes from 
spurious ones, since claims about genuine causation “are needed to ground the 
distinction between effective strategies and ineffective ones” (Cartwright 1979, 
420). Consequently, this view is (somewhat silently) embedded in most of the 
literature on methods for causal inference (see, e.g., Simon 1954; Spirtes, et al. 
 33 
1993; Scheines 1997; Glymour 1997; Pearl 2000; Hoover 2001; Shadish, et al. 
2002; Steel 2004; Guala 2005).  
The standard view is often illustrated with some evocative example 
involving smoking and lung cancer roughly as follows: suppose that “S is a 
variable that codes for smoking behavior, Y a variable that codes for yellowed, 
or nicotine stained, fingers, and C a variable that codes for the presence of lung 
cancer” (Scheines 1997, 188). Suppose further that the actual causal structure 
among these variables is: S causes C, S causes Y, but C and Y are not causally 
related to each other, and all three variables regularly obtain together. The 
practical relevance of genuine causal relations in contrast to spurious relations 
is then shown to follow automatically: avoiding smoking would be an effective 
strategy for avoiding lung cancer and yellowed fingers, but steering clear of 
nicotine stained fingers (say, by wearing protective gloves while smoking) 
would be a plainly ineffective strategy for avoiding lung cancer. But is detecting 
genuine causation all that is required to let us identify effective strategies? 
As a result of the common acceptance and use of the standard view in rather 
abstract terms, little attention has been paid to the details of what it actually 
amounts to. What kind of practical power is causal knowledge in fact capable 
of conferring? How exactly is one meant to exploit or make use of causal 
knowledge for the effective attainment of practical goals in concrete and 
specific situations? Is it the same kind of practical power present in all forms 
of causal knowledge? Could there be any general methodological guidelines 
concerning the use of causal knowledge for practical purposes? 
Instead of providing answers to these types of questions, authors interested 
in causality have primarily directed their attention to some other (no less 
important) inquiries, for instance, conceptual or semantic questions such as 
“what does cause mean?” (e.g., Russell 1912-1913; Ducasse 1926; Lewis 1973) 
or “what is the logical form of causal claims?” (e.g., Davidson 1967); ontological 
questions like “are there causal relations in the real world?” (e.g., Salmon 1980; 
Menzies 1989; Dowe 2000); and epistemological questions such as “how can 
one distinguish, find, or learn about causal relations?” (e.g., Simon 1954; Suppes 
1970; Spirtes, et al. 1993). Hence a serious philosophical effort to investigate 
pragmatic questions related to how scientific knowledge is, can, and should be 
employed to support, guide, or implement practical decisions and policy 
recommendations is still missing.12 
                                            
12 In relation to this longstanding gap in the philosophical research, there have been a few 
authors who have openly suggested that philosophy of science could and should play a much 
more significant role in the investigation of how science is actually applied and used for 
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To be clear, I do not want to claim that the standard view is mistaken. It is 
in principle (and quite obviously) correct, since causal knowledge can indeed be 
exploited for practical purposes. The problem is that it is commonly presented 
and discussed at a high level of abstraction—see, e.g., the quotations offered 
by Leuridan, Weber, and Van Dyck (2008, 298-299)—and thus, in practice, it 
leaves in the shadow all the concrete features and details of the process by 
which causal knowledge is and can be used to do things in the world. So the 
standard view can be taken as a starting point for more substantial and 
thorough philosophical investigation of the practical relevance of causal 
knowledge.  
In the following chapters, my goal is to pursue such a systematic approach. 
Although I adopt a philosophical standpoint, a better understanding of the 
practical aspects of causation should not be of interest exclusively to 
philosophers, but could also help policy makers engage with the tasks of 
formulating, evaluating, and implementing reliable policy prescriptions on the 
basis of available scientific knowledge. 
In chapter 2, I discuss the notions of ‘practical relevance’ and ‘effectiveness’ 
in relation to causal knowledge. In the standard view the notion of ‘practical 
relevance’ is confined exclusively to one of its possible meanings, namely a 
specific form of intervening power, while in fact causal knowledge can 
contribute to the attainment of practical goals in many different equally 
important ways. In particular, I discuss how predictive power and intervening 
power relate to each other and to causal knowledge. The complexity of the 
notion of practical relevance becomes clearer by distinguishing between the 
‘practical potential’ of causal knowledge (which depends on its predictive and 
intervening power), and the notion of ‘effectiveness’ (which refers to actual 
accomplishment in relation to concrete practical goals). The aim of this chapter 
is to argue that practical potential is not sufficient for the effectiveness of 
causal knowledge. 
In chapter 3, I discuss the relation between causal pluralism and practical 
relevance. Causation is a plural notion at several levels: there are distinct 
theories about what causality is (e.g., those put in terms of regularities, 
probability raising, counterfactual dependence, physical processes, invariance 
under interventions, and so forth), and there are distinct causal concepts which 
refer to different configurations of causal factors within a given causal 
                                            
practical (and policy) purposes; see, e.g., Cartwright 1974; Suppes 1984; Kitcher 2001; Douglas 
2009; Mitchell 2009. My position here takes this suggestion seriously and elaborates on its 
possibilities. 
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structure (e.g., net cause, component cause, average cause, preventer, and so 
forth). As a result, a generic causal claim of the form ‘X causes Y’ can have a 
variety of meanings and interpretations. Yet the standard view says nothing 
about how different meanings of a causal claim could relate to different forms 
of practical relevance. The aim of this chapter is to argue that a proper 
philosophical disambiguation of the meaning of causal relations should 
complement any attempt to use causal knowledge for practical purposes. 
In chapter 4, (co-authored with François Claveau) a case study is used to 
illustrate the main points of the previous chapter. The OECD research on 
unemployment in the 1990s was presented to the members of the OECD as an 
up-to-date scientific study including theoretical and empirical findings from 
economic science on the causes of, and the effective strategies against, the 
problem of unemployment. Most of the findings were presented in the form of 
causal generalisations. It is not clear, however, what the precise meaning of 
these claims is when they are analysed taking into account the plurality of 
interpretations of causal claims as presented in chapter 3. more specifically, 
the example shows (1) that the meaning of causal claims is not always clear 
when they are presented as guides for policy; (2) that ambiguities in the 
meaning of a causal generalisation can, in practice, come from several sources, 
namely: the specific meaning of the causal concept in the claim, the meaning of 
the causal relata, and the specification of the population of application; and (3) 
that it is rather unclear from the results of the OECD study which are the proper 
policy recommendations that can be reliably inferred from causal 
generalisations about population average effects to be implemented in 
particular target units. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CAUSATION, PRACTICAL RELEVANCE, AND EFFECTIVENESS 
 
There are several distinctions that have to be made in order to understand the 
ways in which causal knowledge can be exploited for the achievement of 
practical goals. As the standard view suggests, the manipulation of causes in 
order to bring about their effects is obviously one aspect that makes knowledge 
about causal relations useful for practical purposes. However, the role that 
causal claims play in the process of designing and implementing effective 
strategies has more facets in addition to simply allowing potential 
interventions.  
In this chapter, I present a distinction between the potential of causal 
knowledge to be used for practical purposes and its effectiveness in relation to 
concrete strategy or policy implementations. Knowing that “X causes Y” is true 
indeed grants a certain potential for practical use, yet to infer an effective 
strategy, further dimensions related to the practical relevance of causal 
knowledge have to be taken into consideration.13  
First, the practical potential of causal knowledge has two basic components: 
predictive power and intervening power; I will elaborate on these two notions 
in section 2.1. Secondly, the effectiveness of a strategy or policy is dependent 
upon the practical potential and some additional contextual components; I will 
discuss the contrast between practical potential and effectiveness in section 
2.2. Some concluding remarks are presented in section 2.3. 
 
2.1. PREDICTION AND INTERVENTION AS PRACTICAL VIRTUES 
According to John Stuart Mill, causation “is co-extensive with the entire field of 
successive phenomena” because “every fact which has a beginning has a cause” 
(Mill 1874 [1843], 3.5.1). While elaborating on these ideas, Mill makes a brief 
remark about the practical relevance of causal knowledge: 
 
Of all truths relating to phenomena, the most valuable to us are those which 
relate to the order of their succession. On a knowledge of these is founded 
every reasonable anticipation of future facts, and whatever power we possess 
of influencing those facts to our advantage (Mill 1874 [1843], 3.5.1; italics 
added). 
                                            
13 Causal claims are among the most basic ingredients of larger pieces of scientific knowledge. 
Sometimes they are the main target of models, sometimes they are assumptions, and 
sometimes they are implications of those models. In what follows, as a working hypothesis, 
causal claims are taken as the most basic bearers of practical relevance. 
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Reasonable anticipation (prediction) and influence (intervention) of facts to 
our advantage are indeed two crucial aims for which causal knowledge can be 
practically relevant. But how exactly are these aims related to causality, and to 
each other? I call “practical virtues” the qualities that make knowledge useful 
for practical purposes, so that the practical relevance of causal knowledge can 
be thought as relying on at least two distinct practical virtues: 
 
Predictive power: ‘X causes Y’ has predictive power if, provided that the 
claim is true, the observation of an occurrence or change in X allows a 
reliable forecasting of an occurrence or change of state of Y. 
 
Intervening power: ‘X causes Y’ has intervening power if, provided that the 
claim is true, the production or manipulation of X is feasible, and 
intervening on X can produce or change the state of Y. 
 
In general, one and the same causal claim ‘X causes Y’ might carry both 
practical virtues. Nevertheless, there are three differences between predictive 
and intervening power that are crucial for evaluating the practical relevance of 
causal knowledge. 
First, in many cases where there is no intervening power there can still be 
predictive power. Suppose ‘X causes Y’ is true and we know it. Then intervening 
on X can be an effective strategy for affecting Y, but only when it is actually 
possible to manipulate or affect in any desired way the cause X. Arguably, 
knowing that ‘X causes Y’ is true does not necessarily entail the capacity of 
producing or affecting X. This means that intervening power is not always 
granted by genuine causation.14 Yet, a causal claim without intervening power 
can still have predictive power, since knowing that ‘X causes Y’ is true could be 
used to successfully forecast the occurrence of Y, given that X has been 
observed, regardless of any possibility of intervening on X.  
For instance, knowing the causal claims in Newtonian mechanics allows one 
to meaningfully predict (ceteris paribus) future positions of the planets and 
                                            
14 This is the case even if the causal relation ‘X causes Y’ was established as true by means of an 
intervention on X in accordance with the manipulationist theory of causality (see the following 
chapter, section 3.1), since modern versions of this account (e.g., Woodward 2003) only require 
for the truth of the claim that the putative cause X be affected via some ideal intervention 
(fulfilling certain particular requirements) so as to produce a change in Y. However, if the causal 
claim is meant to guide the attainment of a specific practical goal Y in a real world situation, 
the intervention required needs to be feasible (not only ideal), and the appropriate one (not only 
some) so as to affect Y in the specific desired way. The difficulty of inferring concrete practical 
recommendations from abstract and general causal claims is one of the main problems of 
economic policy making. Chapter 5 below is entirely devoted to discuss this issue. 
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other celestial bodies, whereas the same causal knowledge does not 
immediately grant the power to manipulate the putative causes in order to alter 
planetary positions. Weather forecasting amounts to a similar case: knowing 
the relevant causal relations about natural phenomena makes it possible to 
predict (with a certain degree of accuracy) weather changes in the short run, 
like chances of precipitation, the wind’s expected strength, or the possibility of 
storms, but it does not allow one to intervene or control the occurrence of such 
phenomena. Similarly, consider a causal claim stating that gender is a cause of 
the consumption of a particular good. The manipulation of gender so as to 
control its effect on consumption preferences is, at the very least, extremely 
complicated; still that would be independent of the significant predictive power 
the causal claim could still convey, e.g., to the professionals of marketing in 
relation to the expected sales of their product.15  
Secondly, intervening power is more dependent upon genuine causation 
than predictive power. Let me elaborate on this point. Knowledge about genuine 
causation is not always a necessary requirement for making reliable predictions 
(even if it can be argued that it is desirable). Think for example of a job interview 
in which a good score on some standardised test is employed to forecast the 
future performance of a prospective employee. The employee’s abilities are the 
genuine causes of the future performance, and at the same time they are the 
causes of the test scores, yet it is the correlation between scores and expected 
performance—and not any genuine causal relation between them—which is 
used to justify a decision about whether to hire the applicant or not.  
Following this same line of thought, it has been suggested that knowledge 
of genuine causation is not necessary for attaining practical goals, since 
spurious correlations can be quite useful on their own (see Leuridan, et al. 
2008). However, correlations have to be relatively stable in order to be reliable 
for prediction. And if stability is important for prediction—say, in the sense 
that the more stable a spurious relation is, the more reliable the predictions 
based on it will be—then it can be argued that the stability of a correlation 
depends precisely on the indirect influence of some (unknown) common cause 
or of a more complex (unknown) underlying causal structure. If this is the case, 
                                            
15 Some methods used to infer causality in the social sciences (like those following the logic of 
the potential outcomes framework; see chapter 5) restrict their understanding of a ‘cause’ 
exclusively to variables that can be affected in one way or another: “causes are only those things 
that could, in principle, be treatments in experiments” (Holland 1986, 954-955). Hence, 
attributes of a population such as “gender”, which cannot be “experimentally” changed, are not 
considered as causal variables in the first place. Yet, as explained above, knowledge of these 
attributes end their relations with other variables can convey significant predictive power. 
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then ultimately genuine causality is (at least indirectly) required for making 
reliable predictions. 
There is still a meaningful difference between the predictive and the 
intervening power of a stable correlation between X and Y, whenever the 
underlying common cause or causal structure is unknown. A claim of this sort 
can still provide an agent with reliable predictive power, even if the agent knows 
that the relation between X and Y is not genuinely causal. On the same grounds, 
the fact that the claim is not genuinely causal is enough to undermine any 
potential intervening power, at least in the straightforward form of: 
manipulating X is an effective strategy to affect Y. The correlation between test 
scores and future job performance is stable and can be trusted to yield reliable 
predictions insofar as the common cause (employee’s abilities) has a stable 
influence on both correlated effects. Any user of the claim about the correlation 
can make reliable predictions out of it, even without knowing the underlying 
common causal structure.16 However, since the relation is not genuinely causal, 
it is simply not possible for any agent to affect the future job performance by 
directly intervening on the test scores. This is what I mean by saying: 
intervening power is more dependent upon genuine causation than is predictive 
power. 
The third difference is perhaps more controversial. There are cases in which 
causal knowledge can have intervening power, and yet for practical purposes 
have a very ambiguous or null predicting power. Consider a causal structure in 
which a putative cause X has an influence on its effect Y through two separate 
causal routes R1 and R2. An example of this situation is the effect of price 
changes on the quantity demanded of a commodity: within the relevant causal 
structure, this causal relation can be decomposed into a substitution effect and 
an income effect. For so-called inferior goods, i.e., goods that are mainly 
                                            
16 The users (clients) of science might be unaware of the underlying common cause or causal 
structures responsible for the stability of a correlation and still rely on it and use it for 
prediction. This does not mean that nobody knows about the underlying structures. 
Correlations can be reliable to a potential user, for example, because a team of experts knows 
the reasons (the underlying causal structure) that explain why the correlation is stable, and the 
user simply “trusts” on the results of the research team. This issue is related to the notion of 
‘epistemic dependence’ in social epistemology: the process of analysing data would be too long 
for any individual to accomplish, thus specialisation occurs as a rational outcome, and the 
common knowledge goes on developing even if every member of the epistemic communities is 
knowledgeable only about a piece of it. Everybody’s knowledge depends to a certain degree on 
everybody else’s knowledge (see Goldman 2001; Hardwig 1985; 1991). Researchers have to 
“trust” (to different degrees) that the results of others are well founded (see Andersen and 
Wagenknecht 2013). Similarly, clients of a science “trust” that scientific results are well 
grounded, even if they are ignorant of any of the underlying causal structures. 
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demanded by individuals receiving low incomes, the substitution effect on 
quantity demanded is inversely proportional to the change in prices, whereas 
the income effect is directly proportional to the change in prices.  
Supposing that the causal relations postulated in consumer theory can be 
taken to be true, the claim “price changes cause the quantity demanded” can 
provide reliable intervening power, and yet fail to provide reliable predictive 
power in the following sense. An intervention on the price level of an inferior 
good, keeping fixed the influence of prices through one of the two causal 
routes, either R1 or R2 (e.g., through another intervention), will result in the 
desired effect on the quantity demanded. Nevertheless, even knowing that the 
causal claim is true (and the underlying causal structure including R1 and R2), 
the observation of an increase in the price of an inferior good does not entail 
any reliable prediction about the way in which it will affect, if at all, the quantity 
(because the substitution effect and the income effect could cancel each other 
out, thus resulting in no change whatsoever on the quantity demanded).17 
A similar situation has been described by Spirtes and Scheines (2003) as an 
“ambiguous manipulation”. Ambiguous manipulations refer to situations in 
which one can be sure that affecting X will affect Y while at the same time be 
relatively ignorant about exactly how much or in which direction the effect of 
an intervention will go. Spirtes and Scheines illustrate this possibility with the 
following example. Suppose researchers know that the claim ‘high cholesterol 
levels cause heart disease’ is true, but in fact there are two types of cholesterol, 
one that causes heart disease (LDL) and another that prevents it (HDL), and this 
fact is entirely unknown. In such a case, the interventions (which take the form 
of specific diets with either high or low cholesterol levels) are actually 
interventions on the underlying causal factors, but in different unknown 
proportions. Thus, given the available knowledge, the causal claim has 
intervening power, since by setting the level of cholesterol in a diet, an effect 
on heart disease will indeed obtain. Nervertheless, the claim has no predictive 
power (or at least no definite or reliable predictive power), since the proportion 
in which the intervention affects the underlying causal factors is entirely 
unknown, and hence the actual effect of the intervention cannot be 
unambiguously forecasted. 
 
                                            
17 This particular type of causal structure in which a cause has an influence on its effect through 
a number of distinct causal paths refers to a distinction between two causal concepts, namely 
“net” and “component” causes, which will be described in more detail in the following chapter, 
see section 3.2. 
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2.2. PRACTICAL POTENTIAL AND EFFECTIVENESS 
In this section I start exploring the following idea: To know that ‘X causes Y’ is 
true can convey the potential to achieve practical goals, and yet not be sufficient 
to warrant that ‘implementing X is or will be an effective strategy for Y’ in any 
concrete situation. This is a key idea, and in the remaining chapters of this 
thesis, it will be investigated in more detail, arguing for it from different angles. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I present a number of conceptual clarifications 
that will serve as a general framework to better understand the discussion 
about the practical relevance of causal knowledge to be articulated in the 
subsequent chapters. 
The notions of predictive and intervening power are helpful to understand 
in virtue of what causal knowledge can potentially be employed for practical 
purposes. Yet, to understand the actual ways in which causal knowledge is (and 
should be) employed to effectively attain concrete practical ends, the question 
to investigate is rather about how exactly the practical potential of causal 
knowledge can obtain in concrete cases. Differently put, the question is this: 
how can causal knowledge be used in the formulation of strategies and policies 
such that they wind up being effective?  
Let us assume that a piece of causal knowledge has intervening power, then 
the effective attainment of a concrete practical goal on the basis of that 
knowledge requires not only an intervention on the putative cause, but also that 
all additional relevant causal elements are taken into account and that they all 
obtain in the “right” way during the process of policy making. Thus intervening 
power is part of what gives causal knowledge the potential to be used for 
attaining a desired goal. Yet, for this potential to be actualised in an effective 
way (i.e., to result in the actual attainment of an intended goal), disturbing 
factors and background conditions should be adequately identified and 
accommodated. To understand how these additional factors are related to the 
effective practical use of causal knowledge, let us start by making clear the 
following notion: 
 
Practical potential: knowledge that X causes Y can be said to have practical 
potential if it can provide either intervening power, predictive power, or a 
combination of both, to the agents who have that knowledge. 
 
While having this potential is what makes causal knowledge relevant for 
practical purposes, it is only one of the ingredients that contribute to attaining 
effectiveness (a notion yet to be more precisely characterised later in this 
section). The role of causal knowledge in the effective achievement of a desired 
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effect is, more often than not, influenced by additional factors or “background 
conditions”. Thus effectiveness depends on the practical potential of causal 
knowledge and on the state of all background conditions relevant to the 
concrete situation in which a strategy or policy is to be implemented. 
 
Background conditions refer to any additional factor or condition Z (known 
or unknown) which can have an effect on the actual attainment of a concrete 
desired outcome after the implementation of a particular strategy or policy. 
This can happen by enabling (or constraining) the proper implementation 
of the particular strategy or by directly (but independently of any 
intervention on the putative cause) disturbing the occurrence of the desired 
effect (examples of these factors are: the rules or institutional framework 
regulating the implementation, the expertise involved, the decision making 
process, as well as socio-cultural factors, unexpected disturbing social 
events, and so on and so forth). 
 
That background conditions matter for policy purposes is well recognised 
by philosophers and scientists. However, a closely related question that is 
seldom considered in detail is this: how exactly do the background conditions 
matter for the effectiveness of a concrete practical implementation? Causal 
relations are commonly analysed and understood in the context of a causal 
structure, that is, a set of additional causal factors Z which have a potential 
direct or indirect effect on Y, apart from the posited cause X. 
The notion of background conditions Z plays an important role in many 
epistemological accounts of causal inference, since to find or test for genuine 
causation between X and Y, ideally one would like to keep fixed or under control 
all additional causal factors (i.e., potential confounders) that can have an 
influence on Y apart from X. In this way, the causal influence from X to Y can 
be investigated and computed in isolation. As it was put forward in chapter 1, 
this method for investigating causal relations—regardless of whether one calls 
it method of isolation or of abstraction or of controlling for “disturbances” or 
“potential sources of error”—is ubiquitous in the scientific branch of economics 
(see Mill 1874 [1843], 3.8; Mäki 1992a; Cartwright 1989, chapter 5; Reiss 2008, 
chapter 1).  
In the process of economic policy making, however, in order to successfully 
affect or bring about a desired effect in a concrete situation, all the elements in 
Z that have a bearing on the adequate production of the desired effect need to 
be brought back into consideration. The effectiveness of a practical strategy or 
policy in a concrete situation requires a process of de-isolation or 
concretisation (see, e.g., Svetlova 2013), such that information about all (known) 
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elements of Z that are specifically relevant for the situation at hand is made 
explicit.  
The contrast between the methods for establishing causal knowledge and 
the procedures for using it for policy purposes will be analysed in more detail 
at a conceptual level in chapter 5, and at an empirical or evidential level in 
chapters 6 and 7. For the moment, let me point out that there are two elements 
in the set of background conditions which can have a significant weight on 
effectiveness, and which are not usually (explicitly) considered as members of 
Z in scientific studies on causal inference. These notions require careful 
attention especially in relation to the effective attainment of practical goals. 
 
Degree of proficiency: the skilfulness, education, training, experience, or 
any other epistemic feature of the users of the science that can affect the 
process of deliberation or implementation related to the attainment of a 
practical goal by employing the relevant available scientific knowledge. 
 
Persuasiveness: the extent to which relevant audiences are convinced about 
the truth and suitability of a causal claim (or any other piece of knowledge) 
so as to be used as a basis (or a guide) for practical action. 
 
I shall not go into much detail elaborating on these notions; however it 
seems worth considering them briefly, if only to understand how they relate to 
the notion of practical potential and to any piece of causal knowledge.  
As can be seen from the description above, degree of proficiency is a 
property of the users of science, rather than of the causal knowledge they use. 
However, the degree of proficiency of the users contributes (in different ways 
in different cases) to the effective attainment of intended practical goals. Simply 
put, whether a certain policy design is the most effective way to achieve a 
concrete goal or not is independent of whether that policy design is properly 
or deficiently implemented. It can be said that proper implementation is a 
precondition for the effectiveness of a policy. The degree of proficiency of the 
users of scientific knowledge determines the quality of policy implementation, 
and thus indirectly enables (yet does not secures) that a policy be effective. 
The practical potential of causal knowledge and the degree of proficiency 
of the users of science have a concurrent effect on the effectiveness of a 
particular strategy or policy, yet they are two different notions. Numerous 
complaints about the failure of economics in dealing with real world 
phenomena—and about its alleged lack of practical relevance—could be more 
properly addressed as failures related to the use (or misuse) of economic 
science for policy purposes by particular individuals or groups. This is the case, 
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for instance, regarding some accounts on the alleged failure of economics to 
predict and deal with the recent 2008-2009 financial crisis. Several accounts 
supporting this accusation concentrate on criticising the methodology and the 
accuracy of the models used to do economics, rather than on whether particular 
pieces of economic science were in fact misused or misunderstood by policy 
makers (see, e.g., Hodgson 2009; Colander 2010; Kirman 2010).  
To say that the claim ‘X causes Y’ has practical relevance potential 
presupposes that there could be somebody who could use the claim to achieve 
a certain goal or purpose. These individuals are the users and clients of science 
(see Mäki 2004a): people that use scientific knowledge for different purposes 
including to offer practical advice to other individuals or to decide about their 
own strategies for action given particular socioeconomic and epistemic goals. 
Engineers, economic consultants, governmental policy advisors, medical 
practitioners, business managers, public administrators, are only some 
examples. In accordance with this, it should be clear that the effectiveness of a 
policy depends to a certain extent on the actual abilities and skills of the clients 
of the science to properly employ the available scientific information for the 
achievement of their practical goals. 
Degree of proficiency is a property of the clients of the science and not of 
the causal knowledge being employed. And degrees of proficiency can be 
extremely uneven among individuals. Overall, this is an outstandingly 
subjective aspect influencing effectiveness, which seems rather difficult to be 
accurately measured, though it plays a role in almost all real life cases of policy 
implementation. Yet the main point here is that degree of proficiency has to be 
explicitly distinguished from the practical virtues of scientific knowledge so 
that one can separately consider, evaluate, and meaningfully talk about the 
practical potential of causal claims independently of any further assessment of 
the qualifications and performance of any user of such causal knowledge. 
Persuasiveness is another feature of causal knowledge. The reasons why a 
causal claim can be (made) more or less convincing are manifold and cannot be 
exhaustively enlisted. For instance, persuasiveness could be promoted as a 
direct result of the perceived accuracy and reliability of the claim, but also of 
considerations of things such as simplicity, tractability, formality, legality, 
tradition, consensus, authority, and so forth (see, e.g., McCloskey 1983; Mäki 
1995; 2004a). Notice that this notion is highly subjective in the sense that what 
counts as convincing is mainly dependent upon the particular perceptions and 
predispositions of individuals and their epistemic communities. 
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Suffice it to say that a causal claim can be persuasive independently of its 
practical potential. In fact, some causal claims can be very convincing 
regardless of their being false. Clients of a science are interested in the 
persuasive potential of scientific knowledge, almost as much as they are 
interested in its practical potential (see Nelson, et al. 1987; McCloskey 1983). At 
times, persuasiveness might even be all that policy makers seek in order to 
push a particular biased agenda (see Milberg 1996; Klamer and Meeham 1999; 
Stevens 2011). Yet, the points to be emphasised here are 1) that persuasiveness 
as a feature of scientific knowledge can affect the effectiveness of a practical 
implementation, and 2) that it should be distinguished from, and not be taken 
as a surrogate or as a direct indicator of, the practical potential of causal 
knowledge as it sometimes is. 
The notions discussed so far are all related to the practical relevance of 
scientific claims. Predictive and intervening power largely depend on the 
posited truth of causal claims, whereas degree of proficiency is mostly a 
property of the clients of the science, rather than of the causal knowledge that 
they employ, thus its assessment should be kept separate from any proper 
appraisal of the practical potential of scientific causal knowledge. The same 
applies to persuasiveness. While it can be taken as a property of causal claims, 
it highly depends upon how the claims are perceived (as convincing or not) 
rather than upon the truthfulness of their causal content.  
The standard view suggests that effective strategies follow from true causal 
knowledge. But effectiveness refers to the extent to which a “strategy” (or 
policy) contributes to the achievement of a concrete goal under actual 
circumstances of implementation.18 Having true causal knowledge is useful for 
practical purposes, but does not grant effectiveness, for it is only one ingredient 
of a much more complex configuration.  
Using the elements described in this section, the effectiveness of a policy 
claim can be characterised in function of the practical potential of the causal 
knowledge employed to base or to infer the claim, its persuasiveness, the 
degree of proficiency of the agents in charge of the recommended 
implementation, and the actual state of the remaining of the relevant set of 
causal background conditions. 
 
                                            
18 This interpretation of the notion of effectiveness is based on the literature on economic 
evaluation of policy interventions (e.g., Cochrane 1972; Drummond, et al. 1987; Haynes 1999). 
Nancy Cartwright has also used the term ‘effectiveness’ with the same meaning in her writings 
about evidence-based policy (e.g., Cartwright 2009, 2012a, 2012b; Cartwright and Munro 2010; 
Cartwright and Stegenga 2011). 
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Effectiveness: degree of success of the actual implementation of a strategy 
or policy in pursuit of a definite goal under the ordinary circumstances of 
the case, conditional upon the practical potential of the causal knowledge 
employed, the degree of proficiency of the relevant users, the persuasiveness 
of the relevant claims, and all additional background conditions involved in 
the process of implementation. 
 
This is not intended as a precise definition, but simply as a broad 
characterisation that could serve as a guideline for more detailed and focused 
investigations of the distinct interrelated aspects that account for the 
effectiveness of concrete strategies or policies. Effectiveness is a notion that 
can exclusively be assessed in relation to a given goal. Thus, while the practical 
potential refers to the prospective predictive or intervening power that true 
causal knowledge can in principle provide to any agent for a variety of (not yet 
definitely specified) practical aims, the notion of effectiveness refers to the 
actual success of a practical implementation in relation to a particular and 
concrete aim.  
 
2.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The standard view—that if ‘X causes Y’ is true, then manipulating X would be 
an effective strategy for producing or changing Y in any situation—seems to be 
an acceptable first approximation of the practical relevance of causal 
knowledge. Yet it is a highly abstract portrayal of the matter. The relation 
between a causal claim and practical relevance can take different shapes that 
involve much more than straightforward intervening power. Similarly, the 
effectiveness of a strategy or a policy depends on more than the practical 
potential of a true causal claim; hence true causal claims do not warrant 
effective strategies (as the standard view can be taken to suggest). A proper 
approach to the practical relevance of causal knowledge should take into 
account the distinctions presented above (and probably more). The next step, 
after recognising that there are several distinct aspects involved in the notion 
of practical relevance, is to realise that the claim ‘X causes Y’ can have many 
different meanings as well. The following chapter focuses on how the notion of 
practical potential relates to distinct forms of causal knowledge. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CAUSAL PLURALISM AND PRACTICAL RELEVANCE 
 
There are several accounts in the philosophical literature proposing that 
causation is a plural notion and exploring a number of varieties of causal 
pluralism (e.g., Hitchcock 2003, 2007a, 2007b; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Psillos 
2009; De Vreese 2009; Reiss 2011a). According to these accounts, a claim of the 
form ‘X causes Y’ can have many different meanings. In this chapter, I focus on 
two forms of causal pluralism, namely: pluralism about theories of causality and 
pluralism about causal concepts. The aim is to discuss the difference between 
the two forms of pluralism and their implications for policy-oriented sciences. 
Since there are different possible meanings for claims about causal relations, 
the main conclusion of the chapter is that a proper disambiguation of the 
meaning of any causal claim is required before using it for practical purposes. 
 
3.1. PLURALISM ABOUT THEORIES OF CAUSALITY 
It is possible to identify at least five main traditional theories of causality 
available in the philosophical literature. Each of these theories characterises 
causation in terms of an alternative notion, allegedly more primitive than that 
of causation, which in turn allows one to define some comprehensive criteria 
for what counts as causal. The primitive notions employed in the five theories 
are, respectively: law-like regularities, probabilistic relations, counterfactual 
relations, physical processes, and potential manipulations. The gist of each of 
these theories of causation goes as follows: 
 
Regularity theory: X causes Y if and only if there is a regular connection 
between the occurrences of X and the occurrences of Y (see, e.g., Hume 
1975a [1739]; 1975b [1777]; Mill 1874 [1843], book 3; Davidson 1967; 
Mackie 1974). 
 
Probabilistic theory: X causes Y if and only if the occurrence of X increases 
the probability of an occurrence of Y (see, e.g., Suppes 1970; Cartwright 
1979; Skyrms 1980; Eells 1991). 
 
Counterfactual theory: X causes Y if and only if both X and Y have occurred 
and had X not occurred, then Y would have not occurred (see, e.g., Lewis 
1973; Swain 1978). 
 
Process theory: X causes Y if and only if both X and Y have occurred and 
there is a physical process from X to Y (see, e.g., Salmon 1980; Dowe 2000). 
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Manipulationist theory: X causes Y if and only if bringing about or affecting 
the occurrence of X brings about or affects the occurrence of Y (see, e.g., 
Gasking 1955; Menzies and Price 1993; Woodward 1996; 2003). 
 
These theories were (at least originally) intended as accounts of in virtue of 
what a relation between X and Y is considered as causal, and presented in terms 
of necessary and sufficient conditions. Nevertheless, it is recognised by now 
that these attempts to capture the ‘fundamental nature’ of causation with a 
universal approach are all defective (see, e.g., Hitchcock 2003; Cartwright 2004; 
Campaner and Galavotti 2007; Reiss 2009a). There is a huge literature that 
presents and discusses counterexamples designed to challenge either the 
necessity or the sufficiency criteria for each of the posited universal accounts.19 
As a consequence, the quest for a univocal account of causation has been 
gradually substituted by a pluralistic view which can be described as follows. 
 
Pluralism about theories of causality is the position that there is no 
univocal theory providing all necessary and sufficient conditions for 
causality, but rather each of the general theories might capture one aspect 
or another (i.e., regular connections, probability raising, counterfactual 
dependence, processes, or interventions) of the nature and meaning of 
being causal (see, e.g., Longworth 2009; Psillos 2009).  
 
Accordingly, for a claim “X causes Y” to be considered as causal it is 
sufficient that it fulfils the conditions of at least one of the available general 
theories of causality. This form of pluralism is entirely compatible with the fact 
that some relations which one theory of causation takes as causal do not count 
as causal under some other account. Once the goal of finding the ultimate all-
encompassing theory of causation is abandoned and a pluralistic position is 
adopted, the counterexamples to each of the theories can be regarded as less 
threatening (see Longworth 2009).  
Now let us think of economics for a moment: is it at all clear which theory 
or theories of causality are endorsed when formulating and testing causal 
relations in economics? Is it obvious (to economists and to the users of 
economics) according to which theoretical account the established causal 
claims in economics should be interpreted? These questions are fundamental 
since adopting one or another theory of causality to analyse the meaning of 
particular causal claims can lead to different practical implications. 
                                            
19 For instances of discussions about these counterexamples, see the articles included in Sosa 
and Tooley 1993; and in Collins, et al. 2004. 
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For instance, if ‘X causes Y’ means that the occurrence of events of type X 
increases the probability of the occurrence of events of type Y, one can perhaps 
forecast the likelihood of events of type Y after observing an occurrence of X. In 
contrast, if the meaning of the causal claim is that there is a deterministic 
physical causal process from X to Y, then one could confidently produce Y by 
triggering X and by ensuring that the causal process is not disrupted.20 Or one 
might even be able to replicate or reproduce the causal process as it would be 
convenient for attaining a desired practical goal. In the case one also knows 
that the causal process linking X and Y is invariant to a wide range of 
interventions, then it might be possible to generate fine grain variations of Y 
(see, e.g., Woodward 2010), or perhaps even to elaborate a detailed mapping 
about how certain precise manipulations of X would generate definite changes 
in Y. 
Again, the story can change a great deal if what one means by ‘X causes Y’ 
is that had X not occurred, then nor would Y have occurred. Knowing that such 
a claim is true could be useful to ascribe some causal responsibility to factor X, 
given that one observes that Y obtained.21 But knowing that an instance of X has 
been causally responsible for a particular occurrence of event Y provides almost 
no grounds to infer much about future occurrences of Y. Counterfactual 
dependence was in fact originally considered mainly appropriate for cases of 
so-called ‘singular causation’, cases in which X and Y represent particular 
occurrences and not general types of events (see Lewis 1973; Sober 1985; and 
Eells 1991, chapter 6). In this sense, it is not obvious how knowledge of claims 
about singular causation could be practically useful, say, to generate reliable 
forecasting of future occurrences of Y (but see also the discussion in chapter 5, 
section 5.1). 
The fact that there are several theories that can be used to interpret 
causation suggests a practical consideration: it seems recommendable that 
scientists and the users of scientific causal knowledge are clear about the 
theory (or theories) of causation used to analyse the causal claims that are to 
be subsequently employed for policy purposes. Still, even if everybody agrees 
on the theory of causality being used, there are some further distinctions that 
                                            
20 Uskali Mäki has suggested an adaptation of a process theory of causality to analyse the notion 
of the market as depicted in Austrian economics, see Mäki 1992b. 
21 To adjudicate causal responsibility seems to be a significant practical goal in some sciences, 
such as history, law, archaeology, and the like, in which an event that has already occurred has 
to be established as either causal or not. For a detailed elaboration on the particular roles of 
counterfactual causation in law and history, see Hart and Honoré 1985; and Reiss 2009b. 
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have to be made explicit in order to properly disambiguate the meaning of 
causal claims. To see this, let us consider the second type of pluralism. 
 
3.2. PLURALISM ABOUT CAUSAL CONCEPTS 
This form of pluralism—sometimes called “conceptual causal pluralism” (see, 
e.g., De Vreese 2009)—is different from the previous in that it is not mainly 
concerned with the variety of theories of in virtue of what a posited relation 
from X to Y is considered causal. Instead, it is concerned with the different ways 
in which the causal influence from X to Y can obtain relative to the causal 
structure in which it occurs. The characterisations and labels for the distinct 
ways in which genuine causation can obtain are commonly referred to as 
“causal concepts” (see, e.g., Hitchcock 2003, 2007b; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Reiss 
2011a). 
To see the difference more clearly, suppose that there is a genuine causal 
relation between X and Y within a causal structure that includes some known 
additional factors Z = {Z1, Z2,..., Zn}, then the causal influence from X to Y can, 
for instance, be defined as either a net effect or a component effect. Following 
one version of this distinction (see Hitchcock’s 2001b), two causal concepts can 
be characterised as follows:22 
 
Net effect: X has a net effect on Y if and only if Y varies as X is varied 
while holding fixed other appropriate factors, including common 
causes of X and Y, but excluding factors intermediate between X and Y 
(Hitchcock 2001b, p. 372).23 
 
Component effect: X has a component effect on Y along a particular 
causal route if and only if Y varies as X is varied while holding fixed 
other appropriate factors, including factors that are intermediate 
between X and Y along other routes (Hitchcock 2001b, p. 374).24  
 
Alternatively, the causal influence from X to Y can be characterised in terms 
of its sufficiency and necessity conditions. Accordingly, X can be either 
sufficient, but not necessary to produce or affect Y (since perhaps Y can also be 
                                            
22 Hitchcock’s treatment of these causal concepts is explicitly meant to be “theory-neutral” with 
respect to any existing theory of causality (see Hitchcock 2001b, 369). To him the distinction 
between the two concepts is meant to hold “without presupposing any one theoretical 
perspective [about causation]” (p. 369). 
23 The notion of a ‘net effect’ is also sometimes called ‘total effect’ (Pearl 2000, pp. 151-152, 
164; Pearl 2001) or ‘total cause’ (Woodward 2003, pp. 50-51). 
24 This causal concept, which Hitchcock (2001b) calls ‘component effect along a causal route’, 
is essentially the same that Woodward (2003, pp. 50, 57) calls ‘contributing cause’, and fairly 
similar to what Pearl (2001) defines as ‘path-specific effect’. 
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caused by some Zi alone), or necessary, but not sufficient for Y (since perhaps 
some Zi is always required to interact with X in order to cause Y). Or as John 
Mackie (1974, chapter 3) famously pointed out, X can be an INUS condition (an 
insufficient but necessary part of a set of conditions that are together 
unnecessary and sufficient) for Y. 
Then again, in some other cases, the causal influence from X to Y consists 
of preventing or interrupting the occurrence of Y, rather than bringing it about. 
In such cases, X is a preventative of Y. Following one version of this concept:  
 
Preventative: X is a preventative of Y if and only if X has occurred and Y has 
not, and there is an interaction between X and a causal process (generated 
by some Zi) such that if X had not occurred, the causal process would have 
resulted in Y (see Dowe 2001, 221).  
 
Many additional causal concepts can be characterised using alternative 
criteria (see, e.g., Pearl 2000). The examples here are meant to be illustrative, 
not exhaustive. Even so, the second type of causal pluralism can be described 
as follows. 
 
Pluralism about causal concepts is the position that there are different 
causal concepts, each one corresponding to a distinct type of causal 
influence occurring in a causal structure. These concepts are all causal, and 
none of them is privileged as the main or the most basic concept of 
causation (e.g., Hitchcock 2001b; Hall 2004; Cartwright 2004; Reiss 2009a, 
and 2011a). 
 
Accordingly, given that a certain claim is deemed to be genuinely causal (in 
line with one, some, or all general theories of causality), it can have different 
meanings depending on the causal concept that properly captures the type of 
causal influence singled out by the claim. Thus “X causes Y” means different 
things depending on whether: 
 
X is a net cause of Y, or 
X is a contributing cause of Y, or 
X is a sufficient cause for Y, or 
X is a necessary cause for Y, or 
X is a preventative for Y, or 
X is defined as any other causal concept in relation to Y. 
 
Notice that, in principle, the different causal concepts appearing in the 
propositions above could all be characterised by any one of the general theories 
 52 
of causality (see Hitchcock 2001b). Hence, conceptual causal pluralism does not 
entail pluralism about theories of causality. Analogously, it is possible to hold 
a monistic position about causal concepts (i.e., to argue that there is only one 
causal concept) and also accept that different theories of causality capture 
different dimensions of what is to be causal (see, e.g., Russo and Williamson 
2007; Williamson 2008; Casini 2012). Hence, pluralism about general theories 
of causality does not entail conceptual pluralism.25 
The implications for the practical relevance of causal claims should be 
obvious. If different interpretations of the claim “X causes Y” correspond to 
different causal concepts, and thus refer to different ways in which the causal 
influence from X to Y obtains, then the same causal claim can have different 
practical potential and be useful for policy in different ways depending on 
which interpretation is taken as its actual meaning. Different ways of ‘causing’, 
denoted by distinct causal concepts, need not be practically relevant in exactly 
the same way for the attainment of a particular goal. And therefore—at least 
for policy purposes—the specifics of the causal concepts employed in scientific 
claims should be made explicit. 
For instance, the practical relevance of a causal claim could differ, on the 
one hand, when it means that X is a preventative of Y, and on the other, when 
it means that X is a contributing cause of Y. For if X is a preventative of Y, then 
one knows that a causal interaction between X and a causal process that results 
in Y can preclude the occurrence of Y (see Dowe 2001). In such a case, X is 
sufficient to prevent Y. Whereas if X is a contributing cause of Y, then all one 
knows is that X has a component causal influence on Y along one particular 
causal path (see Hitchcock 2001b, 374; Woodward 2003, 57). Given that there 
could be various paths going from a cause to an effect, component causal 
influences need not be sufficient for producing their posited effect. From this 
comparison, it seems that preventatives can have a higher practical power than 
contributing causes. 
                                            
25 Some of the new pluralistic approaches (both about causal theories and about causal 
concepts) have become more epistemologically rather than metaphysically motivated, and 
hence have moved from questions about what is the nature of causation to questions about 
what are the most useful ways of investigating and learning about causal relations. Along the 
same line, causal accounts such as Woodward’s or Pearl’s—which can be taken as pluralistic in 
the two forms I have described in this chapter—are not inquiries in search for the best theory 
about the nature of causation, but rather use elements of several theories of causality 
(probabilities, counterfactuals, interventions, and so forth) in order to investigate and 
characterise different causal concepts, which then are used to illuminate various issues of 
causal inference and causal explanation (see Woodward 1996; 2003; and Pearl 2000). 
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As another example, knowing that X is a net cause of Y, i.e., that the causal 
influence from X to Y includes all relevant causal paths to Y, and thus knowing 
that that X is sufficient for affecting Y in a certain causal structure (see 
Hitchcock 2001b, 369-373) offers a different practical power from knowing that 
X is an INUS condition for Y (see Mackie 1974, chapter 3). If the goal is to 
produce, or to predict as accurately as possible an occurrence of Y, then 
knowing that X is a net cause of Y confers a more reliable practical power than 
knowing that X is an INUS condition, which in fact—without having also the 
appropriate information about the additional causal factors that together with 
X are at least sufficient for Y—would only offer a limited and somewhat 
unreliable practical power. 
These illustrations are meant to give a broad impression of the different 
ways in which scientific causal knowledge can be exploited for practical 
purposes depending on its different causal interpretations. Different causal 
concepts need not have the same practical relevance, and hence conceptual 
causal pluralism has direct consequences on how one would interpret and be 
entitled to use causal knowledge to design or implement policy 
recommendations. Notice that this is a crucial feature of the practical relevance 
of causation about which the standard view remains completely silent. 
If the ideas presented in this section are correct, then clarifying or 
disambiguating the meaning of causal claims is of utmost importance before 
using them as the basis for any recommendation or implementation of a policy. 
It is still to be seen whether this step is completed or bypassed in practice, i.e., 
whether the causal claims that are actually used to guide policy have an 
accurate and unambiguous meaning (this will be done in the following chapter). 
For the moment and to conclude this chapter, I will offer a brief and simple 
example of causal claims that are well established in economics, and which are 
meant to be useful to produce practical results, yet they are implicitly open to 
be interpreted according to distinct causal concepts.  
 
3.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this chapter I have offered an elaboration on causal pluralism and offered a 
conceptual approximation of how distinct causal concepts can be related to 
distinct forms of practical potential. Different meanings of a causal claim can 
vary the relevance of the claim for the production of practical goals in actual 
situations. Furthermore, given the various distinct possible meanings for a 
single causal claim of the form ‘X causes Y’, it is recommendable that a proper 
disambiguation of the precise meaning of causal knowledge is carried out 
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before it is used for policy purposes. In the following chapter, I will illustrate 
with a case study the semantic complexity of the type of causal claims that are 
often used to support concrete policy recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ON THE MEANING OF CAUSAL GENERALISATIONS: 
THE OECD RESEARCH ON UNEMPLOYMENT POLICY26 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that a causal claim ‘X causes Y’ can have 
different meanings depending on different conceptual characterisations of the 
causal relation (section 3.2), and thus I suggested that a careful semantic 
disambiguation should take place before any piece of causal knowledge is used 
for policy purposes. In the present chapter, the complexities related to 
analysing the meaning of causal generalisations in policy-oriented social 
sciences are illustrated in the context of a concrete case of economic research 
explicitly intended to guide public policy, namely: the OECD research on the 
causes of unemployment.  
In addition to the different interpretations that can be given to causal claims 
(as a consequence of conceptual causal pluralism), the analysis of this 
particular example brings into the open two additional potential sources of 
semantic complexity: ambiguities related to the meaning of the causal relata; 
and perhaps more significantly, ambiguities related to the proper specification 
of the population of which causal generalisations are meant to be true. The 
latter—as will be shown in the remaining chapters of this thesis—turns out to 
be a particularly important issue in policy-oriented social sciences. 
In economics, as in other policy-oriented social sciences, causal 
generalisations are the main kind of causal claims investigated, established, and 
used in order to support practical recommendations. The research on the 
institutional determinants of unemployment done by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in the 1990s provides a 
concrete illustration of this practice. The initial motivation for this research 
came from the persistence of high unemployment in most OECD member 
countries throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s. Then the ministers of 
these countries required the OECD secretary-general “to initiate a 
comprehensive research effort on the reasons for and the remedies to the 
disappointing progress in reducing unemployment” (OECD 1994a, 1).  
The major outcome of this effort was the 1994 OECD jobs study, which was 
presented in two parts: a scientific report, subtitled “evidence and explanations” 
(OECD 1994b) and explicitly put forward as the evidential base for the second 
                                            
26 This chapter is based on an article co-authored with François Claveau, only with a number of 
modifications in order to make explicit the connections with the other chapters of this 
monograph. For the published article, see Claveau and Mireles-Flores 2014. 
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part, a policy-oriented report that was subtitled “facts, analysis, strategies” 
(OECD 1994c). The transition between the two parts of this study was done 
mainly through the formulation of causal generalisations. 
From a broad perspective, the process whereby scientific causal knowledge 
was used to come up with effective remedies to unemployment can be thought 
of as comprising the following three stages: first, a scientific evidential base 
was gathered and investigated; second, causal generalisations about 
unemployment were established on account of the evidential base; and third, 
policy recommendations were proposed on the basis of these scientific causal 
claims.27 In this chapter, the focus will be exclusively on the analysis of causal 
generalisations in relation to their use for policy purposes at the third stage.  
Some examples of causal generalisations presented in the OECD research 
on unemployment are the following:  
 
1. The lack of labour market flexibility of the OECD economies is the 
principal cause of high and persistent unemployment (OECD 1994b, vii). 
 
2. Government-imposed barriers to wage flexibility cause higher 
unemployment (OECD 1994b, part 2, chapter 5). 
 
3. Higher employment protection causes higher unemployment (OECD 
1994b, part 2, section 6.3). 
 
4. Short-time work schemes help preserve permanent jobs (OECD 2010, 
68).28 
 
5. More generous unemployment benefits cause higher unemployment 
(OECD 1994b, part 2, chapter 8). 
 
It is from causal generalisations such as these that policy recommendations 
are inferred in the OECD study. Yet—as it was argued in the previous chapter—
the first step in order to use these causal claims for policy purposes is to get 
their meaning right. So the main question in this chapter is the following: what 
is the meaning of the causal generalisations presented by the OECD? 
                                            
27 To be fair to the OECD, one can find here and there statements in the reports that make the 
narrative more complex. Nonetheless, what seems beyond doubt is that, after the publication 
of the report, the causal generalisations and the associated policy recommendations presented 
by the OECD had great persuasive power, and became established recipes for the relevant expert 
community with all caveats stripped and until very recently entirely forgotten. For discussions 
of the impacts of the OECD study on the expert academic community, see, Freeman 2005, 131-
132; Blanchard 2006, 51-52; Boeri and van Ours 2008, 1-2. For a more recent and revised 
perspective on unemployment by the OECD, see OECD 2006. 
28 Short-time work schemes are public schemes inciting employers to temporarily reduce the 
number of working hours of their employees instead of laying them off. 
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There is a long tradition in philosophy devoted to the study of meaning, 
namely: semantics. A standard way of investigating the meaning of linguistic 
utterances is to base the analysis on the notion of representation (see Speaks 
2011; Peregrin, 2012, 3). According to this view, singular terms are meaningful 
in so far as they represent, or stand for, something. Nouns stand for objects, 
predicates stand for properties and relations, and the meaning of compound 
statements is entirely dependent upon the meaning of its constituents. 
Knowing the meaning of a compound statement would then amount to know 
its truth conditions in terms of some extensional relations among its 
components. In other words, the meaning of a sentence is given by “what the 
world would have to be like for [the sentence] to be true” (Heim and Kratzer 
1998, 1) 
This semantic approach can be called “referentialist”, since it bases a theory 
of meaning upon a theory of reference, or in Robert Brandom words “it moves 
from a story about what is represented to one about what is expressed” 
(Brandom, 2007, 651).29 For example, the meaning of a sentence like ‘Snow is 
white’ would depend on whether all its component terms (‘snow’, ‘is’, and 
‘white’) stand for or “refer to” something, and on whether the posited relation 
among these elements actually holds. To know the meaning of ‘Snow is white’ 
would then amount to know that the sentence is true if and only if there is a 
set of objects referred to by the word ‘snow’, such that all the elements of this 
set have the property referred to by the word ‘white’.  
In line with the referentialist semantic tradition, the analysis of the meaning 
of scientific causal generalisations has been posed anew among recent 
philosophical accounts of causation. Accordingly, the meaning of sentences of 
the form ‘X causes Y’ is typically identified, on the one hand, by specifying the 
referents of the causal relata ‘X’ and ‘Y’ and, on the other, by providing an 
analysis of what the verb ‘to cause’ stands for.30 The work of James Woodward 
is emblematic of this approach. He explicitly puts forward that a goal of his 
book Making things happen (2003) is to provide an account for “capturing or 
clarifying [the] ‘content’ or ‘meaning’” of causal claims (Woodward 2003, 7). The 
meaning of causal generalisations according to his account can then be 
unpacked by properly characterising their truth conditions in terms of 
invariance under possible changes and interventions. Different causal concepts 
                                            
29 This approach is also sometimes called “truth-conditional” or “representationalist” semantics 
(see, e.g., Peregrin 2012). 
30 There are some exceptions to the referentialist approach to the meaning of causal claims, see, 
e.g., Williamson 2005, chapter 9; Spohn 2006; Beebee 2007; Reiss 2011a, and 2012. 
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refer to different sets of potential interventions under which a causal claim is 
taken to be true (see Woodward 1996; 2003, chapter 6). 
A distinctive characteristic of the recent philosophical literature on causal 
knowledge is the explicit aim at being relevant to social scientists by helping 
them to get the meaning of causal claims right, and to contribute in this way to 
improve their practice. Again, in Woodward’s words:  
 
[M]y project has a significant revisionary or normative component: it makes 
recommendations about what one ought to mean by various causal and 
explanatory claims, rather than just attempting to describe how we use 
those claims. It recognizes that causal and explanatory claims sometimes 
are confused, unclear, and ambiguous and suggests how these limitations 
might be addressed (Woodward 2003, 7, emphasis in the original). 
 
Thus, whenever a causal claim is “confused, unclear, and ambiguous”, a 
philosophical account of causation such as Woodward’s aims at suggesting 
“what one ought to mean” by such a claim. Keeping these revisionary 
aspirations in mind, the example analysed in this chapter is intended as a 
contribution in two respects: First, the analysis investigates whether the causal 
generalisations proposed by the OECD are precise enough to serve as reliable 
guides for unemployment policy, or whether they are “confused, unclear, and 
ambiguous” instead. And secondly, it illustrates the application of a 
referentialist analysis to the meaning of causal claims as they occur in actual 
scientific practice, and thus the example sheds light on virtues and limitations 
of this type of semantic approach.  
To guide the analysis, the following schematic form of a causal 
generalisation can be used to identify the elements in need of clarification:  
 
(For P), X ↪ Y (schema CC) 
 
In this schema, the symbol ‘↪’ is a connective that refers to a generic causal 
relation where the causal influence goes from X to Y (in principle signifying any 
conceivable causal concept and analysable by any theory of causality), ‘X’ and 
‘Y’ stand for the causal relata,31 and the clause ‘For P’ specifies the relevant 
population for which the causal claim is meant to be true, where P is composed 
by individual units ui, such that P = {u1, u2,…, un}. 
                                            
31 Following a strong trend in the philosophy of causation (e.g., Spirtes, et al. 1993; Pearl 2000, 
Hoover 2001; Hitchcock 2001a, Woodward 2003; Hausman 2005), and in conformity with 
general usage in economics, upper-case italics (X and Y) are variables, and lower-case italics (x 
and y) represent specific values of these variables. 
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To disambiguate the meaning of the causal generalisations presented by the 
OECD, the following four questions have to be answered: 
 
1. What do the causal relata X and Y refer to? 
2. What does the causal relation ‘↪’ stand for? 
3. What does the clause ‘For P’ refer to? (i.e., what is the relevant 
population?) 
4. Which unit-level causal claims are entailed from the truth of the causal 
generalisations? 
 
Each of these questions is discussed respectively in the subsequent four 
sections of the chapter. 
 
4.1. THE MEANINGS OF THE CAUSAL RELATA 
Consider the unemployment rate (U), which is the variable standing for the 
posited effect common to all the OECD causal generalisations presented above. 
What is the meaning of variable U? What does a change in this variable amount 
to in a real economy? The unemployment rate is defined as a ratio between the 
number of participants in an economy having the status of ‘active and jobless’ 
to the number of participants being ‘active’ but in a current job. To calculate 
this number, a subset from all individuals in an economy, including only the 
ones that are ‘active’ is identified. The number of individuals in this subset 
constitutes the denominator of the ratio. Then a subset of the ‘active’ is taken 
apart by considering the individuals who are officially ‘jobless’, and the 
resulting number constitutes the numerator of the ratio. 
Unfortunately, this relatively simple characterisation of U as a ratio does 
not seem to have a clear-cut referent. The ambiguity comes from the 
specification of the two relevant categories—‘active’ and ‘jobless’—since, as 
most specialist would recognise, there are many different ways of defining 
these categories, and there is no unambiguous method for measuring them. 
Precisely for this reasons, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has made 
an effort to provide detailed guidelines on how to define and measure these 
categories in a uniform way (see ILO 1982, 2-5). These guidelines have actually 
helped pin down a more definite meaning for the concept ‘unemployment rate’, 
however some semantic ambiguities remain, since the guidelines still leave 
some margins for subjective (and contextual) interpretation. As the OECD 
recognises, notions like ‘active job-search’ are “in some countries interpreted 
 60 
rather widely” (OECD 1994a, 186).32 Ultimately, the particular decisions that are 
made about the meaning of the ‘unemployment rate’ will affect the meaning of 
the causal generalisations in which it occurs. In as much as the referent of U is 
left ambiguous, the meaning of these causal generalisations cannot be entirely 
clarified.  
The semantic complexity of these generalisations greatly increases when 
one considers the meaning of some of the variables standing for the posited 
causes such as: the ‘adjustment potential of an economy’, the ‘generosity of 
unemployment benefits’, or the ‘short-time work schemes’, which can be 
labelled as variables A, B, and S, respectively. To elucidate a definite meaning 
for these variables turns out to be much more challenging than in the case of 
U, since these are composite variables and thus their values are 
multidimensional. 
To understand this, consider a distinction between two types of variables: 
unidimensional and multidimensional.  
 
A unidimensional variable is an ordinal variable V for which any two values 
v, v’ ∈ Dv, are either v>v’, v<v’, or v=v’.  
 
A multidimensional variable is a variable composed by a set of 
unidimensional variables, i.e., M=(V1, V2,…, Vn), such that any value of 
variable M is in turn a compound of the values taken by the component 
variables, i.e., m=(v1, v2,…, vn).  
 
When a variable is multidimensional and takes a particular value, it takes in 
fact a specific value for each of its dimensions, thus for every two realizations 
m and m’, there are two realized vectors m=(v1, v2,…, vn) and m’=(v1’, v2’,…, vn’). 
Hence, to make sense of any change in the value of this type of variables, one 
has to disambiguate the meanings of assertions about changes in the values of 
these vectors. 
For instance, a first attempt to capture the meaning of variable B (the 
generosity of unemployment benefits) would have to distinguish between at 
least three dimensions: ‘the level of benefits’ Bl, ‘the duration of entitlement’ Bd, 
and ‘the eligibility conditions’ Be (see Nickell, et al. 2005, 4; and Boeri and van 
Ours 2008, sec.11.1). However, specifying B as a tridimensional vector would 
still be an oversimplification, since the first two dimensions, Bl and Bd, are in 
                                            
32 The OECD continues: “[G]reater standardization, for example with a consistently strict 
interpretation of the notion of ‘step of active job-search’, could make a significant difference 
to the level of unemployment reported in labour force surveys for some countries” (OECD 
1994a, 187). 
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fact multidimensional as well. The following comment by an OECD economist 
captures the difficulty involved in trying to clarify the meaning of ‘the level of 
benefits’ Bl, which is generally expressed in terms of the ‘replacement rate’ (i.e., 
the ratio of unemployment benefits to previous employment earnings):  
 
There is no such thing as the replacement rate in any OECD country, rather 
there are a myriad of replacement rates corresponding to the specific 
personal and family characteristics of the unemployed, their previous 
history of work and unemployment, and the different structures and 
entitlements of unemployment insurance (UI) and social assistance (SA) 
systems in OECD countries and the ways in which these systems interact 
with tax systems. Once one tries to grapple with these complexities in order 
to compute replacement rates for the purpose of international comparisons, 
the task becomes a daunting one (Martin 1996, 100). 
 
It is thus obvious that the generalisation ‘the generosity of benefits (B) 
increases unemployment (U)’ is susceptible to a variety of interpretations.33 To 
be sure, depending on what a change in variable B is taken to be, there could be 
cases when a change in the unemployment benefit system could be interpreted 
unambiguously as an increase in generosity, say, because all the component 
dimensions are changed in the same direction. Nevertheless, it would not be 
crystal clear how to measure the more complicated cases in which all the 
composite dimensions would vary in different directions. 
In practice, instead of analysing in detail each one of the different 
dimensions of a multidimensional variable, authorities rely on transformations 
of the multidimensional variable into a unidimensional scale. For instance, in 
relation to variable B, a “summary measure of benefit entitlements” has indeed 
been constructed for the purposes of the OECD Jobs Study. The explicit goal of 
this measure was “to capture the degree of ‘generosity’ of a country’s benefit 
system” (OECD, 1994a, part II, 172). Nonetheless, even if the construction of 
such a measure can be taken as an impressive achievement—since for each 
country, it averages the replacement rates across 18 distinct personal 
situations—the OECD still is of the opinion that it is only “a very approximate 
indicator” of actual generosity, as there are many instances where the measure 
would actually fail to register a change in generosity while intuitions would go 
                                            
33 The causal variables in other generalisations presented in the OECD research have the same 
multidimensional character, for instance, if one considers the purported cause ‘short-time work 
schemes’, variable S, appearing in the third causal generalisation among the examples above, 
one founds that recent discussions about short-time work schemes actually decompose it into 
14 dimensions (which are then regrouped into four main families of features; see OECD 2010, 
Annex 1.A1). 
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in the opposite direction (OECD, 1994a, part II, 173-176). A definite referent for 
B thus remains somewhat elusive. 
To sum up, many implicit methodological decisions have to be made about 
the specification of the relevant categories (e.g., being ‘active’ or ‘jobless’), and 
about the multidimensionality of some concepts involved, in order to get a 
somewhat clear notion of what is meant by the causal relata in these policy-
oriented causal generalisations. 
 
4.2. THE MEANINGS OF THE CAUSAL RELATION 
As was mentioned before in chapter 3, the problems with each of the main 
univocal theories of causality have led philosophers to develop pluralistic 
accounts that desist from reducing causality to a single primitive notion, and 
rather propose to characterise causal relations in a clear and tractable manner. 
In economics, it is seldom explicit which theory of causality one is supposed to 
hold to understand the causal relations presented and discussed. However, 
some of the recent work on causality and causal inference in special sciences 
suggests that certain non-reductive versions of the manipulationist approach 
are indeed suitable for analysing economic causal claims (see, e.g., Hausman 
1998; Pearl 2000, chapter 5; and in particular Hoover 2001). Whether this is the 
“most adequate” approach to characterising causality in economics—given the 
existing plurality of theories of causality—is an open question out of the scope 
of this chapter. In this section the focus is on the consequences of pluralism 
about causal concepts (as described in chapter 3, section 3.2) for the meaning 
of the OECD causal generalisations.  
To begin, let us consider the potential meanings of the causal relation ‘↪’ in 
a claim as represented by schema CC, but with only one single unit as the 
relevant population referred to in clause ‘For P’. Notice that, in the context of 
the OECD research, the units in the population refer to individual countries. To 
restrict the analysis to “single-unit causal claims” is useful for at least two 
reasons: first, it helps us focus on what happens when distinct causal concepts 
are singled out by the causal relation ‘↪’, keeping this issue separated from 
other sources of semantic ambiguities (e.g., different specifications of the 
population of application for a causal claim; see section 4.5 below). And 
secondly, the clarification of the meaning of claims with multi-unit populations 
can be subsequently approached by asking which single-unit causal claims are 
actually entailed by a causal generalisation (also discussed in section 4.5 below).  
The issue of which single-unit claims are warranted by the truth of causal 
generalisations is especially significant in policy-oriented sciences in which 
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scientific causal knowledge is meant to be useful for the production of effects 
in specific target subpopulations or individual units, and not necessarily in the 
population as a whole. For instance, policy makers aiming at reducing 
unemployment can be thought of as being interested not necessarily in a 
reduction of the general incidence of unemployment for the totality of OECD 
countries, but mostly in how one particular unit (i.e., their own specific country) 
can reliably reduce its current situation of unemployment. 
There are at least two distinctions among causal concepts (introduced in 
chapter 3, section 3.2) that are relevant to the meaning of ‘↪’ in the case of the 
OECD generalisations: (1) net versus component causal effects, and (2) necessity 
versus sufficiency.  
 
4.2.1. Net versus component causal effects 
This distinction comes from the fact that in some cases X can affect Y through 
multiple causal paths in a given causal structure. Then a claim about a net effect 
means that X affects Y taking into account all the existing causal paths, while a 
claim about a component effect means that X affects Y only along a particular 
causal path (see Hitchcock 2001b, 372, 374).  
Consider a causal structure for some particular unit, which can be 
represented with the following equations:  
 
X = EX 
Z1 = α1X + E1 
Z2 = α2X + E2 
Y = β1Z1 + β2Z2 + EY 
 
In these equations, X and Y are variables standing for the causal relata, Z1 
and Z2 represent causal factors that are intermediate between X and Y along 
two distinct causal paths, and the Es represent all other (uncorrelated) relevant 
causal factors. The causal graph for this system is shown in Figure 1, Graph 1.  
 
Figure 1 
 
Graph 1                     Graph 2                    Graph 3 
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Accordingly, the net effect of X on Y (denoted here as ‘NetΔy’) can be 
interpreted as the change in Y due to an intervention I that varies the value of 
X from x0 to a new value x1 (see Figure 1, Graph 2). Thus the net causal effect of 
the change in X (Δx=x1-x0) will be NetΔy=(β1α1 + β2α2)Δx. 
The interpretation of the component causal effect of Δx on Y along one 
causal route (here denoted with the label ‘CompΔy’) can be similarly obtained, 
yet by introducing a more complex intervention. To consider only a causal 
effect along the causal path passing through Z1 (as shown in Figure 1, Graph 3), 
the required intervention involves changing the value of X from x0 to x1, but also 
breaking the influence of X on Z2 such that Z2 remains fixed with the value z0—
i.e., the value it would normally have when X is set to x0, even though the value 
of X is set to x1. The component effect along the causal path of Z1 will then be 
CompΔy=β1α1Δx. 
Now consider the OECD causal generalisation: ‘generosity of unemployment 
benefits (B) causes unemployment (U)’. As Daniel Hausman suggests, the ‘causal 
role’ of a causal relation refers to the causal influence of a cause on its effect 
being either positive or negative (Hausman 2010, 48). Accordingly, the causal 
role of B in relation to U is commonly believed to be positive due to evidence of 
mechanisms operating in the labour market such as the ‘job search effect’, i.e., 
that as generosity of benefits increases, jobless individuals covered by an 
unemployment benefit program tend to search for jobs less intensively (see 
Boeri and van Ours 2008, 11.2.1). Exclusively taking into account this 
component effect, an increase in B will be expected to cause an increase in the 
unemployment rate U. The corresponding policy recommendation would be to 
reduce and keep under strict control the generosity of unemployment benefits 
“at levels that do not discourage job search excessively” (OECD 2006, 21), which 
is indeed what the OECD study recommends. 
However, this would be oversimplifying the matter, since some economists 
argue that there is also a countervailing ‘entitlement effect’ that negatively 
relates the generosity of unemployment benefits to the unemployment rate. As 
the story goes, if B increases, then the jobless individuals currently ineligible 
for unemployment benefits would have a stronger incentive to get employed 
soon, because they will be entitled to higher unemployment benefits in case 
they lose their jobs in the future (see Boeri and van Ours 2008, 11.2.2). Thus, 
exclusively taking into account this component effect (i.e., the entitlement 
effect), an increase in B will be expected to cause a decrease in the 
unemployment rate U, and more generous unemployment benefits would then 
supposedly be an effective policy recommendation to reduce unemployment. 
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As a matter of fact, the ‘job search effect’ is believed to dominate the 
‘entitlement effect’, thus according to the extant literature, the net causal effect 
from B to U is normally positive. Yet, even when the net effect is well known in 
general, making explicit all the potential component effects can still be quite 
useful for policy purposes. For instance, before implementing any concrete 
change in the generosity of a system of unemployment benefits, it may be wise 
that policy makers first evaluate whether the ‘entitlement effect’ could possibly 
counterbalance the other component effects with an opposite causal role in the 
particular country in which the policy will be implemented. 
 
4.2.2. Necessity versus sufficiency 
With respect to the notions of necessity and sufficiency, the single-unit causal 
claim ‘(For ui), X ↪ Y’ can mean four different things: First, that for unit ui, 
bringing about a change in X is necessary and sufficient to induce a change in 
Y. Second, that for ui, a change in X is necessary (but not sufficient) for a change 
in Y. Third, that for ui, a change in X is sufficient (but not necessary) for a change 
in Y. And fourth, that for ui, a change in X is an insufficient but necessary 
element of an unnecessary but sufficient set of causal factors, i.e., an INUS 
condition, for a change in Y (see Mackie 1974, chapter 3). This fourfold 
distinction can be illustrated employing some simple equations representing 
each of these types of causal connections.  
First, an instance in which a change in X is necessary and sufficient for 
changing Y can be represented by:  
 
Y=αX  (with α≠0) 
 
Alternatively, an example of a causal system in which a change in X is 
necessary (but not sufficient) for a change in Y can be given by:  
 
Y=Z*X  (where Z is a variable for which DZ = {0, 1}) 
 
Notice that, in this latter expression, the multiplication of the variables 
indicates that it is a causal interaction between X and Z what is required to 
affect Y, rather than a change in X (or in Z) alone (see Woodward 2003, 44-45). 
Whereas a case in which a change in X is sufficient (but not necessary) for a 
change in Y is given by:  
 
Y=αX+E (where E stands for other relevant factors for Y) 
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In contrast to the previous expression, the linear addition of variables 
implies that there are no interactions among the causal factors, i.e., a change in 
any independent variable (in this case either X or E) is sufficient for a change in 
Y. Finally, by combining some components of the previous equations, it is 
possible to get an example in which a change in X is an INUS condition for a 
change in Y:  
 
Y=Z*X+E 
 
In this last case, a change in X is a necessary element of a set of conditions 
(but not sufficient, since Z also would have to take the value of 1) which are 
jointly sufficient to generate a change in Y, yet also jointly unnecessary (since 
a change in Y can alternatively be the consequence of a change in E).  
These distinctions are mainly intended to clarify two points. First, the four 
causal notions depicted above refer to four different ways in which a change in 
X can bring about a change in Y for a given unit ui. The main difference among 
these concepts is that each one imposes different requirements on the changes 
in X in relation to a causal structure, so that a change in Y actually obtains. 
Thus, for policy purposes it would seem indispensable that the different 
requirements of sufficiency or necessity for any causal claim are made explicit 
and that the particular causal structure of the actual system in which a policy 
is going to be implemented is properly checked to conform to such 
requirements. In other words, knowing that ‘X causes Y’ is true is not enough 
for policy purposes without also knowing the specifics of the meaning of ‘↪’ in 
terms of its necessity and sufficiency requirements in relation to the causal 
structure of application. 
Secondly, when a causal relation is presented as an equation—or 
alternatively when some structural equation is given a causal interpretation—
the functional specifications of the equation presuppose the choice of a 
particular causal concept in terms of sufficiency and necessity requirements. 
This point is especially relevant in sciences such as economics in which most 
of the empirical research conducted to build the ‘evidential base’ for causal 
generalisations employs some version of structural equations analysis.34 In 
general (yet not always), the regression literature in economics employs linear 
                                            
34 Some methodological accounts on the use of regression analysis as the primary tool in 
empirical economics are: Pearl 2000, chapter 5; Hoover 2001, chapter 7; Morgan and Winship 
2007, chapter 5; Angrist and Pischke 2009. 
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specifications to establish constant (and homogeneous) causal effects.35 A 
typical regression equation looks like: 
 
 
 
From this linear functional form, it is clear that empirical studies which 
employ this basic type of equations to estimate causal effects assume that a 
change in X is sufficient for a change in Y, regardless of any change in the values 
of the other variables Zi.
36  
Issues of necessity and sufficiency could lead to some semantic ambiguity 
in relation to policy-oriented scientific claims. These can be exposed by probing 
the correct interpretation of the causal claim ‘generosity of unemployment 
benefits (B) causes unemployment (U)’. Given that the OECD research on 
unemployment recognises that distinct causes can affect U through paths that 
are independent from B, then any interpretation of B as a necessary cause can 
safely be ruled out, which leaves us with two alternative interpretations: B is 
either a sufficient cause or an INUS condition for a change in U.  
The OECD research makes extensive use of regression methods based on 
linear equations such as the one described above in order to study the labour 
market institutions. Hence, there is some indication that the causal claim can 
be interpreted as ‘a change in B is sufficient to bring about a change in U’. 
Nevertheless, closer inspection of the narrative in the OECD research reveals 
the recognition that there are causal interactions among distinct factors that 
affect unemployment, such as interactions between B and changes in the GDP, 
for each of the member countries. Therefore, it might be more appropriate to 
interpret B, the GDP, and any other relevant causal factor as INUS conditions. 
And this seems to be the OECD position in some parts of the reports:  
 
                                            
35 This sentence in fact refers to two assumptions common to regression analysis, ‘linearity’ 
and ‘homogeneity’, yet the focus in this section is only on the consequences of the former. The 
consequences of the latter on establishing causal effects in heterogeneous populations for 
policy purposes are extremely significant, since (as it will be further discussed in section 4.5 
below) in heterogeneous populations it is not straightforward whether generalisations that are 
true for the population as a whole would also be true for specific individual units of the 
population. This issue alone is the motivation for most of the discussion in the following 
chapter. For some of the few existing philosophical discussions of this topic, see Hitchcock 
2001a; Steel 2008; Hausman 2010. 
36 The regression equation could let go this assumption of sufficiency by allowing interaction 
terms like X*Zi, yet this would again imply a quite specific form of interaction between the 
regressors. 
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The hypothesis here is not that unemployment benefits (or other structural 
factors) may cause movements in unemployment independently of 
movements in GDP, but rather that they may contribute, for example, to the 
unexpected depth or prolonged nature of a recession (OECD 1994b, 171). 
 
Another reason in favour of reading the causal claim as referring to an INUS 
condition is the recognition by the OECD that “institutional factors influence 
whether or with what lag new benefit entitlements affect unemployment” 
(OECD 1994b, 211). Thus, according to the OECD, institutional conditions are 
among the additional structural factors that usually interact with B in order to 
affect the level of unemployment. Still, if this is the correct reading, then the 
OECD oscillates between a sufficiency interpretation (implicit in the empirical 
research methods employed) and an INUS interpretation (semi-explicit in the 
rhetoric of the reports) of some of the proposed causal generalisations.  
 
4.3. SPECIFYING THE RELEVANT POPULATION 
The truth value of a causal generalisation can vary depending on particular 
interpretations about the right population of application denoted by the clause 
“For P”. This section explores the consequences of this additional source of 
semantic ambiguity for causal generalisations. The first thing to notice is that 
the contextual qualification ‘For P’ of causal generalisations is seldom explicitly 
stated. One would usually say that ‘smoking causes lung cancer’ without 
specifying what are exactly the units of analysis and the population of 
application, such as ‘for humans’. People typically accept as true claims like 
‘seatbelts save lives’ without any specification of whether this claim is meant 
to be true ‘for all humans’, ‘for all accidents’, ‘for humans of a certain type in 
accidents of a certain type’, and so on (see Hausman 2010). This type of 
vagueness is ubiquitous in causal generalisations in the social sciences. Yet 
many causal generalisations are only true for specific populations or 
subpopulations or they are true about a certain property of the population but 
hold no clear truth preserving inference relation with the units. 
There are two paradigmatic ways by which the relevant units of P can be 
specified. First, the specification can be extensional—e.g., explicitly referring to 
some particular individuals or to a concrete group or groups of them. The 
population is then composed of the specific units actually designated. The 
second option is an intensional specification. In this case, the units of the 
population are systems meeting certain conditions or having certain causal 
properties—e.g., humans living in Europe, workers between 20 and 40 years of 
age, modern market economies, and so forth. While the elements of an 
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extensionally-specified population are fixed once they have been designated, 
the elements of an intensionally-specified population could be changing 
continuously. 
Consider again the causal generalisation ‘more generous unemployment 
benefits cause higher unemployment’. It is plausible to say that the implicit 
population for such a claim is meant to be extensionally specified when stated 
in the OECD reports. The OECD’s primary role is to advice its members on policy 
issues, and it had 24 member countries in the early 1990s (when the OECD Jobs 
Study was commissioned), hence the list of the 24 members could be taken as 
the implicit population for the causal claim. 
One could argue just as well that the implicit population for the claim 
should be viewed as intensional, for instance: countries that fulfil a set of 
specific conditions and possess a set of causal characteristics which are 
required to be a member of the OECD. The population so specified could vary 
in time as the actual membership of the OECD changes. In fact, the OECD 
membership has substantially changed since the early 1990s from 24 to 34 
countries. With the intensional specification, the new members will thus be 
included as units of P as soon as they have joined the OECD assuming that they 
in fact have the required causal properties. Yet, new countries could be 
accepted as members of the OECD without having the relevant properties for 
which the causal generalisation is meant to be true. In principle, any country 
having the required causal properties would be part of the relevant population 
for which the generalisation is true, regardless of it being or not a member of 
the OECD. 
A policy relevant question would then be: are the causal generalisations 
about unemployment, which were established during the years prior to 1994 
(and from a concrete evidential base), true for all new members of the OECD? 
Consider, for example, Mexico, which became an OECD member in 1994. Mexico 
is in many respects quite unlike all the other countries that were already 
members: its “official” unemployment rate during the early 1990s was below 
3%, the proportion of its informal economy was (and still is) estimated to be far 
larger than that in all other OECD member countries, and it did not then (and 
still does not) have an unemployment benefits system.37 These facts about 
Mexico (particularly the last one) should make one doubt that the causal 
generalisation ‘more generous unemployment benefits cause higher 
                                            
37See Fleck and Sorrentino 1994; and references therein for better support for the distinctive 
Mexican causal characteristics. 
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unemployment’ is really meant to apply to it, even if the claim would be true 
for all the other members of the OECD. 
For a precise intensional specification of P, ideally the complete conjunction 
of all relevant causal properties would have to be stated. Furthermore—and as 
it will be argued in more detail in the following chapter—the methodological 
assumptions under which the OECD causal generalisations were established 
must be made explicit and tested at the unit level. For example, it should be 
checked how a target unit like Mexico stands in relation to the causal structure 
of the units that were taken into account when the generalisations were 
originally established.  
The most evident problem with getting a precise intensional 
characterisation of P is that in practice it is quite challenging (if not impossible) 
to get an exhaustive description of all the relevant causal properties required 
for a unit to be included. Since an intensionally-specified population has an 
unspecified extension, we always face the danger that a new country would fit 
the criteria for being a member of P (according to certain known relevant causal 
properties), but that in fact the generalisation would be false for it, because of 
some other unknown causal properties specifically related to this new country. 
 
4.4. CAUSAL GENERALISATIONS IN TERMS OF SINGLE-UNIT CAUSAL CLAIMS 
The possible choices related to specifying the population for which a causal 
claim is meant to be true are particularly significant for generalisations that are 
intended for policy use. Even if a causal generalisation can be reliably taken to 
be true in general, a user of the claim might want to know whether the claim is 
also true for the particular target unit or subpopulation of interest in which an 
actual policy is intended to be effective. It is often not straightforward which 
causal claims about individuals (i.e., single-unit causal claims) are in fact 
entailed by a causal generalisation. Among other things, this depends on 
whether the population P for which the causal generalisation is meant to be 
true is homogeneous or heterogeneous. 
Causally homogeneous population: In this case, each single-unit causal 
claim is true for all members of P and they all have exactly the same causal 
meaning, i.e., the causal relata ‘X’ and ‘Y’ are unambiguously defined and 
measured uniformly in all the units, and the causal relation ‘↪’ refers to the 
same causal concept and has the same (either positive or negative) causal role 
in all of the single-unit claims. The meaning of a causal generalisation for this 
kind of population can be understood as an inference from the conjunction of 
all the single-unit claims. For example, consider the causal generalisation ‘for 
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the population including all samples of element bismuth, heat of 271°C causes 
the sample to melt’.38 The homogeneity among the members of this population 
(in relation to melting) warrants that the truth of any single-unit claim about 
the melting temperature of any sample of bismuth can be reliably inferred from 
the truth of the generalisation. If a population P is homogeneous in this sense, 
then the generalisation ‘(For P), X ↪Y’ is true if and only if each of the single-
unit claims ‘(For ui), X ↪Y’ are also true. 
Causally heterogeneous population: In this type of situation either: 1) 
some single-unit causal claims are true for some members of P, but false for 
some others, or 2) all single-unit claims might be true for all members of P in 
the sense that there is a causal influence from X to Y, but the causal role (either 
positive or negative) is different among them (see Hausman 2010). A causal 
generalisation for this kind of populations is the result of an inference from a 
subset of single-unit causal claims to a statement about the whole population 
P. More precisely, a causal generalisation refers to a certain aspect of the whole 
P, based upon a subset of single-unit causal claims about some members of P. 
For this type of heterogeneous population, however, the truth of a 
generalisation does not entail the truth of any particular single-unit causal 
claim. 
In the OECD unemployment reports, just as in most policy-oriented 
economics research, the evidential base from which the causal generalisations 
are inferred consists to a great extent of empirical studies using regression 
analysis. The logic behind this empirical method can be captured by the 
‘counterfactual model for data analysis’ (Morgan and Winship 2007), also 
known among statisticians and economists as the ‘potential outcomes 
framework’ (see Rubin 1990, 2005; Holland 1986; Heckman 2000, 2005). 
Broadly put, given that there are some well-defined causal states X for the 
members of a population P, single-unit causal claims could be characterised as 
follows: For each unit ui, there are two potential values Y: y1 for the outcome of 
the “treatment” state x1, and y0 for the outcome of the “control” state x0. Only 
one of these outcomes is observed for each ui, while the other is hypothetical, 
yet inferred from the available data (see Morgan and Winship 2007, chapter 2). 
Then the causal effect on Y for a single unit is defined as the arithmetic 
difference between the two potential values (y1- y0). In this account, a single-unit 
                                            
38 This example is an adaptation of a case made by John Norton (2003, 649) on “material 
induction”. 
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claim ‘(For ui), X ↪Y’ means that for unit ui, if X varies from x0 to x1, then Y varies 
in a magnitude equal to y1- y0.
39 
Once all causal responses for each unit are obtained (from a data set about 
P), the population-level causal effect is established by making an inference from 
a distribution of all single-unit causal effects (plus a set of methodological 
assumptions). The meaning of the causal effect for the whole population thus 
varies depending on which property of the distribution is singled out by the 
estimation procedure (usually some average measure, e.g., mean, median, 
weighted mean, or the like). Thus the meaning of a causal generalisation 
established in this way can be stated as follows: ‘For the whole P, if X varies 
from x0 to x1, then Y varies on average the magnitude estimated as the causal 
effect (y1- y0). If a population is causally heterogeneous in the sense described 
above, then it is not obvious how one can infer anything definitive about the 
truth of a particular single-unit claim from the truth of a generalisation about 
an estimated average causal effect.  
For instance, the OECD generalisation “more generous unemployment 
benefits (B) cause an increase in unemployment (U)” can mean different things 
depending on which particular property from the set of single-country causal 
claims is picked out by the generalisation. For a population of countries Pc = {c1, 
c2,…, cn}, let us denote for each country in the population a single-unit causal 
effect by Δei > 0. Then the following are three possible (non-exhaustive) 
interpretations of the generalisation about a causal effect of B on U. 
 
1. If the generalisation assumes causal homogeneity among all members of 
Pc, then its meaning is: “For all members of Pc, Δei > 0”. 
 
2. If the generalisation singles out the median, then its meaning is: “For Pc, 
there is a number m of countries, for which Δei > 0, such that m > n/2”. 
 
3. If the generalisation singles out the mean, then its meaning is: “For Pc, 
1/n Σi Δei > 0”. 
 
The mean interpretation of the claim is commonly called the ‘average causal 
effect’, and it is by far the most usual interpretation in the econometrics 
literature. But notice that the connection between average-effect causal 
generalisations and single-unit causal claims is highly elusive. The 
generalisation understood this way does not entail at all that if one draws one 
country from the population, the causal effect of B on U for this country will be 
                                            
39 The potential outcomes framework and its methodological assumptions are described in 
more detail in the following chapter 5, see section 5.5. 
 73 
positive as it is indicated by the average. Moreover, the generalisation does not 
even entitle one to infer that the causal effect would be positive for the majority 
of countries (which is an inference that would be entailed by the median 
interpretation), since the positive average effect might have been pulled up by 
a few very large positive single-unit effects in a small minority of countries 
(while the majority of the total of countries exhibits null or negative single-unit 
effects). 
Econometricians know about these complications related to heterogeneity 
and in fact have a good amount of sophisticated techniques to deal with them 
(see, e.g., Angrist and Pischke 2009). Yet, the research results offered to the 
users of the science, such as the results summarised in the OECD reports, refer 
to average causal effects for a population P as a whole. One can only wonder 
whether policy makers, when dealing with their own particular unit-level 
targets, would get the correct interpretation of these causal claims, with all the 
relevant contextual and technical qualms concerning their causal 
interpretation. 
The point to be taken from this section is that the OECD causal 
generalisations have entirely different meanings depending on how ‘For P’ is 
specified, and depending on which properties of the distribution of single-unit 
causal claims the generalisations refer to. The example also suggests that the 
more causally heterogeneous a population is, the less reliable the inferences 
about single-units are likely to be when made only upon the basis of a causal 
generalisation. The specific assumptions about the truth conditions for a causal 
generalisation and about the heterogeneity of the relevant population 
determine which inferences at the single-unit level are allowed. This idea—
which has crucial implications for the use of causal claims for policy purposes—
is explored in much more detail in the following chapter. 
 
4.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The practical value of causal knowledge goes far beyond the intuition that the 
manipulation of causes is an effective strategy to bring about desired changes 
in the effect. Disambiguating the meaning of scientific claims that are intended 
as the basis for economic policy is a priority in the process of policy making. 
The OECD generalisations and policy recommendations on unemployment are 
a good example to illustrate these ideas.  
The semantic analysis developed in this chapter has shown that the causal 
generalisations presented by the OECD can have different meanings depending 
on: a) what are the precise referents of the causal relata, b) which causal concept 
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the causal claims refer to, and c) how the population of application is specified. 
Moreover, d) the causal effect that the proposed generalisations single out for 
the whole population of member countries of the OECD do not entail any clear-
cut or reliable inference about single-unit causal effects.  
The semantic complexity of these causal generalisations leaves the door 
wide open to subjective (and perhaps arbitrary) decisions made by the 
researchers and policy makers in order to grasp their own interpretation of 
these generalisations. More communication and collaboration between 
economists, philosophers, and policy makers can help make causal notions 
explicit and clear so that scientific causal knowledge can have a more useful 
and effective role in the solution of practical socio-economic problems. 
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PART III 
EVIDENCE AND ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART III 
 
Causal generalisations are claims of the form ‘X causes Y’ which are meant to 
be true for a whole population P given a number of conceptual, methodological, 
and inferential assumptions. Yet, they are typically presented to non-academic 
audiences as scientific results without any definite provisos about how they are 
meant to apply to individual members of a population, or about specific 
requirements of the background context of application. Policy makers are 
usually interested in formulating effective policies for particular target units 
(or sub-groups) of larger populations, e.g., a community, a city, a country, and 
the like; however—as it is suggested in the example discussed in chapter 4—it 
is not always clear how to infer unit-level causal claims of the form: ‘for unit u, 
X is an effective strategy for Y’ from a causal generalisation of the form: ‘in 
general for population P, X causes Y’. 
Apart from the normal scientific knowledge, additional information is 
required to warrant reliable inferences from causal generalisations to particular 
instances of policy implementation. As suggested in chapter 2, the concept of 
effectiveness depends on knowledge about a number of different elements, in 
addition of true causal generalisations established in isolation (see chapter 2, 
section 2.2). There I tentatively characterised effectiveness as depending upon 
the following notions: 
 
Effectiveness: degree of success of the actual implementation of a strategy 
or policy in pursuit of a definite goal under the ordinary circumstances of 
the case, conditional upon the practical potential of the causal knowledge 
employed, the degree of proficiency of the relevant users, the persuasiveness 
of the relevant claims, and all additional background conditions involved in 
the process of implementation. 
 
In the following chapters I will analyse the role of evidence in supporting 
the effectiveness of policy recommendations. My main aim is to show that there 
is an important contrast between the logic and the methods of assessing the 
evidential support, on the one hand, of causal generalisations, and of policy 
recommendations, on the other. As explained in previous chapters, the practical 
potential of a causal claim depends to a great extent on which causal 
connotation is referred to by the claim. Different notions of causality require 
different assumptions and appraisal criteria which in turn determine the 
specific meaning of a piece of scientific causal knowledge. And different 
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meanings of causality lead to different implications for practical purposes (see 
chapter 3). 
The evidence required for testing scientific causal generalisations is 
obtained employing methods of causal inference that allow researchers to 
control for all disturbing factors (the background conditions) so that the posited 
causal relation can be assessed in isolation. Whereas the evidence required for 
evaluating the effectiveness of a policy recommendation has to be obtained by 
taking into consideration all dimensions of the goal at hand; by using all the 
relevant economic knowledge available that relate to these dimensions; and by 
using whatever empirical work that could shed light on the goal at hand and on 
all its relevant dimensions (see chapter 1, section 1.5; and contrast with 
Colander 1994, 41-45).  
There is no absolute or overall procedure to achieving policy effectiveness, 
so the only way of offering some substantive insight on it is by analysing in 
some detail: a) the typical evidential requirements and testing methods 
employed to establish causal generalisations, and b) what I put forward as the 
distinct evidential requirements and methodology of evaluating policy 
hypotheses. In the following chapters, I shall offer answers to the questions: 
How does evidence for generalisations relate to policy recommendations? What 
does it count as acceptable evidence for policy goals? Where can one search for 
and attain such evidence? Is there any relevant information for policy 
effectiveness in the existing scientific evidential base of causal generalisations? 
In chapter 5, I discuss in detail an aspect of the practical relevance of causal 
knowledge that was prompted by the case study analysed in chapter 4, namely: 
how is it possible to infer effective strategies for particular country-cases from 
causal generalisations such as those presented by OECD? I start by exploring 
the existing philosophical literature on the meaning of causal generalisations, 
and on the relation between general- and unit-level causation (all this within a 
probabilistic framework). I argue that most proposals fail to offer a clear and 
useful account of the inferential relations between causal claims at the general 
and at the unit level. A key part of this chapter consists in showing how 
different versions of a causal theory—the probabilistic account in this case—
define their causal criteria by making different assumptions about inferential 
relations between singular and general cases. Defining different criteria (e.g., 
unanimity, Pareto, or fair-sample conditions) for what counts as causal 
determines, then, the potential inferences that can be made from the resulting 
causal claims. I then show how the potential-outcomes framework commonly 
used to establish causal generalisations in economics and other social sciences 
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relies on a number of conceptual and methodological assumptions (very similar 
to those used, e.g., in the fair-sample account), which at the same time enable 
and constrain the inferences that can be made from general results to the unit 
level. This illuminates a number of facets related to the problem of inferring 
unit-level causation from average causal effects in the presence of causal 
heterogeneity (as suggested in chapter 4, section 4.4). A way to deal with this 
issue is by making explicit all the relevant underlying methodological 
assumptions that are used by researchers to establishing the truth of causal 
generalisations. Clear knowledge of such assumptions by policy makers can 
provide useful information about which unit-level and contextual aspects 
should be checked and further evaluated to help making unit-level inferences 
on the basis of causal generalisations more reliable.  
In chapter 6, I suggest that causal generalisations and their practical 
relevance are inferentially connected to certain features of the evidential base 
employed to established them, and then elaborate on such features. An 
evidential base is the set of all the evidence that supports and allows an 
epistemic agent or community to believe that a piece of scientific knowledge is 
true. In economics, the evidential base used to support causal knowledge 
commonly includes a set of theoretical results and empirical studies. In this 
chapter, I focus on understanding the empirical methodology employed to test 
causal generalisations and on how to use that understanding to support 
effective policy making. As I have argued in the previous chapters, knowing that 
a causal generalisation is true is not sufficient for securing the effectiveness of 
policy strategies; therefore, good evidence for the truth of a causal 
generalisation is not necessarily good evidence for believing in the effectiveness 
of a related policy recommendation. The first part of this chapter is devoted to 
critically review the existing philosophical literature on the so-called evidence-
based movement and Nancy Cartwright’s “evidence for use” approach. I argue 
that the methodological worries related to the evidence-based movement and 
of Cartwright’s account are not useful enough to properly understand the 
evidential requirements relevant to policy purposes in economics. The 
literature has focused on the methodology of randomised controlled trials 
(RCTs),40 which are an allegedly important but not representative part of the 
evidential methods used in most of applied economics. The gold standard of 
evidence in economics is not RCTs, but a collection of well-established 
                                            
40 In relation to the use of randomised control trials in evidence-based medicine and health 
policy, see Cartwright 2012b. I will comment further on most of her work on the “evidence for 
use” approach in section 6.1. 
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econometric techniques. While there are some similarities in the epistemic aims 
and in the logic of these evidential techniques (for instance, both RCTs and 
econometric methods aim at testing causal relations by controlling as best as 
possible for all potential disturbing and contextual factors), the use of 
econometrics to establish causal claims has some specific methodological 
consequences for economic policy making. In the second part of the chapter, I 
analyse and discuss conceptually the basic problems of policy inference in 
relation to economics. Following Christopher Hitchcock (2001a), I identify 
different types of causal claims so as to characterise more precisely both: causal 
generalisations about large populations and policy hypotheses about particular 
units. I thus propose an account of evidence to support policy hypotheses that 
is different, and yet grounded upon, the typical ways in which empirical 
economists obtain evidence for causal generalisations. In my proposal, the 
distinction between scientific economics and the “art” of economic policy 
making is made explicit at the evidential level. 
In chapter 7, I illustrate what I have said in the previous chapters by 
analysing in detail the empirical literature in international trade economics that 
studies the economic benefits of free trade. A huge amount of empirical 
research has been produced with the aim of evaluating the hypothesis that: 
(more) trade liberalisation causes (more) economic improvements (in terms of 
growth, investment, employment, and the like). I explore these studies so as to 
characterise which type of evidence and which evidential methods are 
employed to support their results. Three methodological issues emerge: a) the 
lack of definite referents for the relevant causal relata, and specially for the 
posited causal variable “trade liberalisation”; b) the use of econometric methods 
as a “gold standard” of scientific evidence, which already come with a built-in 
conception of causality, and which in turn restrict the kind of inferences that 
can be reliably made about the effectiveness of policy implementations; and c) 
a tendency to seek for generality over specificity in the results of the research. 
I call the latter the “saving-the-generalisation attitude” among empirical 
economists. The pursuit of generality has been originally intended to enhance 
the confidence on the truth of purported policy-oriented causal generalisations, 
but it now seems to be backfiring by leading to scientific results in the form of 
broad causal generalisations with no clear ways to be applied in specific real 
cases. Even if the existing empirical evidence could be taken as acceptable to 
support that there is “some” causal relation between trade liberalisation and 
economic benefits (usually in the form of an average causal effect estimated 
using well-established econometric techniques), I argue that the existing 
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evidence is not conclusive at all (and probably not even appropriate) to support 
concrete policy recommendations for individual countries and their specific 
socio-economic conditions. In the final part of the chapter, I elaborate on my 
constructive proposal. I claim that there is a lot of information valuable from a 
policy-making perspective that is missing in the reporting of empirical research, 
I discuss this information in relation to the case at hand, and suggest that a 
stronger focus on this information (in accordance with the methodology of 
economic policy-making, as understood in this dissertation) will improve the 
reliability of economic science as a basis for attaining effective economic policy. 
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CHAPTER 5 
INFERRING POLICIES FROM CAUSAL GENERALISATIONS 
 
At the end of the previous chapter (section 4.4), it was suggested that the types 
of inferences about unit-level causal effects which can be made from causal 
generalisations vary depending on the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the 
relevant population to which the claim refers. When units in a population are 
heterogeneous in aspects that are causally relevant to the influence of a causal 
effect, it is not clear how one can infer anything reliable about the posited effect 
for particular units, exclusively on the basis of a causal generalisation. In this 
chapter I investigate whether there can be a methodical way of understanding 
which inferences about individual units of a population are allowed, and which 
ones are not, from the type of causal claims commonly employed in economic 
policy making. 
The OECD research results were presented in the form of causal 
generalisations, such as “the lack of labour market flexibility causes 
unemployment” or “unemployment benefits cause unemployment”. Causal 
generalisations are probabilistic causal claims that are meant to be true for a 
wide assortment of units and causal backgrounds (see Hitchcock 2001a). In the 
OECD case, policy recommendations to control unemployment levels were 
inferred from causal generalisations and offered as effective strategies to be 
implemented in individual OECD member countries (see OECD 1994c). 
Similarly, in the research on the economic benefits of free trade (a case to 
be analysed in more detail in chapter 7) the theoretical and empirical results 
are presented in the form of causal generalisations such as “trade liberalisation 
causes investment”, “trade liberalisation causes economic growth”, or “trade 
liberalisation reduces income inequality”. These generalisations are then 
employed in policy deliberations to justify prescriptions for specific countries 
such as “for Mexico, increasing trade liberalisation will increase capital 
investment, cause economic growth, and reduce income inequality”—which 
were among the reasons considered by Mexican economic authorities in favour 
of joining the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) back in 1994. 
The fact that these causal claims about unemployment and about the 
benefits of free trade are probabilistic causal generalisations makes the main 
question of this chapter a genuine policy-related worry: even if one knows that 
a causal generalisation is true, will this warrant its effectiveness guiding policy 
for any particular individual-unit case? Or, to put it in terms of one of the 
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examples above: even if one knows that the claim “trade liberalisation causes 
economic growth” is true, will that be enough to be certain that more trade 
liberalisation will cause growth in the context of any given individual 
community or country?  
In practice, causal generalisations are hardly ever universal or 
exceptionless. On the contrary, as a consequence of the typical heterogeneity 
of the populations for which they are meant to be true and the pervasive 
unevenness of background conditions, they are often “irregular” (see Hausman 
2010). Causal generalisations are taken as true only after making a great deal 
of simplifying and idealising assumptions regarding the populations of which 
they are about and the influence of background causal factors. Thus these 
claims wind up being true only in idealised settings in which all relevant 
disturbing factors are assumed to be fixed or absent or controlled for (see Mill 
1844 [1830], 97-98; Cartwright 1989, chapter 5; Hausman 1992, chapter 8; Mäki 
1992a, 1994; Reiss 2008, chapter 1). 
The gist of this chapter is the following: causality accounts make a number 
of assumptions at the conceptual level in order to define the truth conditions 
for probabilistic causal generalisations. These assumptions refer to different 
specific configurations of the causal properties of the units in a population, and 
to the causal significance of background factors. Deciding on using one set of 
assumptions rather than another, and setting up the truth conditions in one 
way or another, determines—as I will show—different and particular 
conceptions of causality. That is to say, different methods of causal inference 
(i.e., methods to test for causality) have distinct causal concepts already built 
into them before any testing is done. When a causal generalisation is thus 
assessed and accepted as causal, the specific assumptions used in order to 
define and test its causal status strongly determine the inferences that can be 
made about how the posited causal influence actually would obtain in any 
particular unit or member of the relevant population. 
The question about how to infer from established causal claims at the 
general-population level claims at the unit level is closely related to a relatively 
old philosophical question: how does general causation relate to singular 
causation? An answer to the latter question could be useful to answer the 
former, so I begin this chapter by looking at some existing attempts in 
philosophy to tackle it. Unfortunately, there seems to be no unambiguous 
conceptual framework accounting for how exactly causation at the so-called 
general level relates or connects to causation in singular cases. Still, the analysis 
presented in this chapter helps to identify more clearly a number of features in 
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causal inference that are actually problematic (or restrictive) for practical and 
policy purposes. 
In sections 5.1 and 5.2, I analyse how general and singular causation relate 
to each other within the framework of probabilistic theories of causality, and 
show how the assumptions required to set up truth conditions for general 
causation affect the inferences that can be made about singular cases. In section 
5.3, I consider an improved version of the probabilistic account, proposed by 
Christopher Hitchcock (1993, 1995, 2001a) and argue that while it solves some 
problems of previous accounts it still fails to offer an appropriate answer to 
the main question of this chapter. In section 5.4, I claim that existing accounts 
place a strong emphasis on saving the truth of causal generalisations at the 
expense of saying almost nothing about how to infer the truth of claims of 
singular cases of causation. In section 5.5, I illustrate the type of assumptions 
required to establish the truth of causal generalisations in the methodology of 
causal inference commonly used in empirical social scientific practice, and in 
which sense such assumptions can be restrictive for policy purposes. 
 
5.1. TWO NOTIONS OF CAUSATION 
Traditional theories of causality separate the study of causation into the 
analysis of two distinct notions. 
General causation (sometimes also labelled “type-level” or “property-level” 
causation) refers to relations reported by sentences like: 
 
Smoking causes lung cancer. 
 
Singular causation (sometimes also labelled “token-level”, “actual”, or 
“event” causation) refers to relations reported by sentences like: 
 
Pedro’s smoking caused his lung cancer. 
 
Proponents of the distinct theories of causality have been inclined to 
separate the analysis of general and singular causation on the presupposition 
that they are two fundamentally distinct notions. In line with this, most 
accounts have focused on explicating either one or the other notion, leaving the 
inferential relations between general and singular causal claims relatively 
unexplored. For instance, David Lewis’s (1973) counterfactual theory or Wesley 
Salmon’s (1980) process theory were explicitly intended to characterise cases 
of token-level (singular) causation, and in turn were essentially not concerned 
with the relation between singular cases and type-level causation. Alternatively, 
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probabilistic accounts of causality in their origins were explicitly devoted to the 
analysis of type-level (general) causation (e.g., Suppes 1970; Cartwright 1979; 
Skyrms 1980).  
Moreover, there is no clear agreement among the few accounts that take a 
more tangible stance on how the two notions relate to each other. For example, 
proponents of the regularity account have typically interpreted cases of 
singular causation as instantiations of true general causal regularities, so that 
the truth of claims about individual cases depends on (or follows from) the 
truth of general causal laws (e.g., Davidson 1967). The opposite view has also 
been put forward, namely that claims about singular causation are true 
independently of there being true causal regularities, and that the truth of 
general claims depends on whether they are proper descriptions of patterns of 
cases of singular causation (e.g., Ducasse 1926; Dowe 2000; Glennan 2011). Still 
another view is that there is no special priority between singular and general 
causal claims, since they refer to two related but essentially different concepts 
of causation (e.g., Sober 1985; Eells 1991; Hitchcock 1995). 
Elliott Sober (1985) and Ellery Eells (1991) have explicitly argued for a 
fundamental distinction between singular and general causal relations based 
on two distinct concepts of causation, each of which is said to require a 
different theory of causality in order to be properly characterised. According to 
Sober’s (1985) argument, cases of general causation—which he calls cases of 
“property causation”—refer to relations between “properties of a population” 
and can be suitably analysed by means of probabilistic theories of causality 
(Sober 1985, 420). So claims like “smoking causes lung cancer” can be 
interpreted as “smoking increases the probability of developing lung cancer”. 
However, the same probabilistic account—Sober argues—delivers ambiguous or 
counterintuitive results when employed to characterise cases of “token 
causation”, which are causal relations between token events (Sober 1985, 407). 
To illustrate Sober’s point, consider the following two famous examples. 
 
Counterintuitive example 1: A golf ball rolls towards the green with a high 
probability to drop in the hole. A squirrel passes by and kicks the ball 
diverting its trajectory and thereby reducing its probability of dropping in. 
However, the ball goes on rolling and drops in. Did the squirrel’s kick cause 
the ball to drop in? Intuition says yes, but probabilistic theory of causality 
says no, for the kick reduced the probability of the ball dropping in.41 
 
                                            
41 The original version of this example is attributed to Deborah Rosen by Patrick Suppes (1970, 
41). 
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Counterintuitive example 2: Sherlock Holmes walks into a valley as he is 
observed by Moriarty from the top of a cliff. Moriarty has a huge stone ready 
to be pushed down the cliff so that it will follow a specific trajectory with a 
high probability of killing Holmes. Watson being also at the top of the cliff 
realises that by pushing the stone at random, the probability of killing 
Holmes will significantly decrease, so he rushes to the stone and pushes it. 
The stone rolls down and kills Holmes nonetheless. Did Watson’s push 
cause the stone to kill Holmes? Intuition says yes, but probabilistic theory 
of causality says no, for Watson’s random push reduced the probability of 
killing Holmes.42 
 
After considering variants of these examples, Sober concludes that there 
must be two distinct concepts of causation, “the first concerns the causal 
significance of properties, while the second addresses the causal significance of 
token events” (Sober 1985, 407). The probabilistic theory of causality which 
otherwise adequately characterises property causal relations seems to fail to 
account for cases of token causation, such as those presented in the examples, 
and hence some alternative theory seems to be required in order to analyse 
cases of token causation. Sober suggests that Wesley Salmon’s (1980) causal 
process theory is a suitable candidate for dealing with cases of token causation 
(Sober 1985, 408), such that, in the examples above, it can then be true that “X 
type events reduce the probability of Y type events” at the property level, and 
simultaneously that “token event X initiates a causal process that results in the 
occurrence of token event Y”.43 
This type of argument has been used in the literature to make two basic 
points: a) singular and general causality are two distinct and independent 
causal concepts; and b) traditional probabilistic theories of causality are 
inadequate to characterise cases of singular causation and thus the two causal 
notions require different theories for their analysis. I will come back to these in 
section 5.3, after considering more closely how probabilistic accounts ended up 
focusing almost exclusively on saving the truth of type-level causal claims. 
 
5.2. TYPE- AND TOKEN-LEVEL CAUSATION IN THE PROBABILISTIC APPROACH 
As a result of the alleged complications related to the characterisation of 
singular causation, probabilistic accounts focused on the analysis of claims 
about general causation and on how to determine the truth conditions for such 
                                            
42 The original version of this example is by Irving J. Good (1961-1962). 
43 Ellery Eells arrives to a similar conclusion, namely that “token level” (singular) causation and 
“type level” (general) causation are two independent concepts that require different theoretical 
analyses, however he proposes a variant of the probabilistic theory of causality to analyse the 
cases of token-level causation (see Eells 1991, chapter 6). 
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claims. As it was mentioned before, this was done with no commitments about 
the approach being also suitable for analysing cases of singular causation (see, 
e.g., Suppes 1970; Cartwright 1979; Skyrms 1980). However, these proposals 
included at least implicitly a stance about the relation between type and token 
causal relations, since their strategy for defining necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the truth of causal claims consisted essentially in setting specific 
constraints on unit-level causal background conditions.  
The basic schema of this strategy is as follows: For the claim ‘X causes Y’ to 
be true for population P, X must increase the probability of Y in “enough” 
individual units of P that share the same specific relevant causal background. 
Here ‘the relevant causal background’ refers to the set of all factors apart from 
X that can have a causal influence on Y, and which have to be held fixed (or 
controlled for) to assess the truth of the causal claim for P. Yet it is the 
specification of how many individual unit cases are “enough” where the various 
proposals significantly differ from each other.  
The specification of the particular constraints imposed on the units at the 
token level amounts to taking a stance on the inferential relation between type-
level and token-level. Different assumptions about how many unit cases are 
“enough” for the truth of general causal claims entail different inferential 
relations between the causal generalisations and claims about single-units. To 
clarify this point, let us consider three of the typical proposals of truth 
conditions for causal generalisations: contextual unanimity, Pareto dominance, 
and the fair-sample condition.  
A traditional phrasing of the probabilistic theory of causality is that, for 
population P, event X causes event Y if and only if “the appearance of the first 
event is followed with a high probability by the appearance of the second, and 
there is no third event that we can use to factor out the probability relationship 
between the first and the second events” (Suppes 1970, 10). This can be 
expressed in terms of conditional probabilities: 
 
“For P, X causes Y” is true if and only if p(Y | X, Z) > p(Y | Z) 
 
Where X and Y stand for repeatable events, p(.) stands for a function of 
objective probability, and Z represents the complete set of additional causal 
factors that could affect Y in P (apart from X) and which have to be held fixed 
in order to make sure that “there is no third event” acting as a confounder. 
Population P is composed by individual units ui, such that P = {u1, u2,…, un}, so 
Z can be interpreted as a partition Z = {z1, z2,…, zn} where each of the zi 
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corresponds to a state description of the specific causal background (relative 
to Y) for each unit ui.
44 The different proposals for the truth conditions for 
causal generalisations can then be understood as different proposals of just in 
how many unit-specific causal background contexts zi the occurrence of X has 
to increase the probability of Y, for a causal generalisation to be true. Then the 
three proposals mentioned before can be described as follows. 
Contextual unanimity condition: the claim “For P, X causes Y” is true if and 
only if p(Y | X, Z) > p(Y | Z) in every zi relative to population P (Cartwright 1979; 
Humphreys 1989; Eells 1991). If the population is causally homogeneous with 
respect to Y, then the same zi characterises the causal background contexts for 
every unit of P, yet the condition can also apply to well-defined homogeneous 
subpopulations (see Eells 1991). In this account, the causal generalisation “For 
P, X causes Y” is true if and only if each single-unit claim “for ui, X increases the 
probability of Y” is true for every unit member of P. 
Pareto dominance condition: the claim “For P, X causes Y” is true if and 
only if p(Y | X, Z) > p(Y | Z) in at least one zi, and p(Y | X, Z) ≥ p(Y | Z) in all the 
remaining causal background contexts that are different to zi (Skyrms 1980). In 
this account, the causal generalisation “For P, X causes Y” is true if and only if 
there is at least one member of Z for which the single-unit claim “for ui, X 
increases the probability of Y” is true, and there are no members of Z for which 
single-unit claims of the form “for ui, X decreases the probability of Y” are true. 
Fair-sample condition: the claim “For P, X causes Y” is true if and only if 
p(Y | X, Z) > p(Y | Z) in a “fair sample” of population P (Dupré 1984), where ‘a 
fair sample’ refers to a subpopulation of P selected with no bias with respect to 
the relevant causal factors in Z (p. 173). Ideally this requirement warrants an 
even-handed distribution of all the specific relevant causal background 
contexts zi among the members of the sample. This account is typically 
interpreted in terms of a randomised controlled experimental design, since an 
ideal randomization would generate precisely a fair sample in the required 
sense (see Eells 1987, 111; Hitchcock 2001a, 224-225; Hausman 2010, 55-56). 
Then in this account, the causal generalisation “For P, X causes Y” is true if and 
only if the addition of all p(Y | X, zi) for all ui in the fair sample for which X 
occurred is larger than the addition of all p(Y | zi) for all ui in the fair sample 
for which X did not occur.  
                                            
44 This unorthodox way of defining Z as a partition corresponding to the units of P is only 
intended to keep the presentation expressed in terms of units rather than in terms of 
background conditions as much as possible. The essence of the different truth conditions for 
each of the proposals remains unaffected, which is what mostly matters for my purposes. 
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Which of these accounts is used to define the truth conditions for a causal 
generalisation determines and constrains the possible inferences one can make 
from the generalisation to individual cases. Consider the common example of 
“smoking causes lung cancer”. What do the three proposals above really tell 
about the truth of single-unit causal claims? According to the contextual 
unanimity proposal, “smoking causes lung cancer” is true for P if and only if it 
is true that smoking causes lung cancer for each zi for all the members of that 
population. Thus in principle, contextual unanimity could warrant that the 
truth of a single-unit claim for any particular ui in P actually follows from the 
truth of the causal generalisation. Unfortunately, this would be the case 
exclusively under the assumption that P is a causally homogeneous population. 
For practical purposes, if the units of the relevant target population are not 
causally homogenous in relation to the variable of interest, then the truth of 
single-unit causal claims cannot be straightforwardly inferred from the truth of 
a causal generalisation. The contextual unanimity condition might work well as 
an ideal standard for the truth of abstract causal generalisations, nevertheless 
in practice many generalisations that are of interest for policy purposes are 
meant (and expected) to be true about heterogeneous populations precisely in 
order to be useful (see Hausman 2010). 
According to the Pareto dominance condition, the generalisation is true if 
there are at least some ui for which smoking causes lung cancer and there are 
no units in P for which smoking prevents it. In this case, the truth of a single-
unit causal claim cannot be reliably inferred from the truth of the 
generalisation, since all one knows is that the causal claim is true for some units 
in P, but not necessary for all. The relevant population need not be causally 
homogenous for the causal generalisation to be true, and thus the claim might 
or might not be true for any particular ui depending on its particular set of 
causal background conditions. Knowing that a causal generalisation is true—
according to Pareto dominance—is simply not enough for inferring the truth of 
any particular single-unit causal claim.  
Finally, according to the fair-sample condition, “smoking causes lung 
cancer” is true if and only if in an ideal randomised experiment, the frequency 
of lung cancer is larger among the units that smoke than among the units that 
do not. In this case, it is far more ambiguous than in the previous cases how 
exactly the truth of a single-unit causal claim is to be inferred from the truth of 
a generalisation. The causal influence referred to by the generalisation is an 
average measure of the experimental responses observed in the fair sample. 
Since the sample is “fair” by definition, the result can be generalised for the 
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whole population as an average effect. Yet it is not clear how from the average 
probability of developing lung cancer as an effect of smoking—which has been 
estimated from a sample of the whole P—the probability of developing lung 
cancer as an effect of smoking can be inferred for any specific unit ui.
45 
The sketches presented here should suffice to illustrate how the 
philosophical discussion about how general and singular causation relate to 
each other within the probabilistic theory of causality has focused on what the 
necessary and sufficient conditions are (in terms of single-unit cases) such that 
causal generalisations of the form “For P, X causes Y” can be true. However, the 
posited accounts do not tell much about how to infer the truth conditions for 
particular single-unit claims of the form “For ui, X causes Y” given the truth of 
causal generalisations. Before moving on to analyse in more detail the 
implications of these theories being focussed on saving the truth of causal 
generalisations, I will consider in the following section a final and fairly neat 
philosophical attempt to connect general and singular causation. 
 
5.3. CONNECTING SINGULAR AND GENERAL CAUSATION: HITCHCOCK’S ATTEMPT 
Conceivably as a consequence of Sober and Eells’s influence, most accounts of 
probabilistic causation (as those discussed in the previous section) have been 
explicitly devoted to analyse type-level causation, with no particular interest in, 
or strong commitment to, analysing token-level causation. But is it really the 
case that general and singular causation are two independent notions as Sober 
and Eells (and the examples in section 5.1) suggest? 
Christopher Hitchcock’s (1993, 1995, 2001a) revision of the probabilistic 
account of causality is an ambitious attempt to dissolve the strong dichotomy 
between singular and general causation, such that both notions can be 
characterised with no need of two independent theories. In this section I show 
how Hitchcock’s proposal actually succeeds in conceptually connecting type-
level causal claims with token-level claims within the same probabilistic 
theoretical approach. Nevertheless, the success of this approach depends—as I 
will show—on the inclusion of several strong assumptions about probabilities 
and about the causal backgrounds of individuals, which make the account 
rather stylized and unlikely to be applicable to concrete cases in the social 
realm. Be that as it may, Hitchcock’s proposal is a clear illustration of how 
assumptions at the conceptual level in the characterisation of causal relations 
                                            
45 In fact, under the fair sample account, the more heterogeneous the population is, the less 
reliable any direct inference about unit-level effects will be. See discussion in section 5.5 on the 
assumptions of the potential outcomes framework. 
 90 
determine (or restrict) the inferential relations between type-level 
generalisations and unit-level causal claims about concrete cases. 
According to Hitchcock, even if one accepts that singular and general causal 
relations refer to distinct causal concepts, one can still challenge the idea that 
they need to be analysed by different theories of causality. He argues that the 
probabilistic theory (with some additions) can handle properly both notions of 
causation. 
Hitchcock (1993; 1995) presents a refinement to the probabilistic theory of 
causality in which he suggests that causal claims should be understood as 
reporting comparisons between different values of conditional probability 
functions. Thus, they should be interpreted as reporting that the value for Y 
that a conditional probability function yields when X takes a certain value is 
larger than the value it yields when X takes some other specific value. Causes 
increase (or decrease) the probability of their effects always in contrast to 
alternative causes, instead of exclusively in contrast to the absence of the 
putative cause (Hitchcock 1995, 261). Hence, in this account the inequalities 
that describe probability increases can be rewritten as: 
 
p(Y | X=x1, Z) > p(Y | X=x2, Z) 
 
The apparent problems in the examples presented in section 5.1 vanish as 
soon as the contrast values for X are properly set. In those examples, instead 
of one sole inequality describing a type of event X decreasing the probability of 
its effect Y (an effect which actually ends up occurring), there are two 
inequalities to be considered: the first describes one type of event x1 decreasing 
the probability of the event Y, in contrast to another kind of event x2; while the 
second inequality describes the same event x1 increasing the probability of Y, 
in contrast to an alternative event x3. 
 
p(Y | X=x1, Z) < p(Y | X=x2, Z) 
 
p(Y | X=x1, Z) > p(Y | X=x3, Z) 
 
The analysis of the relevant causal claims in the examples becomes 
unambiguous by interpreting the variables of the inequalities as follows:  
 
For example 1  For example 2 
Y=golf ball in the hole.  Y=Holmes crushed by stone. 
x1=squirrel’s kick.   x1=Watson’s random push. 
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x2=no kick.  x2=Moriarty’s well-aimed push. 
x3=squirrel’s different  x3=Watson’s push well-aimed 
more deviating kick. away from Holmes. 
 
Then from the first inequality p(Y | X=x1, Z) < p(Y | X=x2, Z) one finds that x1 
events reduce the probability of Y to occur, thus x1 events do not 
probabilistically cause Y in contrast to x2 events. In terms of example 1, a 
squirrel’s kick (x1) reduces the probability of golf balls to drop into the hole (Y) 
in contrast to no kick (x2). In terms of example 2, a random push (x1) reduces 
the probability of crushing the target (Y) in contrast to a push well-aimed at the 
target (x2).  
Whereas, from the second inequality p(Y | X=x1, Z) > p(Y | X=x3, Z) one finds 
that x1 events increase the probability of Y to occur, thus x1 events 
probabilistically cause Y in contrast to x3 events. In terms of example 1, a 
squirrel’s kick (x1) increases the probability of the ball going into the hole (Y) in 
contrast to a different type of kick (x3) which is more deviating than the first. 
And in terms of example 2, a random push (x1) increases the probability of 
crushing the target (Y) in contrast to a well-aimed push away from the target 
(x3). 
As Hitchcock points out, different alternatives for X become significant 
depending on the appropriate context of the analysis (Hitchcock 1995, 269-
272). Once contextual information is made explicit, the probabilistic theory can 
very well be used to analyse the allegedly problematic examples without 
reaching any of the counterintuitive results (Hitchcock 1995, 282). Thus it is 
possible to contest arguments using these examples to illustrate the limitations 
of the probabilistic theory of causation.  
But what about the connection between general and singular causation? 
Notice that Hitchcock ultimately deals with the examples by making explicit the 
contrast class of the posited cause X, and then by offering two probabilistic 
interpretations about two distinct general (type-level) causal relations. So the 
question remains: is Hitchcock’s refined probabilistic theory suited for 
analysing claims about singular causation as well? According to him, yes: 
 
This account applies at both the singular and general level. Singular causal 
claims describe probability relations between singular events (and also state 
that the named events occurred), while general causal claims describe 
formally analogous relations between generic event-types (Hitchcock 1995, 
277). 
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The account is meant to apply to both notions by making the relevant 
specifications for the relata in terms of either “singular events” or “generic 
event-types”. Thus both type of claims can be characterised within the same 
account. But even if Hitchcock’s proposal also allows for the characterisation 
of claims about singular causation, does it allow for the assessment of whether 
it is true that a particular single event X has caused event Y or not? Hitchcock’s 
account provides a probabilistic interpretation of cases of singular causation in 
terms of conditional probability functions, yet it takes for granted that the 
singular cases are already true. To make clearer the significance of this point, 
a brief elaboration on the details of Hitchcock’s proposal will be helpful. 
Consider the following form of a probability function: 
 
fi(x) = p(Yi | Xi = x) 
 
The function is analogous to those employed for describing causal relations 
at the general-type level, but in this case, the indexing numbers ‘i’ attached to 
the variables stand for single units (or “individuals” in Hitchcock’s account), 
thus the value of Yi represents a single event occurring to unit ui, such as 
“Pedro’s developing lung cancer”, and the value of Xi represents another single 
event occurring to ui, such as “Pedro’s smoking a certain amount of cigarettes 
per day”. Following Hitchcock’s account, claims about singular causation 
describe contrastive values of the above indexed type of conditional probability 
functions. For instance, the claim “Pedro’s smoking 10 packs of cigarettes per 
day caused him to develop lung cancer (relative to not smoking)” would mean 
that: p(Yi | Xi = 10) > p(Yi | Xi = 0), and that the two events standing as the causal 
relata have already occurred (see Hitchcock 1995, 279-280). 
If the goal of this account is mainly to characterise token-event level cases 
in terms of probabilistic measurements, then Hitchcock’s account offers a 
viable alternative to previous accounts. Nevertheless, it is not clear at all how 
this revised approach can be used in practice to connect both levels such that 
one can infer the truth of claims about singular events from claims at the 
general level. The problem I see in this respect comes from the formal 
assumptions that are required in order to define the proper conditional 
probability functions.  
Broadly put, the assumptions required include idealisations about 
probability spaces for token events, in which, for instance, events can be 
repeated infinitely often, such that sequences and probabilities of token events 
Xi for each individual unit ui can be well defined (see Hitchcock 1995, 277-278). 
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The major worry in relation to using this kind of idealising assumptions to 
formalise the account is that such assumptions are rather out of place when it 
comes to characterising the widely heterogeneous and in many cases 
unrepeatable events that are the subject matter of causal claims in actual social 
sciences (as the example in the previous chapter shows, see section 4.4). If there 
is no way to find a setting in the actual world at least vaguely resembling what 
the assumptions postulate in the formal setting, then any inference from the 
general level to the singular level could be formally sound and valid, but entirely 
unreliable in the real world.  
But suppose, for the sake of the argument, that Hitchcock’s analysis is 
practically applicable and suited to analyse causal claims at any level of 
analysis. What useful information can this account convey about the inferential 
relations between the two notions of singular (token-level) and general (type-
level) causation?  
The formal details and proof of the account are indeed indispensable for 
the accuracy of Hitchcock’s proposal. As mentioned above, a crucial 
assumption behind his account is that the probability functions for singular 
and general causal claims are interrelated given particular postulations made 
about the structure of the probability spaces in which they are respectively 
defined. If the indexed conditional probability functions of the form fi(x) = p(Yi 
| Xi = x) are all identical, i.e., if the causal influence of X to Y is identical from 
unit to unit, then it is possible to provide information about a “larger” 
probability space that would correspond to the not-indexed probability 
function f(x) = p(Y | X = x), which is the kind of function reported by causal 
generalisations (see Hitchcock 1995, 278-281). Therefore, the probability 
function described by “For P, smoking causes lung cancer” can be constructed 
from information coming from the unit level probability space, but only if a 
“uniformity of nature” assumption is met: “that individuals will have identical 
probabilities of suffering from lung cancer, conditional upon their smoking the 
same amount, and being alike with respect to other causally relevant factors” 
(Hitchcock 1995, 281).  
Hence what Hitchcock ultimately does is to develop a probabilistic 
requirement for characterising type-level causal claims, which is very similar to 
the contextual unanimity condition discussed in the previous section. Only that 
Hitchcock’s version includes the refinement that a posited cause is always 
relative to another alternative cause, and provides a formal apparatus with 
which the probability values for causal claims at the type-level can be defined 
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in terms of probability values at the token-level, which are also in principle well 
defined.  
As valuable as all these achievements are for the goal of being able to 
analyse both notions of causation within the same probabilistic approach, there 
is a constraint on the inferential relations between the two levels built-in in the 
specification of the account. In order to infer the truth of a single-unit causal 
claim from the truth of a causal generalisation, the uniformity-of-nature 
assumption has to be true for the population of interest. In any other (more 
realistic) situation in which such assumption does not hold for the relevant 
population, Hitchcock’s account fails to be informative about how to make 
inferences at the token level from true causal generalisations. 
 
5.4. SAVING THE TRUTH OF CAUSAL GENERALISATIONS IS NOT ENOUGH 
The main point to be taken from the previous sections is that inferences about 
causation at the unit level are dependent upon the particular specifications of 
the truth conditions used to establish causal generalisations. There are in fact 
two main types of specifications involved in the conceptual setting of causal 
generalisations which are (explicitly or implicitly) fixed a priori (i.e., before any 
empirical testing takes place), and which limit the inferences about whether ‘X 
causes Y’ in individual cases. 
First type, conceptual assumptions about the causal characteristics of the 
relevant population P = {u1, u2, u3,…, un} and about their specific unit-level causal 
backgrounds Z = {z1, z2, z3,…, zn}. These assumptions define essentially how 
homogeneous (and on which relevant respects) the members of the population 
under study should be for the causal generalisation to be true. Hitchcock’s 
“uniformity of nature” condition is an example of this kind of assumptions, for 
it states (as described in the previous section) that the same conditional 
probability function holds for all individuals ui, at the unit level, given that they 
all are identically affected by the posited cause X, and given that they are all 
identical in all relevant Zs. This assumption is indispensable in the account to 
make the proper connection to the related general-level probability function 
(see Hitchcock 1995, 278-281). The uniformity of nature condition is in effect a 
description of how homogeneous certain causally relevant aspects of 
individuals ui should be for the causal generalisation to be true about P. (As it 
will be illustrated in the following section, assumptions of this type are often 
required and used in empirical research in order to make standard causal 
inferential methods operational.)  
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Second type, the specification of the truth conditions for the causal 
generalisations in terms of causal influences at the unit level. These conditions 
define the criteria for discriminating spurious relations from genuine 
causation, but always in relation to a specific causal conception. This is 
precisely what the contextual unanimity condition, the Pareto condition, and 
the fair-sample condition are meant to do. They describe the sufficient and 
necessary criteria (in some ideal conditions) for a causal generalisation to be 
true. Since such criteria is defined in terms of the units ui for which the posited 
cause X should increase the probability of the effect Y (conditional to their 
respective backgrounds zi), these conditions—as described in section 4.2—
allow entirely different inferences about causation at the unit level. (As it will 
be illustrated in the following section, standard inferential methods commonly 
used in empirical social research define truth conditions in this very same way, 
and thus they come with a particular notion of causation a priori fixed. As 
argued in chapter 3, different notions of causation in a causal claim in turn 
determine to different extents the inferences that are allowed from that claim.) 
There is no clear answer—in the relevant philosophical accounts—to the 
important practical question of how to infer the truth of unit-level cases from 
the truth of causal generalisations. Most of the existing approaches focus on 
defining the appropriate conditions to warrant the truth of causal 
generalisations—which incidentally seems to be an attitude one also can find 
in empirical studies devoted to test posited socio-economic causal relations (see 
the examples in chapters 4 and 7). 
During the philosophical debates in the 1980s about probabilistic causality, 
John Dupré (1984) famously suggested a hypothetical case (with the aim of 
undermining the contextual unanimity proposal) in which there is a rare 
condition present in some members of a population, such that if they have the 
condition, smoking make them less likely to develop lung cancer. In relation to 
Dupré’s example, Ellery Eells made this remark: 
 
[A] person contemplating becoming a smoker, and trying to assess the 
health risks, should not be so concerned with the population frequency of 
that condition, but whether or not he has the condition. That is, the person 
should be concerned with which subpopulation he is a member of, the 
subpopulation of individuals with the condition (a population in which 
smoking is causally negative for lung cancer) or the subpopulation of 
individuals without the condition (a population in which smoking is causally 
positive for lung cancer) (Eells 1991, 104). 
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The idea emphasised in Eells’s comment is comparable to the practical 
concern presented in the introduction of this chapter. From a policy-oriented 
point of view it would be much more useful to know about which particular 
conditions have to be met for a causal claim to be effective in relation to a 
concrete target of interest, rather than to know that a causal claim tends to be 
true in general. In other words, when a particular individual unit (e.g., an agent, 
a group, a country) has a decision to be made about achieving a certain practical 
goal on the basis of causal knowledge, the relevant concern is not necessarily 
(or exclusively) whether a causal generalisation is true or not for a whole 
population, but rather the concern is: given that the generalisation is true, how 
one can tell whether the posited causal relation will hold in an individual 
concrete case of interest.  
Before moving on to the next section, let me put into words a brief 
preliminary reflection about the prospects of making policy analysis more 
reliable. Assuming for a moment that everything I say in this chapter is in fact 
perfectly well-known by philosophers of causality and probability experts, the 
issues I intend to emphasise are the following: are all the assumptions and 
conceptual specifications in the heart of causal inference always clear and 
explicit enough to all potential users of scientific results in the form of causal 
generalisations? Are all the potential users of such causal knowledge aware of 
all the intricacies and qualms about the outcomes of empirical scientific 
research?  
Given that one knows that a causal generalisation has been assessed and 
established as true, it should be possible to make explicit all the relevant 
methodological assumptions that were required in the process of causal 
inference, such that all of them could be independently tested in relation to any 
concrete case of actual policy deliberation. One could increase the level of 
confidence in the expected effectiveness of a particular policy or strategy by—
in addition of trusting that scientific causal claims are true—further evaluating 
whether (or how) the conceptual specifications employed in idealised settings 
also hold for the unit-level concrete cases of interest. Making all the relevant 
assumptions reasonably clear and explicit in this way—and then testing 
whether they hold or not for specific particular units in their particular 
background contexts—seems at least as a first approximation towards a 
procedure for obtaining more reliable information about whether a causal 
relation is true for particular target units.46  
                                            
46 This tempting and admittedly simple idea will be elaborated further in the context of the 
forthcoming chapters. 
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5.5. THE POTENTIAL OUTCOMES FRAMEWORK OF CAUSAL EFFECTS 
I move now from the philosophical discussions on singular and general 
causation to the realm of the empirical methodology that social scientists use 
to make inferences about the truth of causal relations. In particular, I focus in 
this section on the counterfactual model of observational data analysis (see 
Morgan and Winship 2007), also known by statisticians as the potential 
outcomes framework of causal effects.47 The aim is, on the one hand, to 
illustrate how conceptual and a priori methodological assumptions (similar to 
those described in the previous sections) are the backbone of one of the most 
successful methods of causal inference currently available in the social 
sciences. And on the other hand, to weigh up a key idea related to this 
framework, namely that once the assumptions required to establish the truth 
of a causal generalisation are made explicit, one can then proceed to assess 
whether they are valid, or reasonable, or realistic, or true about a particular 
individual member of a population and about its particular causal context. 
The potential outcomes framework is often used in economic research to 
support policy recommendations such as those related to the OECD 
unemployment research, and to the research on the benefits of free trade 
briefly mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. As the study of these two 
cases shows (in chapters 4 and 7), when empirical methods are used in 
economics to establish causal generalisations, it is mostly only the final 
outcomes of the research (in the form of generalisations) that is offered to the 
policy makers as scientific guides for action.48  
The model is composed by a population P of units ui, such that P = {u1, u2,…, 
un}; and variables representing the causal relata X and Y, which can take 
different values assigned by some measurement process for each given unit of 
analysis. Analogous to the logic of an experiment, a treatment variable and a 
response variable are defined on the basis of the particular aim of the 
investigation. 
                                            
47 Paul Holland (1986) refers to the framework as “Rubin’s model of causal inference”, since it 
was Donald Rubin who formalised it in a series of papers (see, e.g., Rubin 1974; 1977; 1978); 
while Rubin attributes the framework to Jerzy Neyman’s original studies (see, e.g., Neyman 
1935) on the “potential outcomes” of different treatments of land plots in agricultural 
experiments (see Rubin 2005, 324). For a “brief and selective history” of the potential outcomes 
framework, see Morgan and Winship 2007, chapter 1, sections 1.1 and 1.2. 
48 It could be argued that policy makers in fact demand such type of final results in the form of 
straightforward generalisations, so that they can use them quickly and easily as recipes for 
action without having to deal with the methodological complexities involved in their 
production. 
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Just as in Hitchcock’s account, the effect of a certain cause is always the 
result of a contrast to an alternative cause (Holland 1986, 959). Causes are 
variables that can be interpreted as treatments to which the units of P can 
potentially be exposed to, and the response variable is a measurement of the 
difference between the outcomes produced by alternative treatments on the 
same unit. Assuming for simplicity a binary cause X = {x1, x2}, then for each unit 
ui in P: 
 
y1 is the value of Y if ui is exposed to x1 
 
y2 is the value of Y if ui is exposed to x2 
 
Then the unit-level causal effect of x1 on ui (relative to x2) is given by the 
difference: 
 
dy = y1 - y2  unit-level causal effect 
 
In principle, the main goal of the analysis is to measure the value of the 
causal effect at the unit-level, however this goal is frustrated by what Holland 
calls the “fundamental problem of causal inference”: it is impossible to observe 
simultaneously on the same unit the value of y1 and y2 and, therefore it is 
impossible to observe the causal effect of x1 on unit ui alone (Holland 1986, 
947). 
A way of dealing with this problem is to focus on the population-level causal 
effect, rather than on the unit level, and to take for granted a number of a priori 
conceptual assumptions. Standard statistical analysis is used at the population 
level in order to calculate probabilities, distributions, and expected values. The 
probability of a variable taking a certain value is the proportion of units in 
which the variable takes that value, and expected values are calculated as 
average values over all members of P. The population-level causal effect is then 
defined as an average measure on the unit-level causal effects for P. The most 
usual average effect employed is the expected value of the difference y1 - y2 for 
all ui. This specific causal concept is typically called the average causal effect 
(ACE) = E(y1 - y2), which can also be expressed as: 
 
ACE = E(y1) - E(y2)  average causal effect 
 
 99 
Once defined in this way, the ACE can be estimated from observable data, 
since information from different units can be gathered to calculate E(y1) and 
E(y2) separately. The crucial move at this stage is that well-defined unit-level 
causal effects, which cannot be observed, are replaced by the population-level 
average causal effect which can be estimated. Causal inference proceeds from 
the observed values of X, either x1 or x2, and the observed values of the response 
variable Y, for each ui. A causal generalisation obtained using this framework 
can then be interpreted as:  
 
For population P, X = x1 (in contrast to X = x2) has an average causal effect 
dy = y1-y2 (see also Pearl 2000, 98; and Rubin 2005). 
 
Notice that this account is analogous to the fair-sample account defended 
by Dupré, which uses an average effect in a “fair sample” of members of a 
population to infer whether there is a causal effect for the whole population 
(see Dupré 1984). And just as in the fair-sample account (reviewed in section 
5.2), knowing that a generalisation about an ACE is true, it is not enough to 
automatically know what can be reliably inferred about the truth of any single-
unit causal effect.  
To see this more clearly, let me restate what is going on here: causal effects 
cannot be observed from a single unit (because of the fundamental problem of 
causal inference), but an ACE can be estimated from observed data on the 
outcomes of units exposed to x1 and the outcomes of units exposed to x2. Given 
certain assumptions (to be reviewed below), the ACE is then the expected value 
of the difference between being (potentially) exposed to x1 and to x2 in the 
population of study. However, from such expected value, it is not 
straightforward what the actual values of concrete unit-level causal effects 
would be for any individual unit. 
The inferential process leading to an ACE requires a number of assumptions 
specifically intended to deal in one way or another with the fundamental 
problem of causal inference. To properly understand the meaning of an ACE 
one needs to understand the specific roles of the assumptions that are used to 
arrive at the final result. As it will be discussed below, some of them are 
indispensable to estimate an ACE in the first place, while also some of them are 
more essential than others in determining the inferential relations between the 
estimated ACE and unit-level causal effects. The main assumptions usually 
employed to estimate an average causal effect (ACE) are the following: 
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Temporal stability: The value of yj, with j={1, 2}, is assumed to be 
independent of when the cause xj is produced and measured in any 
particular unit ui of P. The inferential framework assumes that the response 
on the same unit to the same cause would be the same response over time. 
Simply put, it does not matter at all when any particular unit is exposed to 
the posited cause (or to its alternative), the response will be the same for 
that same unit.  
 
Causal transience: The value of yj is assumed to be entirely independent 
from any prior exposure of ui to the alternative cause, this means that the 
effect of the cause and the measurement that results in, say, y1 does not 
affect ui enough so as to affect the value of y2 measured at a different point 
in time. Which is to say that it does not matter at all how many times any 
unit is exposed to the posited cause, the response will be the same each 
time for that same unit.49 
 
Independence: The values of Y for each unit ui are assumed to be 
independent of the process whereby units are assigned either to receive x1 
or x2. A process of randomisation correctly carried out makes possible the 
independence between the assignment of X and the respective responses. If 
randomisation is possible, and thus the independence assumption is 
granted, then the ACE can be estimated from the available data on the 
observed variables. 
 
Unit homogeneity: The value of the response variable y1 is assumed to be 
equal for all units ui, and the response variable y2 is also assumed to be 
equal for all units ui. Therefore, the unit-level causal effect dy can be 
calculated by subtracting the y2 observed in units that were exposed to x2 
from the y1 observed in other units that were exposed to x1. 
 
Constant effect: the value of dy on every unit of P is the same. If the 
variability of dy is large among the members of P, then the ACE may not 
represent correctly the causal effect of specific units ui. Simply put, the 
constant effect condition states that if every unit could be exposed 
simultaneously to x1 and to x2, the difference between the two outcomes 
will be the same for all units. This assumption can be seen as stating a form 
of causal homogeneity, and in this sense is analogous, e.g., to the contextual 
unanimity condition for the truth of causal generalisations (see section 5.2). 
 
Stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA): the value of dy of each 
unit ui is assumed to be independent of any changes in the causal exposures 
to X of any of the other units in P (see Morgan and Winship 2007, 37-40). If 
this assumption does not hold, then the causal effect would be open to 
variation depending on how many members of P are exposed to the causal 
variable. 
                                            
49 Notice that if temporal stability and causal transience both hold, then dy = y1 - y2 could be 
calculated by exposing the same unit ui to x1 (and measure its effect on Y) at some point in time, 
and then to expose it to x2 (and measure its effect on Y) at a different moment. 
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From this list of assumptions, the first two—temporal stability and causal 
transience—are required to validate to a certain extent the inference from the 
unit-level causal effects yd to the ACE at the population level. However, they are 
not indispensable in the sense that the ACE can be calculated from the existing 
data regardless of these conditions failing to hold strictly. They are mean to 
avoid that the ACE is biased. If temporal stability is not secured, the ACE could 
be including the effect of a confounder, i.e., the time at which units are exposed 
to X. If causal transience is not secured, then the number of times a unit has 
been exposed to X could be a confounder as well. In the ideal situation in which 
these assumptions hold, they make the ACE more reliable. Of course, in real-
life cases, the situations described by these assumptions would seldom (if ever) 
be the case. Still, a way of understanding these assumptions from the point of 
view of a user of scientific causal results can be: the closest the actual situation 
of interest resembles situations of temporal stability and causal transience, the 
more reliable (or the less biased) the value of the ACE is as an estimate for the 
whole population.  
Independence and unit homogeneity are indispensable to validate the 
inference of the ACE from the data on the unit-level observed outcomes. 
Independence is required to make sure that all potential confounders are 
distributed equally between the units exposed to cause x1 and those exposed to 
x2. In practice this is achieved by using different randomization techniques, and 
thus independence is dependent on the practical difficulties of actually 
achieving randomisation using the relevant technique in the population of 
interest. Independence is essential to secure that the average causal effect 
estimated is the genuine outcome of the posited cause X, rather than of any 
other potential disturbing factor. Lack of independence in practice, makes the 
ACE unreliable. 
Unit homogeneity is a more debatable assumption. In practice, the higher 
the degree of unit homogeneity (i.e., the more similar the outcomes of exposure 
to x1 or to x2 are among all units), the better the ACE will represent the actual 
value of the unit-level differences between y1 and y2. Again this assumption is 
not indispensable to actually produce the estimate, but it makes the ACE more 
meaningful for potential inferences, so to speak. The better the ACE represents 
the actual outcomes of exposure to X for all units, the more confidence one can 
have on the inferences about unit-level causal effects. 
Constant effect and stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) are also 
meant to make the ACE a better representation of the actual difference between 
 102 
exposure outcomes (to the posited cause X). But what is more, they are 
indispensable for the validity of any inference about unit-level causal effects 
from the estimated value of an ACE. Thus these assumptions are extra 
important for practical and policy purposes.  
As Holland explicitly puts it, the constant effect assumption “makes the 
value of the average causal effect relevant to every unit and, therefore, allows 
[the ACE] to be used to draw causal inferences at the unit level” (Holland 1986, 
949). Hence, even when an ACE is perfectly well estimated, if the constant effect 
assumption does not hold in reality, one cannot make reliable inferences about 
causal effects for any particular unit of interest. 
Similarly, the SUTVA states that the outcomes of causal exposure in the 
units are independent among each other. If SUTVA does not hold, the ACE is 
unstable among units in a very unsystematic way. Broadly put, the causal effect 
for each unit will be dependent on how many other units have been exposed to 
cause X, which will make the ACE entirely unreliable for inferential purposes. 
The example of causal generalisations on the benefits of free trade provides a 
good illustration of the significance of this assumption: the causal effects of a 
trade liberalisation policy in a country (almost by definition) cannot be entirely 
independent of the trade liberalisation policy implemented in other countries. 
In relation to trade liberalisation policies, it is precisely the concurrence of 
causal interventions in different units (countries) which determines to a great 
extent the resulting causal effect (see chapter 7). 
The point of making these assumptions explicit is not to simply question 
them as unrealistic or false, but rather to understand that they are part of the 
meaning of a causal generalisation about an ACE. Accordingly, any user or 
consumer of this kind of causal knowledge could benefit from taking them 
seriously. As I have been repeating all along this chapter, the meaning of a 
causal generalisation depends (among other things) on the conceptual 
assumptions made a priori to characterise it. These assumptions carry essential 
information about when, where, and how causal concepts are supposed to 
obtain in the real world. 
As Holland suggests, it would be “a mistake to conclude from the 
Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference that causal inference is impossible. 
What is impossible is causal inference without making untested assumptions” 
(Holland 1986, 959). This is perfectly acceptable when investigating or testing 
causal relations in isolation, e.g., when doing positive scientific economics (as 
described in chapter 1). However, such untested assumptions should later be 
put to the test whenever the aim is to implement an effective policy in a 
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concrete target situation, i.e., when engaging in the art of economic policy 
making (see chapter 1). The potential outcomes framework is a method that 
focuses on establishing empirical scientific knowledge in the form of “causal 
generalisations”, however to be useful for concrete policy purposes, its 
assumptions should be explicit and clear to the users of the science so that they 
can be tested in the context of the particular situations of interest. 
The first point that should be made explicit about the potential outcomes 
framework is its emphasis on measuring the effects of causes rather than on 
investigating what the causes of given effects are (Holland 1986, 959). The 
method is meant to offer estimates of causal effects given that previous causal 
knowledge about the hypotheses under investigation is available or 
presupposed by the researchers. On this, Morgan and Winship comment that: 
 
To offer a precise and defendable causal effect estimate, a well-specified 
theory is needed to justify assumptions about underlying causal 
relationships. And, if theory is poorly specified, or divergent theories exist 
in the relevant scholarly community that support alternative assumptions 
about underlying causal relationships, then alternative causal effect 
estimates may be considered valid conditional on the validity of alternative 
maintained assumptions (Morgan and Winship 2007, 30). 
 
Hence, any potential user of the results of this research should be well 
aware that the specifics of the theory and those of any underlying causal 
relations on which scientific causal hypotheses rely have to be independently 
tested. The fact that empirical results are sensitive to the theoretical 
presuppositions underlying empirical research is well known by scientist, but 
commonly neglected in the process of policy making (this issue will be 
reconsidered in chapter 6).50 
For policy purposes, whenever the potential outcomes framework is 
employed to evaluate a causal generalisation, and then subsequently the same 
generalisation is employed as an input in a policy deliberation for the 
attainment of a desired effect in a particular unit-system (e.g., a city, a country, 
a community, or the like), the following steps will be advisable to take:  
 
                                            
50 The focus on the measurement of the effects of causes can be considered as a significant 
limitation of the potential outcomes framework for policy purposes, since in the policy making 
process the interest is not only on the exclusive causal influence of one cause on its effect, but 
rather on what all the relevant causes for the production of the desired effect are and whether 
they are or not present in the particular case of interest. Nevertheless, the framework is often 
employed to evaluate the “effectiveness” of policy claims (see Morgan and Winship 2007, 17-
21). 
 104 
a) Review exactly which methodological assumptions were made in order 
to deal with the fundamental problem of causal inference.  
 
b) Evaluate how large the variability of the posited ACE is assumed to exist 
among the different units of P (this can be done in practice via sensitivity 
analyses, yet these analyses are not always offered to the policy makers 
as relevant information together with the research results). 
 
c) Check out whether the assumptions that were made to calculate the ACE 
hold for the particular unit-system for which the policy recommendation 
is intended, for the degree to which these assumptions hold or fail to 
hold for the relevant unit will indicate how reliable the inference made 
about this unit can be.  
 
The steps presented above are not enough for securing the truth of policy 
claims, for instance more has to be done in terms of getting the proper 
evidential support for policy claims. But carefully performed, these basic steps 
can help increase the reliability of the inference of particular single-unit policy 
claims from the truth of scientific causal generalisations. 
 
5.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this chapter, I focused on the question of how causal claims about individual 
units of a population can be warranted by the truth of causal generalisations. 
After considering traditional probabilistic approaches to causality, I argued that 
the existing philosophical accounts about how to understand causal 
generalisations mainly focus on establishing the truth conditions for the causal 
claims, but do not say much about the inferential relations between true 
generalisations and claims about particular cases (i.e., the ones relevant for 
policy recommendations). The main point put forward is that the criteria for 
the truth of causal generalisations (defined under different assumptions) 
enables and constrains the inferences that are allowed from the general (or 
average) level to the individual unit case. 
The analysis also shows that for every proposed specification of truth 
conditions for causal generalisations there are always some (more or less 
implicit) methodological assumptions that are required for the claims to be 
true. From this insight, I have proposed that to make better informed inferences 
from causal generalisations to concrete individual cases, these assumptions 
should be made explicit, and it should be investigated case by case how they 
hold in concrete contexts of application. The main idea behind my proposal can 
be expressed in simple language as follows: if you want to infer a concrete 
policy recommendation form a causal generalisation, tell me which 
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assumptions were made to establish the truth of the generalisation at the 
conceptual level, and then I will tell you which aspects of your particular and 
concrete case have to be checked to make your inferences more reliable. 
Finally, I illustrate the relevant methodological assumptions that have to be 
made explicit for concrete policy purposes by using the potential outcomes 
framework for causal inference. As it will be made clear with the case study in 
chapter 7, assumptions like unit homogeneity, constant effect, or SUTVA are 
usually required in empirical research to establish the truth of causal 
generalisations. Therefore, the implications of whether these assumptions 
actually hold or not in concrete cases of application have to be properly 
inspected each time one makes an inference to a concrete new case. In the 
following two chapters, I will refer to this framework again, and will elaborate 
in more detail on the proposal here only sketched. In particular, I will explain 
how the different sources of evidential support for policy making are related to 
testing whether methodological assumptions hold or not for target unit cases. 
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CHAPTER 6 
EVIDENCE FOR CAUSALITY AND EVIDENCE FOR POLICY 
 
In the previous chapter, I have argued that the conceptual assumptions 
required for defining and assessing the truth of causal generalisations 
determine the inferences that can be made about the truth of unit-level policy 
recommendations. If the population of reference, P, is not causally 
homogeneous in the relevant respects, then the truth of a causal generalisation 
does not automatically allow reliable inferences about the truth of the posited 
causal relation for particular units of P (let alone for units belonging to other 
populations different from P). In this chapter, I investigate in more detail the 
difficulties of inferring unit-level policy recommendations from general causal 
claims, and the ways in which empirical evidence can be used to deal with such 
difficulties.  
I defend the claim that there are different roles for empirical evidence in 
relation to the process of policy making, which are often conflated in academic 
discussions on the practical relevance of economic science: one is the 
straightforward and direct role in establishing economic causal generalisations, 
another is a more indirect and often complex role in the process of making 
inferences about effective policy strategies on the basis of causal knowledge. 
The distinction between these two roles of evidence is mainly methodological 
and follows—as I will make clear in this and the next chapter—from the 
distinction between scientific inquiry and policy making defended in chapter 1. 
Evidence plays different functions in the process of testing scientific causal 
claims and in the process of inferring effective policies because these two 
activities have different epistemic aims which require rather different appraisal 
procedures. 
There are some quite comprehensive philosophical accounts explicitly 
intended to tackle in general the use of evidence and scientific knowledge in 
relation to policy with a fairly normative attitude (see, e.g., Kitcher 2001; 
Douglas 2009; Mitchell 2009). In a much more focused line of research, 
philosophers interested in studying how scientific knowledge is employed to 
shape policy have directed their attention to a relatively recent case: the 
evidence-based movement. Since the 1980s, researchers in medical science (and 
later in other disciplines) have been advocating a more evidence-based 
approach to scientific practice, in contrast to traditional approaches which have 
been mainly based either on pure theory or on what are often considered low-
quality and unreliable forms of evidence, e.g., narrative studies, unsystematic 
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experience-based accounts, common sense, informal conventions, expertise, 
and so forth (see, e.g., Cochrane 1972; Guyatt, et al. 1992; Sackett, et al. 1996; 
Sackett, et al. 1997; Petty 2006). 
In a nutshell, the main idea motivating the whole evidence-based approach 
is that empirical sciences should devote more effort to improving and 
systematising their evidence-gathering methods and evidence-evaluating 
standards. The aim is to make such methods and standards as “scientific” as 
possible, with “scientific” here meaning: conducive to high levels of accuracy 
combined with a minimum amount of subjective influence over the results (see 
Worrall 2007; Stegenga 2011). 
Most philosophical discussions have focused on probing a number of 
procedural difficulties related to the evidence-based movement. They explore 
questions like: how can we comparatively evaluate the epistemic weight of 
different types of evidence? How can evidential rankings be objective? Is the 
best available evidence always the best in relation to all types of scientific 
problems? Is all the evidence labelled as ‘non-scientific’ dispensable? (see, e.g., 
Barton 2000; Worrall 2002, 2007; Ashcroft 2004; Vandenbroucke 2004, 2008; 
Borgerson 2009; Howick 2011; Solomon 2011; Stegenga 2011, 2013). In a rather 
huge contrast, it is difficult to find any piece of philosophical research 
discussing or offering a full-fledge investigation of the question: assuming the 
best evidential methods and standards have been employed, is it really the case 
that having evidence-based scientific knowledge leads to more effective policies? 
An exception to this last remark can is the work of Nancy Cartwright. She 
has written in a variety of academic settings about the methodological and 
philosophical problems related to how the evidence-based movement provides 
or fails to provide good basis for effective policy. In her view, the evidence-
based movement that has been taking over policy-oriented scientific research 
in the last decades (especially in health and medical practice) has wrongly 
placed a great deal of trust on particular evidential methods, such as 
randomised controlled trials (Cartwright 2009, 2010). But these types of 
methods are exclusively successful “at establishing efficacy: whether a 
treatment causes a given outcome in the selected population under the selected 
circumstances”. When for policy purposes “we are interested in effectiveness: 
What would happen were the treatment to be introduced as and when it would 
be in the population of interest” (Cartwright 2009, 131). 
In relation to the social sciences, Julian Reiss has recently argued 
specifically for a more evidence-based economic science (see Reiss 2004; and 
2008, chapter 1), with the intention of supplementing what he calls a theory-
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based orthodoxy in current economics. In his view, evidence-based economics 
should integrate “individual socio-economic expertise with valid external 
evidence from systematic research relevant for the purpose at stake” (Reiss 
2008, 13). In accordance with the general premises of the movement, in as much 
as causal claims in economics are supported by the best available evidence, by 
means of using the best available evaluating techniques, then they would more 
likely be claims about genuine causal relations. Nevertheless, even if an 
evidence-based economics of this sort could help making scientific causal 
knowledge more reliable, it remains to be seen whether (and how exactly) 
evidence-based economics would also help making economic policy more 
reliable. 
In the first section, I unravel the main tenets of Cartwright’s ideas on 
evidence for use and her ideas on the evidence-based movement (section 6.1), 
then I discuss some merits and deficiencies of her approach (section 6.2). In the 
third section, I suggest a way to rethink the ways in which evidence and 
evidential methods connect to causal efficacy and to policy effectiveness (section 
6.3). In section four, I single out three methodological differences between 
causal hypotheses and policy hypotheses (section 6.4). In the fifth section, I 
adapt an existing typology of causal claims to characterise more precisely the 
notion of a ‘policy hypothesis’ (section 6.5). In the final section, I provide a 
sketch of what I call the basic problems of policy inference and briefly elaborate 
on the roles that empirical evidence plays and could play in dealing with such 
problems (section 6.6). 
 
6.1. DECONSTRUCTING CARTWRIGHT’S VIEW ON EVIDENCE FOR USE 
Nancy Cartwright has been concerned with the relation between scientific 
practice and public policy for over four decades. The scope of her ideas and 
worries on the topic go from calls to fellow philosophers of science to become 
more involved in practical social concerns (e.g., 1974, 1979, 1999, 2006, 2012a) 
to thorough criticisms of scientific methods of causal inference revealing how 
they fail to be of any use (or to provide reliable guidance) for practical action 
(e.g., 2001, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012b). In particular—and in relation to this 
chapter—she has written on the uses and misuses of evidence and evidential 
techniques by researchers and policy-oriented organisations related to the so-
called evidence-based movement. Without intending to be exhaustive, I will 
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discuss here some of her most specific ideas about the use of causal inference 
and evidence for policy purposes.51 
Cartwright’s ideas about the use of evidence for policy can be grouped into 
two main lines of argument: The first is a general criticism of causal theories 
and methods of causal inference on the basis of their inherent limitations to 
provide reliable support to policy recommendations. The second is a much 
more specific assessment of the evidence-based movement, which focuses to a 
great extent on criticising the unjustified epistemic priority given to 
randomised control trials (RCTs) as the best evidence for policy purposes. 
These are two complementary but distinct discourses in Cartwright’s theory of 
evidence for use. To use her own labels, I will refer to the first kind as criticisms 
against the “hunting of causes”, and to the second as criticisms against the 
“using of causes”. 
 
6.1.1. On the hunting of causes 
Cartwright’s first significant attempt to characterise the relation between causal 
knowledge and practical relevance occurs in “Causal laws and effective 
strategies” (Cartwright 1979). In this well-known article, she presents a 
proposal of a theory for hunting causes and then attempts to formally connect 
it to practical guides for action. 
In the first part, she draws on existing accounts of probabilistic causation 
(e.g., Suppes 1970) in order to develop a non-reductive account which could 
allow reliable discrimination of spurious correlations from genuine causation. 
Her theory is based upon conditioning on additional background knowledge 
and her version of a contextual unanimity condition (see previous chapter, 
section 5.2), so that “C causes E if and only if C increases the probability of E in 
every situation which is otherwise causally homogeneous with respect to E” 
(Cartwright 1979, 423). The formal presentation of her theory includes some of 
the usual conceptual assumptions about the whole set of relevant causal 
factors, other than C, in order to warrant the causal inference in an ideally 
conceived setting. These assumptions presuppose some causal notions, hence 
why Cartwright presented her account as a non-reductive theory of causality, 
which was later promoted under the slogan: “no causes in, no causes out” (see 
Cartwright 1989, chapter 2).  
In the second part of the article, she offers a probabilistic conception of 
what would count as an effective strategy S in relation to a practical goal G. Her 
                                            
51 These ideas are presented, e.g., in Cartwright 2006, 2009, 2013; Cartwright and Efstathiou 
2011; Cartwright and Stegenga 2011. 
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probabilistic definition of S has, among other allegedly desirable qualities, the 
virtue of being compatible with the following common intuition: 
 
There is a natural connection between causes and strategies that should be 
maintained: if one wants to obtain a goal, it is a good (in the pre-utility sense 
of good) strategy to introduce a cause for that goal. So long as one holds 
both the simple view that increase in conditional probability is a sure mark 
of causation and the view that conditional probabilities are the right 
measure of effectiveness, the connection is straightforward (Cartwright 
1979, 431-432; emphasis added). 
 
There is not much use in analysing the formal details of Cartwright’s 
probabilistic theory for the purposes of this chapter. On the one hand, she has 
currently moved away from defending her old probabilistic account and has 
developed instead a tendency-law account of what she calls “capacities” (see 
Cartwright 1989, chapter 4). More recently she has also advocated a (radical) 
pluralistic account of causality (see Cartwright 2004). Furthermore, in her 
discussions on evidence for use, she casts some doubt on the potential policy 
virtues of the probabilistic account: when she criticises the major theories of 
causality for being incapable of producing causal knowledge that connects to 
real-life effective strategies (e.g., Cartwright 2001; Cartwright and Efstathiou 
2011), one of the main targets of her attack is the probabilistic account. 
On the other hand, regardless of the particular qualities and merits of 
Cartwright’s theory of causality, her analysis of the connection between causal 
claims and effective strategies obviously falls into what Leuridan, Weber, and 
Van Dyck (2008, 298) characterise as “the standard view on the practical value 
of causal knowledge”, namely the over-simplistic intuition that the practical 
relevance of a causal claim lies entirely in the fact that intervening on causes is 
a good way to bring about desired effects (I have argued against the standard 
view on several dimensions in chapters 2, 3, and 4).  
In her more recent publications, however, Cartwright holds a position that 
is much more critical of the standard view. For example, her criticisms on why 
invariant accounts of causality fail to be relevant to support reliable policy 
interventions is entirely built on the idea that the standard view is problematic. 
Her criticism is, broadly put, that even if these causal accounts use the notion 
of ideal invariant interventions to establish causality, it does not automatically 
follow that the concrete interventions required to deal with a particular policy 
problem in real life will be warranted on the same grounds (see, e.g., Cartwright 
2002; Reiss and Cartwright 2004). 
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In one of her first presentations of her evidence-for-use view, Cartwright 
(2006) claims that most methods of causal inference employed for hunting 
causes are successful in doing so, only because they are “clinchers”, i.e., their 
causal conclusions can be deduced from their premises; yet they fail to provide 
guidance about how to use such conclusions. There are “on offer right now a lot 
of alternative accounts of what causality consists in: probabilistic theories of 
causality, invariance accounts, manipulation theories, causal process theories, 
and so on. Each, it turns out, is closely associated with one or another well-
known method for establishing causal conclusions” (Cartwright 2006, 988), but 
these accounts do not tell much about how to apply such methods in real cases 
of interest, or about when it is appropriate to do so. 
For example, the “fashionable Bayes-nets methods […] lay down three 
assumptions about causality, then show that any time causes meet these three 
conditions, their methods will not give erroneous results” (Cartwright 2006, 
988-989). When one takes a closer look at these three assumptions required to 
warrant causality, namely faithfulness, the causal Markov condition, and 
minimality, one then notices—as Cartwright does—that they rarely hold for or 
correspond to anything in reality: “Are there any even rough identifying 
features a system may have that will give us a clue that it is faithful or satisfies 
causal Markov or minimality?” (2006, 989). 
Cartwright point is similar to what I have claimed in the previous chapter: 
the specifications of the truth conditions for causal generalisations come with 
a built-in characterisation of causality in the form of conceptual assumptions 
about causal criteria and relevant causal backgrounds. Similarly, methods of 
causal inference such as Bayes-nets methods (criticised by Cartwright) or the 
potential-outcomes framework (described in the previous chapter, see section 
5.5) heavily rely on conceptual assumptions such as faithfulness and minimality 
(the former) or independence and unit homogeneity (the latter) to be successful 
in estimating causal effects. However, these assumptions wind up restricting 
the inferences one is allowed to make about causal effects for particular units 
of interest in concrete real-world situations.  
 
6.1.2. On the using of causes 
The case of the evidence-based movement allowed Cartwright to accomplish 
two things: on the one hand, philosophy of science had in fact a lot to contribute 
to the discussion of evidence-based medical practice at the end of the 1990s. 
Thus by engaging with a detailed analysis of the methodological and 
philosophical caveats of the movement, Cartwright was able to preach by 
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example and direct her philosophical efforts towards questions of social policy 
relevance, just as she had been urging other philosophers to do. On the other 
hand, the overemphasised devotion to RCTs as the gold standard of scientific 
evidence within the evidence-based movement provided Cartwright with the 
perfect example of a method of causal inference that is very successful in 
hunting causes, while at the same time has a very limited potential for being 
informative about policy targets in non-experimental settings.52 
For the purposes of this chapter, let me single out three general premises 
that align most evidence-based ventures:  
 
1. Empirical evidence (and evidential methods) can be objectively ranked in 
terms of epistemic weight. 
 
2. When a decision about accepting or rejecting a hypothesis has to be 
reached, it has to be based on the best available evidence. 
 
3. Improving evidential standards by using the best methods will result in 
scientific knowledge that is more reliable to support practical and policy 
applications. 
 
As regards to the original evidence-based movement in medical practice 
most discussions focus on premises 1 and 2. The main target of criticisms has 
been the implicit and not thoroughly justified view that in all objective 
rankings, randomised controlled trials (RCTs) are always the best available type 
of evidence (together with meta-analyses and systematic reviews, which 
combine results from RCTs). However, as most critics have argued, it is not 
obvious why RCTs would necessarily have a higher epistemic weight in 
comparison to other types of evidential sources (e.g., Worrall 2002, 2007; 
Ashcroft 2004; Borgerson 2009; Howick 2011). 
There are some well-known methodological problems related to 
randomised experimentation. In theory, randomisation needs to be perfect in 
order to secure that all relevant causal factors apart from the causal variable 
under assessment are distributed equally among the sub-population to be 
                                            
52 Note that RCTs are not the most common method of causal inference in economics. Especially 
in policy-oriented branches of empirical (or applied) economics, like health economics, 
monetary economics, public economics, labour economics, international trade economics, 
economic growth, industrial organisation, environmental economics, and the like. Econometric 
regressions and simulations have been the preferred evidential tool in these sub-disciplines. 
However, there are some recent serious efforts to increase the use of experimental and quasi-
experimental evidence to deal with policy issues in line with the evidence-based movement, for 
instance, in development economics, see Duflo, et al. 2004; Banerjee 2007; Banerjee and Duflo 
2011; Cohen and Easterly 2009; and List 2011. 
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tested. In practice, the larger the sample used for a particular study, the more 
likely that randomisation distributes all the relevant known and unknown 
confounders equally among the different study groups. Thus while an infinite 
sample would be the conceptual benchmark for an ideal randomised control 
trial, actual RCTs can seldom use very large samples (see Reiss 2013, 203-204).  
Moreover, practical difficulties in implementing perfect blind 
experimentation, or in monitoring the experiments without influencing them, 
are common methodological problems that could contribute to bias the results 
(see Shadish, et al. 2002; Guala 2005; Reiss 2013, chapter 10). And even in an 
impeccably well randomised, properly double blinded, and well monitored RCT 
some unknown confounders could “by chance” be unbalanced between the 
treatment and the control group producing unexplained significant differences 
in the result (see Worrall 2007, 1004-1006). 
All these well-known facts about RCTs mean that, in practice, RCTs for 
many causal relations of interest might not be properly feasible, accurate, or 
reliable, simply because randomisation is not always sufficient to provide full 
control over confounders. This opens the discussion about the virtues of 
alternative non-experimental types of evidence, and about the supposedly 
objective grounds on which evidence rankings are constructed. It is just not 
clear why alternative sources of evidence are necessarily of less epistemic value 
than RCTs in all conceivable situations.53 
Yet Cartwright’s criticism of RCTs takes a clear detour from the discussions 
on evidential rankings and gold-standard status, to rather focus on the third 
premise of the evidence-based movement presented above, namely: the idea 
that using high quality evidential methods, such as RCTs, will produce more 
reliable strategies or policies to achieve concrete goals. Her main concern can 
be put as follows: even if one takes for granted that RCTs are successful 
methods for testing causal relations, the question is how can one tell whether 
the results of RCTs are of any relevance for the effectiveness of a proposed 
policy? (see Cartwright 2009, 127-128). 
According to Cartwright, there are two criteria for good evidence: “First, the 
evidence must be credible: Evidence claims should be likely to be true. Second, 
the full body of evidence should make the conclusion probable, or probable 
enough given the size of the policy bet” (2009, 128). In relation to policy 
                                            
53 There are a number of studies on the epistemic virtues of observational studies (e.g., Black 
1996; Benson and Hartz 2000), expert knowledge (e.g., Selinger and Crease 2006; Collins and 
Evans 2007; Martini and Boumans 2014), case studies (e.g., Gerring 2007; Ruzzene 2012), and 
other forms of qualitative evidence (e.g., Silverman 2001 [1993]), which contribute to cast doubt 
on the gold-standard status of RCTs. 
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effectiveness, she argues, the aim is to assess whether a particular “Treatment 
T will result in outcome O when implemented when and how it will be in the 
target situation/population” (2009, 129). 
The evidence-based movement claims that RCTs are good evidence to 
support claims about implementing ‘T in order to bring about outcome O’, but 
Cartwright argues that RCTs only support “claims of one particular form, 
essentially, ‘T causes O in particular circumstances X in particular population 
Φ’” (2009, 129). But if one wants to bring about O in a completely different 
population from Φ, how can one be sure that T will be effective there as well? 
This question is the centrepiece of Cartwright’s evidence for use, which can be 
fairly put (using her terminology) in terms of another slogan: “we need to know 
not only what works, but what works for us”. 
Cartwright and many others often refer to this issue as the external-validity 
problem: “for what other populations can we expect these same conclusions to 
hold?” (2006, 986). Is it possible to extrapolate a result obtained in a particular 
controlled experimental setting to a different (non-experimental) setting and 
expect the same result to obtain? In line with her general criticisms of the 
methods for causal inference commented above, Cartwright claims that RCTs 
are good evidential methods for hunting causes, because they are clinchers: 
 
Given the right definition of ‘ideal’, it is possible to show that in an ‘ideal’ 
RCT a positive result deductively implies the conclusion under test: If there 
is a higher probability of O in the treatment group in an ‘ideal’ RCT than in 
the control group, it follows deductively that T causes O in the experimental 
population under the experimental conditions (Cartwright 2009, 129). 
 
Yet, RCTs are just not good at warranting that their results will hold when 
the posited treatments are implemented in different populations or sub-
populations on current normal conditions. In Cartwright’s view, to make the 
move from the experiment to the real life situation “an inference ticket” is 
needed (2009, 131). But where can one get an inference ticket? 
 
6.2. WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN’T WORK IN CARTWRIGHT’S ACCOUNT 
I take Cartwright’s criticism of RCTs as parallel and, to some extent, 
complementary to my argument in the previous chapter. The problem of 
inferring a specific effective treatment for a concrete target from a RCT is 
analogous to the problem of inferring a specific policy recommendation for a 
concrete target from a causal generalisation. Thus I entirely agree with her 
general diagnosis: methods of causal inference commonly used in scientific 
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research are often “clinchers” of causality, and they require certain unrealistic 
assumptions to be successful in evaluating causal results, which limits in 
significant ways the reliability of using any of such results as an effective guide 
for action in the real world. Good evidence for causation is not necessarily good 
evidence for policy. This is definitely an extremely relevant issue that has not 
received enough attention neither from academics nor from policy makers. 
Nevertheless, her proposals seem a bit lacking about how to deal with the issue. 
The evidence-for-use view as put forward by Cartwright offers a well-
developed diagnosis of the situation: it provides a systematic and quite 
persuasive account about the problem of using causal knowledge for policy 
purposes in the simplistic way suggested by the standard view, and then the 
problem is nicely traced back to the intrinsic features of existing methods of 
causal inference (mainly RCTs). But there is never a clear answer to the question: 
what to do then?  
The issue is how can one know whether the result of a RCT performed in 
population A (in an experimental setting) will also obtain in population B (the 
non-experimental target population of interest)? Cartwright’s answer then is 
that “[w]e need to construct a variety of causal scenarios” (2009, 135). 
Unfortunately, there is no elaboration of what exactly these causal scenarios 
are or how one is meant to construct them. On which causal grounds would 
these different scenarios be built? One could perhaps look at further causal 
information about population B before making any inference about whether the 
result of an RCT performed in A will obtain in B as well. But where should one 
look for such further causal information? 
Cartwright’s general idea is still very much in the right direction. The point 
she tries to emphasise with the idea of constructing alternative causal scenarios 
seems to be that, independently of how they are to be produced, one should 
think of them as different arguments that support a hypothesis H throughout 
different warranting steps. Then all the relevant steps leading to the ending 
point of a causal scenario need to be evaluated separately and one by one in 
order to assess whether the posited cause T will bring about effect O in different 
settings: 
 
A claim that supports a step in a scenario is relevant to H only if the scenario 
starts with T, leads to O or not O, and itself has sufficient probability to be 
taken seriously. But whether this last is true will depend on how well 
supported other steps in the scenario are, and that depends on what other 
claims support these steps” (2009, 135). 
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Indeed this procedure, whenever practicable, could be helpful to detect 
whether there is any logical flaw somewhere in the line of argument leading 
from the premises to the particular outcome of a potential scenario. Thus one 
could rule out from the set of available causal scenarios a number of them as 
invalid or incorrect. As potentially useful as this might seem, it still does not 
tell us “what will work for us”, it only tells us “what will not work at all”.54 But 
how do we choose the right causal scenario to settle policy evaluations? 
A more worrying aspect in Cartwright’s evidence-for-use account occurs in 
relation to the rather striking claim that: “causation is in trouble”. In a joint 
article, Nancy Cartwright and Sophia Efstathiou (2011) argue that 
“philosophic—and economic—accounts of causality” are in trouble because 
they are directly based upon the logic of specific inferential methods, such as 
experimental and counterfactual methods (Cartwright and Efstathiou 2011, 
223-224). As Cartwright has argued before, the main problem with such existing 
accounts of causality is that they do not offer a “bridge” between hunting and 
using causes, yet here the argument goes a bit farther: 
 
What assures us that the knowledge we hunt at such great effort and cost 
can be put to the uses we want to make of it? To be practicable a theory of 
causation must simultaneously ground how we label features as ‘causes’ and 
the inferences we make once the label is attached. So we need a theory of 
causation that gives us in one fell swoop both methods for inferring causes 
and methods for using them (Cartwright and Efstathiou 2011, 224; emphasis 
added). 
 
What exactly the aim behind this suggestion is or how exactly a proper 
theory of causation should then look like are issues not outlined in the article. 
Yet, there are some hints that Cartwright’s account of capacities could be a 
suitable candidate to start building an ideal theory of causation that is good 
both for hunting and for using.  
                                            
54 An alternative way of understanding (or of developing further) Cartwright’s suggestion could 
be to use causal models to generate economic policy simulations. Simulations could include all 
known relevant causal factors as variables with some representation of their specific causal 
influences and then, by including possible values, or probabilities of taking any values, for 
certain variables in the model, one could compute a hypothetical estimate of particular policy 
outcomes (see Adelman 1988; Gilbert and Troitzsch 1999; Law and Kelton 2000). Another form 
of generating “causal scenarios” has been proposed to model complex multilevel causal 
structures (with nested causal relationships) in the form of recursive Bayesian networks (RBNs). 
This modelling proposal is still a conceptual formalism with not many explored concrete 
applications; however, the final aim is to provide quantitative information about probabilities, 
as well as qualitative information about mechanistic structure and causal relations, which could 
then be used for prediction, explanation and control of actual systems (see Williamson and 
Gabbay 2004; Casini, et al. 2011). 
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The theories of causality considered by Cartwright as problematic are listed 
as: invariance interventionist accounts, “accounts based on ‘Galilean’ 
experiments (Giere 1979), Lewis-style (‘miracle’-based) counterfactuals (Lewis 
1973)”, and probabilistic accounts (Cartwright and Efstathiou 2011, 224). 
Cartwright has made similar criticisms already in her earlier assessments of 
probabilistic, interventionist, and Bayes-nets methods for causal inference (see 
Cartwright 2007). 
Again, all these theories and methods are problematic because they are 
good for testing “efficacy” claims, but not “effectiveness” claims. To move from 
efficacy to effectiveness, Cartwright argues, “we need an inference ticket. For a 
long time I have been selling inference tickets underwritten by an ontology of 
capacities” (2009, 131). Capacities are not traditional causal laws, but a sort of 
latent causal contributions which are inherent to certain factors independently 
of any contextual circumstances.  
 
The notion of capacity has three elements: (1) potentiality (capacities 
describe what a factor can do in the abstract, not what actually happens in 
full empirical reality); (2) causality (capacity claims are not claims about 
coassociation but about what results a factor can produce); and (3) stability 
(the ability to produce the effect in question must persist across some 
envisaged variation of circumstance) (Cartwright 1998, 45). 
 
To know that X has the capacity to produce Y is, according to Cartwright, 
more useful for policy purposes than knowing that X causes Y, because the 
former claim implies that the ability of bringing about the effect is present in 
many different situations. Capacities are like Millian tendencies in that their 
influence is always present (whenever they are activated), yet their total outcome 
could be counterbalanced by other causal influences (disturbing factors) 
affecting the same target (see Cartwright 1998). Thus even if X has the capacity 
of producing Y, it will only result in the production of Y if X obtains together 
with the right configuration of additional causal factors that affect Y. Capacities 
are said to explain better than “causal laws” what underlies the process that 
brings about certain effects. Since one can be sure that a “capacity will produce 
its contribution whenever it is present (or is properly triggered), knowledge of 
capacities can be extremely useful” (Cartwright and Efstathiou 2011, 233). But 
how can one acquire knowledge about capacities in the first place? 
One would expect that the usual methods of causal inference could be a way 
to find about capacities. For example, the result of a controlled experiment 
could be informative about the existence of a capacity that works (or manifests) 
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in a particular setting of controlled conditions. But how can one know in which 
other settings it will manifest again or not? If this interpretation is correct, then 
all the problems related to the available methods of causal inference that 
Cartwright has criticised will apply to finding capacities as well.  
As a matter of fact, capacities are said to be different from causal laws, 
among other things because a capacity can be measured “in various 
experiments but the experiments themselves are not enough to tell us that there 
is a capacity to be measured in the first place” (Cartwright and Efstathiou 2011, 
233). So the manifestation of a capacity in an experiment is not enough to know 
it is there yet. But then if the usual methods of causal inference are not good at 
all to find capacities, how can one know that there is a capacity somewhere at 
all; a capacity which we can be sure “will produce its contribution whenever it 
is present”?55 
Even accepting—for the sake of the argument—that having knowledge of 
capacities is possible, it is still not obvious how exactly capacities are supposed 
to be employed to dealing with the external validity problem. How can 
capacities be put into use to achieve effectiveness? Is the idea that by taking 
into account all pertinent capacities acting together in a particular situation, 
then one could secure the effectiveness of a policy implementation? These 
interesting insights definitely call for further elaboration.  
After a whole section devoted to highlighting how capacities are much 
better than causal laws in several respects, Cartwright and Efstathiou make the 
following comment:  
 
[T]he most we can definitely predict with the kind of knowledge we usually 
have in these situations [i.e., situations in which we know there is a capacity] 
is that the [posited cause] […] may very well [bring about the expected 
effect] […]. So, even with capacities, predictive power is weak. But that is 
not the point here (Cartwright and Efstathiou 2011, 234). 
 
But then what was the point? Was not the point to offer an account of 
causality that could offer simultaneously a way for hunting causes and a way 
for using them? In a subsequent paragraph the authors suggest that capacities 
are at least partially or potentially useful for the task (in an indeterminate way), 
                                            
55 Sherrilyn Roush makes essentially the same observation about Cartwright’s capacities 
proposal when she comments that verification of capacities could be just as difficult as 
verification of causal factors (see Roush 2009, 141-142). Capacities are helpful to illustrate 
better “the transferability problem” (i.e., the external validity problem) and “what the problem 
of evidence-based implementation is. However, to take it as a solution requires supposing we 
have knowledge of capacities, and this is as hard as the problem was in the first place” (Roush 
2009, 142). 
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and thus an account of capacities is still a better option than the existing causal 
accounts which are hopeless as inference tickets to move from efficacy to 
effectiveness:  
 
What matters for our worries about causal laws is that causal laws and 
capacities are entirely distinct. This is so even if one has a very different 
account of causal laws from Cartwright’s. None of the accounts of causal 
laws currently discussed in philosophy look anything like an account of 
capacities; nor do our standard methods for testing causal laws serve well 
for establishing capacities. Capacities can be of use for predicting what 
happens when we set policy or build new technological devices. That, 
however, does not salvage causal laws. In introducing capacities Cartwright 
never meant to undermine causal laws. But focusing on the distinction 
between capacities and causal laws points up the problem in bold relief: we 
are very good at finding out about causal laws; but once we have done so, 
of what possible use are they? (Cartwright and Efstathiou 2011, 234). 
 
Cartwright and Efstathiou’s conclusions seem a bit misled in relation to the 
issue at hand. The alleged problem with theories of causality which makes the 
authors claim that “causality is in trouble” is that no theory offers an account 
that is simultaneously successful to hunt and to use causal knowledge 
effectively.56 But apart from mentioning that “capacities” could be a useful 
notion that “points up the problem [of moving from efficacy to effectiveness] 
in bold relief”, there is no elaboration on how exactly a proper causal theory is 
supposed to achieve this required move. Much more puzzling, perhaps: there 
is no elaboration whatsoever on how the proposed desiderata for what counts 
as a proper or “practicable” causal account is justified. Why does a “practicable” 
theory of causality need to offer “in one fell swoop” both inferential methods 
for testing causality and methods for practical use? Why simultaneously? And 
how would such a theory work?  
My own suggestion about how to think of this issue follows form asking the 
question: is it really indispensable to get a causal theory that does it all? Is it 
really the case that existing causal theories as they stand are of no use to cope 
with this policy relevant issue? Contrary to Cartwright and Efstathiou’s opinion, 
my suggestion is that it is not necessary to have a theory that is simultaneously 
                                            
56 The idea of simultaneously knowing how to asses and how to use causal claims has been 
Cartwright’s crucial desiderata for causal theories already in most of her earlier criticisms of 
causal accounts: “Perhaps it seems an unfair criticism of our philosophic accounts to say they 
are thin on use. […] The problem is one we can see by comparing Hoover’s approach to Simon 
with mine. What we need is to join the two approaches in one, so that we simultaneously know 
how to establish a causal claim and what use we can make of that claim once it is established” 
(Cartwright 2007, 5; emphasis added). 
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good for hunting and for using causal knowledge. Instead, we should 
understand that the process of discovering, justifying, and evaluating causal 
relations, on the one hand, and the process of conceiving, justifying, and 
evaluating policy strategies, on the other, are two distinct endeavours with 
different epistemic goals and thus contrasting appraisal methodologies. This 
distinction compels us, not to have a unique theory that simultaneously deals 
with the two endeavours, but to use all the relevant available causal knowledge 
(including, causal theories, inferential methods, causal concepts, background 
and contextual knowledge, and so forth) to deal separately with each of these 
two endeavours in the best possible way in relation to their respective aims. I 
will elaborate on this distinction in the following sections of chapter 6 and will 
offer a detailed illustration in chapter 7. 
 
6.3. EVIDENCE FOR CAUSAL RELATIONS AND EVIDENCE FOR POLICY STRATEGIES: A 
PRELIMINARY DISTINCTION  
The two endeavours of hunting causes and using them require testing two 
different types of hypotheses: hypotheses about causal influence (of the form 
‘X causes Y’), and policy hypotheses (of the form ‘X is an effective policy to 
attain Y’). Testing both types of hypotheses means testing them for their truth. 
Even if there is a broad sense in which both types of hypotheses are “causal”, 
the first are about causal efficacy whereas the second are about the effectiveness 
of strategies or policies in relation to concrete ends. Thus, in contrast to 
Cartwright’s view, what needs to be recognised is that available theories and 
methods of causal inference play different evidential roles when the hypothesis 
under evaluation is a claim about causal efficacy and when it is a claim about 
policy effectiveness. 
One and the same piece of evidence or a particular evidential method could 
play a specific role in evaluating a causal hypothesis and a totally different role 
in evaluating a related policy hypothesis. To clarify this, consider the following 
typology of three concepts of evidence, proposed by Julian Reiss: 
 
Prima facie evidence: “An observational or experimental outcome e is 
prima facie evidence for h if and only if knowing e is relevant (in a sense to 
be determined in a concrete context on the basis of background knowledge) 
for believing or acting on h” (Reiss 2008, 7). 
 
Valid evidence: “e is valid evidence for h if and only if e is prima facie 
evidence for h and all known sources of error in inferring from e to h have 
been controlled for” (Reiss 2008, 8). 
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Sound evidence: “An experimental or observational outcome e is sound 
evidence for an h if it is valid evidence for h and h is the relevant hypothesis 
for attaining purpose p” (Reiss 2008, 10).  
 
This distinction only offers a very broad way of epistemically distinguishing 
types of evidence, since there could be further meaningful ways to sub-
differentiate pieces of evidence within the same basic type (e.g., a piece of valid 
evidence could be “better” or “more reliable” than other pieces of valid 
evidence). But overall, the idea behind this typology is that the relevance of any 
piece of evidence has to be always evaluated in relation to a particular purpose. 
Accordingly, Reiss summarises the typology relative to different purposes: 
“prima facie evidence gives a licence to investigate; valid evidence gives a licence 
to believe; and sound evidence gives a licence to act” (Reiss 2008, 11). 
Reiss’s typology might seem quite clear-cut at first sight. If correct, one 
could immediately jump to the conclusion that what we need in order to 
connect scientific causal knowledge to effective policy making is to make sure 
we always employ sound evidence to support scientific hypotheses. Sound 
evidence would thus be, at least in principle, a solution to the evidence-for-use 
problems singled out by Cartwright. Unfortunately, the distinction is not as neat 
as it seems. 
The move from prima facie to valid evidence is fairly unproblematic. For 
instance, let e be the observation of a correlation between X and Y, then e can 
be taken as prima facie evidence for hypothesis h that ‘X causes Y’. This then 
allows (or induces) us to investigate further about h. Now let e* be a properly 
designed and well performed randomised controlled trial (RCT) used to control 
for all potential sources of error in inferring from e* to the same h, then e* is 
valid evidence for h, and e* allows us to believe in h. Putting this example in 
terms of statements we can see it as: 
 
Hypothesis h: X causes Y. 
Claim e: X has been observed to be correlated to Y. 
Claim e*: X has been observed to cause Y in an RCT. 
 
Given that e* is valid evidence for h, let us put forward a further claim such 
as: 
 
Credence claim: There is valid evidence to believe that X causes Y. 
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Now the move from valid evidence to sound evidence is a bit more 
problematic. Notice that, in the previous example, e and e* are distinct in 
relation to the same h. It is precisely that e* is epistemically better than e in 
supporting h what makes the distinction reasonable in the first place. But, in 
accordance to Reiss’s definitions, the move from valid evidence to sound 
evidence is not achieved by improving the quality of the evidence, but by 
making sure that “h is the relevant hypothesis for attaining purpose p” (Reiss 
2008, 10). The notion of sound evidence seems to add a further dimension for 
the appraisal of evidence in addition to evidential weight, namely a relevance 
dimension. This breaks the continuity among the three types of evidence in 
terms of them providing different levels of epistemic support for h, and makes 
the notion of sound evidence rather ambiguous. 
Given hypothesis h mentioned above, i.e., that ‘X causes Y’, then according 
to Reiss’s definitions at least the following four claims need to be true for a 
piece of evidence to count as sound evidence: 
 
Claim e*: X has been observed to cause Y in a well performed RCT. 
Credence claim: There is valid evidence to believe that h. 
Purpose claim: There is a purpose p which is to bring about Y. 
Relevance claim: h is the relevant hypothesis for attaining purpose p. 
 
The credence claim is true in virtue of claim e* being true; if claim e* would 
be false (and there would be no other piece of evidence that could be taken as 
valid), then there would be no valid evidence for believing h to begin with. The 
purpose claim is a description of a postulated goal which could easily be tested 
as true or false in the context of concrete cases. So for the sake of the argument, 
let us take the first three claims as true. The question then is: how can one then 
tell whether the relevance claim is true? 
By construction in this case, h is ‘X causes Y’, and p is ‘bringing about Y’. 
Thus it seems tempting to say that h is obviously the relevant hypothesis for 
attaining purpose p. However, in real life things would almost never be as 
straightforward. Rarely practical purposes would coincide exactly with the 
posited effect of a causal claim. For instance, a purpose q could require a 
compound of effects Y, Z, and W, each one brought about in a particular way 
so as to generate a particular interaction among the three effects. In such a case, 
we could still claim that h is a relevant hypothesis to attain purpose q, and given 
that there is valid evidence to take h as true, then all the requirements for 
having sound evidence would be fulfilled. Yet it is not clear that such a case 
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would offer any licence to act at all on the basis of h, for to bring about Y is 
clearly not enough to attain purpose q. But goals in policy making are usually 
extremely more complex than these conceptual illustrations. Not only they 
often are multidimensional (in the sense described in chapter 4, section 4.1), but 
also they commonly require the inputs from other known and unknown causal 
influences and additional background specifications to be effectively achieved 
(see chapter 2, section 2.2). In most concrete cases, policy goals would require 
a complex concurrence of causal effects triggered by some specific 
multidimensional (or compound) interventions. 
It could be argued that the definition of sound evidence requires not that h 
is the relevant hypothesis, but only a relevant hypothesis for attaining p. Yet 
this makes the notion of sound evidence either trivial or more ambiguous, since 
everything can be relevant to everything in one way or another. But even if one 
concedes that a causal hypothesis for which there is already valid evidence 
could be unambiguously judged as relevant (in some well-defined way) to a 
particular purpose p, this does not straightforwardly license any definite acting 
upon that hypothesis. In most real life cases, the h tested for causal efficacy in 
the context of scientific research is simply a different hypothesis from the h* 
tested for policy effectiveness. 
As I have argued in the first part of this thesis, knowing that ‘X causes Y’ is 
true does not allow one to believe that ‘bringing about X is an effective strategy 
to bring about Y’. Confusing between these two different hypotheses is 
precisely the kind of mistake that can follow from uncritically endorsing the 
standard view (see chapter 2). The implicit idea, in Reiss’s notion of sound 
evidence, that the h to be tested for validity can simultaneously be the same h 
that would be relevant to effectively attain a practical purpose p is reminiscent 
of the basic intuition captured in the standard view.  
In short, having valid evidence for h, plus knowing that h is relevant for 
‘bringing about Y’ could be labelled as ‘sound evidence’ if that is preferred, and 
yet that does not tell us anything about whether the (entirely different) 
hypothesis ‘bringing about X is an effective strategy to bring about Y’ is true, 
let alone whether one could reliably act upon it.57 
                                            
57 It is not that Reiss’s sound evidence necessarily implies the standard view, but the fact that 
the “relevance relation” between h and p and the characteristics of “purpose p” are left vague 
leaves the notion open to interpretations directly based on the standard view. The ambiguities 
in the characterisation of this notion risk mistakenly taking valid evidence for a causal claim as 
valid evidence for a claim about an effective strategy, when—as I will elaborate further—these 
two claims are in all significant respects different hypotheses. 
 124 
My suggestion about how adapt this typology would be to drop the notion 
of ‘sound evidence’ all together, and simply make explicit that whenever causal 
knowledge is to be used as a basis for policy there are (at least) two types of 
hypotheses under assessment, a causal hypothesis and a policy hypothesis. Then 
for each of these types of hypotheses there can be prima facie or valid evidence. 
We can then focus on how to use our knowledge on causal inference to evaluate 
each type of hypotheses in the most appropriate way. To see this more clearly, 
consider the following two types of hypotheses: 
 
h: ‘X causes Y’ 
 
h*: ‘bringing about X is an effective strategy to bring about Y’ 
 
As mentioned before, claims like h are for most scientific purposes 
evaluated for causal efficacy. In relation to this type of endeavour, one can have 
prima facie evidence for h, which in turn will trigger further testing using 
customary methods of causal inference. Then assuming the causal tests are 
properly implemented, the results would provide valid evidence for believing 
h. But for policy purposes the type of hypothesis to be assessed is not h, but 
one like h*, which is to be tested for effectiveness and on rather different 
grounds from those used to test h. 
In relation to testing hypothesis h*, one can have prima facie evidence for 
h*, which could be, incidentally, a causal claim like h. More precisely, given that 
there is properly established scientific causal knowledge in the form of claims 
like h (all of them well-grounded on valid evidence), and given that such causal 
knowledge is relevant to the attainment of a particular policy goal that relates 
to Y, then all the available well-grounded causal knowledge can at the most 
aspire to count as prima facie evidence for h*.  
This is to say, even if there is valid evidence for h, h is only prima facie 
evidence for h*.58 At the most, h (the fact that there is valid evidence to believe 
h) gives a license to investigate h*, but neither a licence to believe nor to act 
upon h*. In order to be licensed to act upon h* what is required is to get in turn 
valid evidence for believing that h* is true. I will say more about the type of 
                                            
58 In turn, given that there is valid evidence to believe h*, for example, after an actual policy 
strategy has been implemented in a concrete unit of analysis and the intended goal has been 
effectively attained, then such evidence for h* should not be automatically taken as valid 
evidence for h. Unless all potential sources of error have been controlled for in relation to h, 
valid evidence for h* could amount at best to be prima facie evidence for h. 
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evidence that can amount to valid evidence for claims like h* after exploring 
further the differences between claims like h and h* in the following section. 
 
6.4. DIFFERENCES THAT MATTER BETWEEN CAUSAL AND POLICY CLAIMS 
I have been saying that claims about causal efficacy are different from claims 
about policy effectiveness. But how exactly are they different types of claims? 
And more importantly, in which way are the suggested differences significant 
to the problem of connecting causal knowledge to effective strategies? Broadly 
put, the methodological differences that I mean to point out determine the 
evidential standards upon which hypotheses are to be evaluated and accepted 
as true. 
Consider the following two examples of hypotheses commonly studied and 
discussed in international trade economics: 
 
h: Trade liberalisation causes economic growth.  
 
h*: Implementing a trade liberalisation policy in a country is a good strategy 
to obtain economic growth. 
 
The first claim has the form of a causal generalisation, while the second has 
the form of a typical policy recommendation. These two propositions are 
similar in that they both can be taken as empirical hypotheses about a relation 
(yet to be specified) between trade liberalisation and economic growth. Both can 
be evaluated or recognized as true (or false) after considering all the pertinent 
evidence in accordance to the suitable appraisal criteria. But the similarities end 
there. 
The statements above are different at least in three significant respects: a) 
the implicit epistemic aims for which they are studied, b) the standards for 
what counts as valid evidence in their assessment, and c) the intended scope of 
application. Making explicit these three dimensions is essential—or so I 
suggest—for a proper understanding of the roles of causation and evidence in 
real-life cases of socioeconomic policy making. 
a) Different epistemic aims: this difference has been already put forward 
and discussed in a variety of ways all along this chapter, so I will just briefly 
restate it. The types of relations to which the claims refer are of a different sort. 
h is a proposition about the existence of a causal relation between some posited 
causal relata. The immediate epistemic aim behind investigating it is to find out 
whether the causal relation is actually there, and as much as possible about its 
 126 
whole causal structure and about how it works. In contrast, h* is a proposition 
about the effectiveness of a particular policy in relation to a concrete desired 
outcome. The immediate epistemic aim is rather instrumental, i.e., to find out 
whether the posited policy will be successful—and if possible the extent to 
which it will be successful—to achieve an intended practical goal.  
b) Different testing methodologies: h is true if ‘trade liberalisation’ is 
causally efficacious in relation to ‘economic growth’, where ‘causally efficacious’ 
is to be defined in accordance to any accepted criteria for causation put forward 
by traditional theories of causality (see chapter 3, section 3.1). In contrast, h* is 
true if the implementation of a trade liberalisation policy in a concrete context 
of application is effective in relation to the attainment of its goal. The testing 
criteria for ‘effectiveness’ have to be set in terms of a certain level of confidence 
(to be contextually characterised) that the policy will generate the desired 
economic growth, given all the relevant background causal factors and 
conditions (and potential by-products) in the intended concrete target situation. 
Causal efficacy and policy effectiveness thus require different evidential 
standards and procedures in order to be assessed. As it has been discussed in 
the literature on causation and causal inference, the criteria for establishing the 
truth of a causal hypothesis involve procedures that can help distinguishing 
cases of genuine causation from spurious relations (see, e.g., Mill 1843, 3.8; 
Simon 1954; Spirtes, et al. 1993; Pearl 2000; Hoover 2001; Shadish, et al. 2002). 
Whereas the suitable criteria for evaluating the truth of a policy 
recommendation should involve any procedures that could help warranting the 
achievement of the concrete desired effect. These procedures cannot be 
reduced exclusively to scientific methods, but to any formal or informal 
epistemic activity that could provide useful information about the reliability of 
the particular policy under deliberation in the particular context of 
implementation. 
A more detailed elaboration on the complexities of the policy-appraisal 
methodology will have to wait until the concrete example analysed in the 
following chapter. However, I can state here that there is one clear procedural 
aspect that differentiates the methodology for testing causal hypotheses from 
the more intricate methodology for testing policy hypotheses. As mentioned 
before, testing causal efficacy requires the use of our theories and methods of 
causal inference with the aim of controlling for (abstracting from, screening off, 
or isolating from) all potential sources of error; whereas testing the effectiveness 
of a policy hypothesis requires the use of our causal theories and all useful 
evidence-gathering methods with the aim of collecting and evaluating all the 
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relevant causal information about any potential errors and disturbing causal 
factors that could influence the intended policy effect in the concrete target 
population. Broadly put, in the first case the testing methodology consists in 
isolating a causal influence from all possible disturbances, whereas in the 
second case the methodology consists in de-isolating it to evaluate all the 
potential interactions in the context of a target situation. 
c) Different intended scope of application: generality is a desirable 
property of causal claims, whereas specificity is often a desirable property of 
policy recommendations. “Trade liberalisation causes economic growth” is a 
causal claim that is meant to be true in general, i.e., for a rather large population 
of application (with countries being the units of the population in this case), 
even if the members of the population are to a great extent causally 
heterogeneous (see chapter 4, section 4.4). In contrast, the policy hypothesis 
“implementing a trade liberalisation policy is a good strategy to obtain 
economic growth in a country” is a unit-level type of claim in the sense that it 
is meant to apply to a single unit (or a specific sub-population). 
Generality (broadly understood) is commonly regarded as a theoretical 
virtue of scientific knowledge. For example, in the appraisal of competing 
scientific explanations, a more general explanation is—other theoretical virtues 
being equal—often taken as a better explanation (see, e.g., Kitcher 1981; 
Cartwright 1983; Strevens 2004). Similarly, claims about scientific causal 
relations that are true along a wide variety of cases and situations are preferred 
for explanatory purposes over claims that are only true about a few individual 
or isolated events (see, e.g., Mitchell 2000; Woodward and Hitchcock 2003; 
Hitchcock and Woodward 2003). 
For policy purposes, there seems to be also a certain demand for scientific 
knowledge of general validity in order to inform and guide the deliberations 
and recommendations made by policy authorities (for instance, the OECD and 
the countries’ economic authorities in the example analysed in chapter 4). 
However, the final aim of a policy-making process is to bring about local effects 
for a particular unit-system in a particular context. Policy hypotheses like h*, 
namely “trade liberalisation policy is a good strategy to bring about economic 
growth in a country” are unit-level claims. Thus, what really matters in relation 
to a policy hypothesis like h* is not to know that a related scientific causal 
generalisation about free trade is true with a high degree of generality (which 
would be mere prima facie evidence for h*), but whether there is specific valid 
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evidence to believe that the unit-level claim h* will be true for the concrete 
target unit in which a policy is to be implemented.59 
 
6.5. CHARACTERISING POLICY HYPOTHESES: A CONCRETE PROPOSAL 
What type of claims exactly are those that I have been calling ‘policy 
hypotheses’? To understand in a more systematic way the differences between 
causal and policy hypotheses, let me briefly refer to a—frequently ignored—
typology of causal claims put forward by Christopher Hitchcock. 
I have discussed (in chapter 5) Hitchcock’s probabilistic account of causality 
with the aim of understanding better the inferential connections between 
general (or type-level) causation and singular (or unit-level) causation. In the 
context of that discussion, Hitchcock argues that most traditional views on the 
meaning of causal claims conflate two different distinctions into the general-
singular typology: on the one hand, there is a distinction between “narrow” and 
“wide” causal relations; and on the other, a distinction between what he labels 
“actual causation” and “causal tendencies” (Hitchcock 2001a, 219-220).  
The narrow-wide distinction is based on the specification of the units of 
the population for which a causal claim is meant to be true. Hitchcock presents 
it as follows: “narrow” causality refers to causal relations that are true “within 
a single individual or a homogeneous population”, whereas “wide” causality 
refers to relations that are meant to be true “within broader, more 
heterogeneous populations” (Hitchcock 2001a, 220).  
The actual-tendency distinction is less clear-cut. At first, it seems to be 
based on whether X and Y have occurred or not. Cases of actual causation are 
thus relations between events that have actually obtained, whereas in the cases 
of so-called causal tendencies, the relata need not be actualised events 
(Hitchcock 2001a, 220). It is not entirely clear why Hitchcock takes the notion 
of “tendency” as the alternative to “actual”. The only explicit comment on this 
respect appears in a footnote in which he says that the terminology for this 
distinction is taken from I. J. Good’s (1961-1962) causal account, in which in 
turn ‘causal tendencies’ are understood as probabilistic regularities. 
                                            
59 I am taking for granted that causal generalisations are often the final goal of most scientific 
research and that they are among the preferred forms of scientific knowledge used as the basis 
of policy recommendations. This is the case in the two paradigmatic case studies I have chosen 
(see chapters 4 and 7). The same qualm applies for the idea that policy hypotheses are 
commonly claims about concrete policies being applied in the context of a specific target unit. 
Causal claims studied in scientific research could be about particular cases as well, like for 
example causal claims studied and assessed in history. And policies might very well be intended 
to attain certain abstract goals at a highly general level, like for example to reduce the level of 
inequality or of poverty in the whole planet. I simply do not focus on such special cases here. 
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Hitchcock’s notion of causal tendency is indeed compatible with an 
interpretation of it as a probabilistic causal relation, such that whenever he 
writes that X “tends to cause” Y, he basically means that X increases the 
probability of Y. 
An aspect that Hitchcock’s actual-tendency distinction is intended to 
underline is that the truth of claims about actual causation is independent of 
the truth of claims about causal tendencies. A single case of actual causation 
does not entail the truth of a probabilistic causal tendency, for causal 
tendencies are relations among repeatable events (Hitchcock 1995, 265). The 
claim “Pedro’s last dance caused his death” would be according to Hitchcock’s 
distinction a claim about actual causation that could very well be true, and yet 
the causal tendency “dancing causes death” need not be true at all. Similarly, a 
claim about a causal tendency might be true, even if no related case of actual 
causation has ever occurred. For instance, “eating one kilogram of uranium-235 
causes death” reports a true causal tendency in virtue of certain features of 
humans and the nature of nuclear reactions, yet no death has ever been caused 
in this way (see Hitchcock 1995, 265). 
Hitchcock’s main goal after presenting these distinctions is to argue that 
they cross-classify into four distinct categories of causal claims (see Hitchcock 
2001a, 219-220):  
 
(1) narrow-actual causation,  
(2) narrow-causal tendencies,  
(3) wide-actual causation, and  
(4) wide-causal tendencies, 
 
which, in Hitchcock’s view,60 correspond to four distinct causal concepts 
that are respectively reported by claims like the following: 
 
(1) Pedro’s smoking caused his lung cancer. 
(2) Pedro is the sort of person for whom smoking tends to cause lung 
cancer. 
(3) Last year, thousands of cases of lung cancer were caused by smoking. 
(4) Smoking causes lung cancer. 
 
                                            
60 For an argument against Hitchcock’s fourfold distinction as an unnecessary multiplication of 
causal concepts, see Jacob 2006. 
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This seems reasonably neat, yet a few qualms should be raised before 
using this distinction to clarify the nature of policy hypothesis. For instance, it 
is not clear from Hitchcock’s definitions whether the essential basis for the 
narrow-wide distinction is the number of units for which the claim is meant to 
be true (Hitchcock 1995) or the fact that the units are causally homogenous or 
heterogeneous to a certain degree (Hitchcock 2001a). It seems safe to say at 
least that whether a claim is narrow or wide in Hitchcock’s sense would depend 
entirely on the specification of the relevant population of application of a causal 
claim. As it was argued in chapter 4, a causal claim ‘(For P), X causes Y’ could 
have different meanings depending not only on which causal concept is singled 
out as the relevant causal relation, but also on the specifics of the often implicit 
clause ‘(For P)’. 
It is also not clear whether the actual-tendency distinction might be 
conflating some further distinctions. If by “actual causation” one understands 
a success verb—as Hitchcock suggests—then opposite notions to “actual” that 
are more appropriate than “tendency” could be, for example, “potential”, 
“hypothetical”, or “counterfactual” causation (this point is particularly 
important to characterise policy recommendations, so I will comment further 
on it below). On the other hand, if by “tendency” one presupposes a 
probabilistic relation—as Hitchcock does—then a more appropriate opposite 
notion to “probabilistic” could be “deterministic” (see Hausman 2010, 47-48).  
Furthermore, it is not clear whether causal generalisations need to be always 
interpreted as “probabilistic” tendencies, their meaning can be analysed 
employing other non-probabilistic approaches, as it is done in some recent 
accounts on the meaning of “generic claims” (see, e.g., Leslie 2007) or of “ceteris 
paribus” generalisations (see, e.g. Earman and Roberts 1999; Strevens 2012). 
Claims such as “mosquitoes cause malaria” or “sharks eat people” are normally 
taken, for practical purposes, as uncontroversial true causal generalisations, 
regardless of the very small probability that a mosquito carries the relevant 
parasite or that a shark attacks and eats a human, hence the traditional 
probabilistic interpretations might not be enough to grasp all there is to the 
meaning of certain practically useful generalisations (see Leslie 2007). 
According to Hitchcock’s classification, causal generalisations like ‘trade 
liberalisation causes economic growth’ can be understood “as reporting a wide 
causal tendency” (Hitchcock 2001a, 220). As mentioned above, this means that 
they report probabilistic causal relations (between repeatable events) which are 
meant to be true for relatively broad heterogeneous populations. But which one 
of Hitchcock’s notions suits better the form and contents of policy 
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recommendations such as ‘implementing a trade liberalisation policy in a 
country is a good strategy to obtain economic growth’? 
So far (and in previous chapters) I have been describing policy hypotheses 
as claims that are meant to be true for specific unit members of a population. 
Thus they can be taken as narrow claims in the sense that they are about one 
or perhaps a few causally homogeneous units. In the case at hand, the trade-
liberalisation-policy hypothesis is intended to be true for a particular country. 
In so far as the claim need not in principle be about repeatable events, but only 
about a one-time event, the claim is not meant to report a “causal tendency”. Is 
it then a claim about “actual causation”? Not necessarily, since the posited 
causal effect in the policy hypothesis has not yet been actualised, but it is only 
expected to obtain after the policy is implemented. When testing a policy 
hypothesis, the question is not whether an instance of X has caused an instance 
of Y, but rather whether an instance of X will cause an instance of Y in the target 
setting.  
The interpretation of “actual causation” as a success verb (as Hitchcock puts 
it) is thus not entirely appropriate for the relation reported by a policy 
recommendation. ‘For unit u, X caused Y’ is a generic form for claims about 
narrow-actual causation, but the type of claim to be characterised and to be 
assessed in policy-making cases has instead a form like ‘For unit u, X will cause 
Y’. Hence, in addition to the four notions proposed by Hitchcock, let me 
introduce a supplementary type of causal relation called narrow-potential 
causation which in turn is reported by claims of the form ‘For unit u, X will 
cause Y’. This additional notion seems to suit better the form and contents of 
typical policy recommendations.61 
 
6.6. THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF POLICY INFERENCE 
I have argued (in chapter 5) that the main issue to be dealt with in relation to 
the process of designing and implementing effective policies on the basis of 
economic science is contained in the question: how can one infer the truth of 
unit-level causal claims from the truth of type-level causal generalisations? I 
                                            
61 Perhaps for some philosophical purposes to differentiate between ‘X caused Y’ and ‘X will 
cause Y’ could be somewhat irrelevant, and both claims could simply be treated as reporting 
the same kind of “causal concept” (and perhaps even be conceptually given the same necessary 
and sufficient basic truth conditions). However, if the purpose is to understand as clearly as 
possible the process of inferring policy recommendations that are expected to be effective at 
some point in the future, then the distinction between actual and potential is in fact a crucial 
issue. 
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will refer to the issue raised by this question as the tendency-to-unit problem of 
policy inference. 
Given the following examples of claims h (about a wide-causal tendency) 
and h* (about narrow-potential causation): 
 
h: For P, trade liberalisation (TL) causes economic growth (EG).  
 
h*: For u*, implementing a trade liberalisation policy (TL = tl*) will cause 
economic growth (EG = eg*).62 
 
The tendency-to-unit problem of policy inference can be phrased as: How 
can one infer claims about narrow-potential causation like h* from claims 
about wide-causal tendencies like h? 
 
Assuming the following evidential claims are true: 
 
Prima-facie-evidence claim:  
TL has been observed to be correlated to EG. 
 
Valid-evidence claim:  
TL has been observed to cause EG in a number of well-performed 
econometric studies.63 
 
Then the following credence claim is also true: 
There is valid evidence to believe h, i.e., that TL causes EG. 
 
The credence claim is precisely what most of the existing evidential base of 
empirical studies on the benefits of free trade can warrant at best (see chapter 
7 for details). But contrary to what many agents involved in economic policy 
analysis and deliberation assume, all that empirical evidential base, together 
with any ideological or conceptual arguments that could contribute to support 
the truth of h, are nothing but prima facie evidence for the policy hypothesis h* 
which says that: ‘For u*, a trade liberalisation policy (TL = tl*) will cause 
economic growth (EG = eg*)’.  
The tendency-to-unit problem of policy inference is akin to the problem of 
external validity emphasised by Cartwright and many others as one of the main 
                                            
62 Where the superscript ‘*’ refers to a specific policy-target situation. 
63 In the case of international trade liberalisation, most of the empirical research consists in 
econometric studies using national or cross-national databases. Some of these studies can be 
very local, i.e., they investigate the causal effects of trade liberalisation at the sector, regional, 
or national level; while others are rather broad in their scope trying to estimate average causal 
effects for a large amount of (causally heterogeneous) countries. For more details and 
references to these empirical studies, see chapter 7. 
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problems of RCTs, and by implication of the evidence-based movement (see 
sections 6.1.2 and 6.2 above). The issue raised by Cartwright is: how is it 
possible to reliably infer that a result that obtained in a particular controlled 
experimental setting will obtain in a different (non-experimental) setting? As it 
has been noted by some authors, the so called external validity problem is not 
exclusive to RCTs (see, e.g., Roush 2009, 139; Reiss 2013, 205). Any empirical 
study (experimental or not) that is restricted to analysing data about a 
particular case in a specific (controlled or natural) setting can be subject to the 
same inferential misgivings. This issue can also be put in terms of the causal 
notions depicted in the previous sections in order to understand the relevant 
evidential relations. Let me refer to the issue as the unit-to-unit problem of policy 
inference and describe it as follows. 
Given the following examples of claims hc (about narrow-actual causation) 
and h* (about narrow-potential causation): 
 
hc: For uc, implementing a trade liberalisation policy (TL = tlc) caused 
economic growth (EG = egc).64  
 
h*: For u*, implementing a trade liberalisation policy (TL = tl*) will cause 
economic growth (EG = eg*). 
 
With uc ≠ u* and assuming that the following evidential claims are true: 
 
Prima-facie-evidence claim:  
TL has been observed to be correlated to EG (in country uc or in any other 
country that is not u*). 
 
Valid-evidence claim:  
(TL = tlc) has been observed to cause (EG = egc) in a well-performed empirical 
study using all the relevant data about country uc. 
 
Then the following credence claim is also true: 
There is valid evidence to believe that TL caused EG in country uc. 
 
Again, valid evidence for hc can only aspire to be nothing but prima facie 
evidence for h*. Thus the usual external-validity concerns for policy purposes 
can be put in terms of the unit-to-unit inferential problem: 
 
                                            
64 Where the superscript ‘c’ refers to the controlled setting of a well-performed empirical study. 
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The unit-to-unit problem of policy inference: how can one infer claims 
about narrow-potential causation like h* from claims about narrow-actual 
causation like hc?  
 
Both issues are highly problematic for the inference of effective policies 
from causal knowledge, particularly when the populations of interest are 
causally heterogeneous. The specifics of the evidential base can certainly be 
much more complicated than the rough outline presented here. For instance, a 
large amount of studies about the same unit of analysis uc (or about causally 
homogenous units) could be combined in order to give “stronger” evidential 
support to a distinct causal hypothesis such as ‘TL tends to cause EG in country 
uc’.65 In Hitchcock’s typology this would count as a claim reporting a narrow-
causal tendency, which in turn could be taken as prima facie evidence for h*. 
Then again, regardless of there being valid evidence allowing us to believe that 
there is a narrow-causal tendency from TL to EG in uc (or in countries that are 
causally homogenous to uc), a variation of the tendency-unit problem of policy 
inference would emerge as soon as anyone would want to infer a unit-level 
policy recommendation for country u* on the basis of the causal-tendency claim 
about uc. 
So how to get valid evidence for unit-level policy hypotheses like h*? I will 
only begin delineating an answer to this question by means of the specifics of 
the case study in the following chapter. Suffice it to say here, the valid evidence 
required to be allowed to believe in policy hypotheses—like h*—requires the 
collection and processing of a whole new evidential base. Such new evidential 
base will be composed by all available pieces of information that could support 
further credence claims about the status of all the relevant background and 
disturbing causal factors (and unintended by-products) that could have an effect 
on the causal influence of TL on EG in the specific target-unit of interest. 
 
6.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A causal generalisation is a proposition of the form “X tends to cause Y”, 
whereas a policy recommendation is a proposition of the form “X is an effective 
strategy for Y in a specific causal context”. These two types of propositions are 
often put forward as similar hypotheses in need of evidential support; however, 
                                            
65 This is essentially what systematic reviews and meta-analyses are meant to do with the results 
of experimental studies, and meta-regressions with the results of econometric studies. As it 
will be discussed in the following chapter, these type methods of evidence amalgamation are 
commonly used to offer more robust evidential support to economic causal generalisations (i.e., 
claims about wide-causal tendencies). 
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they differ in three important respects: First, the two types of hypotheses 
commonly aim at different purposes: establishing scientific knowledge and 
designing policy recommendations in relation to concrete goals. Second, the 
criteria for establishing the truth of causal knowledge involve procedures that 
distinguish cases of genuine causation from spurious relations, whereas the 
criteria for the truth of policy recommendations involve procedures that 
warrant the achievement of a concrete desired effect in a concrete context of 
application. And third, generality is a desirable property of scientific causal 
knowledge, whereas specificity is often a desirable property of policy 
recommendations. 
In so far as causal claims differ from policy recommendations in aims, 
testing criteria, and intended scope, then the required evidence (and the ways 
it is used) to support them also differs. This implies different methodological 
approaches. Economic research that aims at supporting causal hypotheses 
requires evidential methods that generate results in isolation from all potential 
sources of error, e.g., confounders, experimental bias, institutional frameworks, 
and so on (see chapter 2). Thus, a causal hypothesis “X causes Y” within a 
particular causal structure including other causal factors Z requires evidence 
that X causally affects Y independently of any influence from the relevant set 
of factors Z. In contrast, research that aims at supporting policy 
recommendations requires the use of evidential methods to generate results 
not only about causal relations in isolation, but also about which potential 
sources of error (from all the known and unknown factors Z) are present and 
active in the intended concrete context of policy application. Thus, the 
assessment of a policy hypothesis “X is effective to generate Y in a concrete 
context” requires valid evidence that X tends to cause Y, plus valid evidence 
about whether all the relevant factors Z (pertaining to the relevant causal 
structure) are or are not active in the concrete intended context of application.  
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CHAPTER 7 
THE ROLE OF EVIDENCE IN ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING: 
FROM CAUSAL GENERALISATIONS TO TRADE POLICY 
 
One of the main points I have been making in this thesis is that accepting as 
true a causal generalisation is not sufficient to infer the truth of any policy 
recommendation that derives from it. Causal hypotheses like “Trade 
liberalisation causes economic gains” require different evidential support from 
the support required by policy hypothesis like “For country A, increasing trade 
liberalisation will cause economic gains”. As suggested in the previous chapter, 
having valid evidence to believe in a causal hypothesis is not sufficient at all to 
believe in (let alone to act upon) any purported policy implication. To confuse 
these two types of hypotheses or, more precisely, to take the available valid 
evidence for the former as valid evidence for the latter is a big and rather 
common mistake in economics.  
Presented this boldly, it might seem obvious that a causal claim of the form 
‘X causes Y’ and a policy recommendation of the form ‘implement X in order to 
attain Y’ are not the same type of hypotheses, and that their evidential 
requirements thus differ. Still, the confusion is pervasive in the economic 
literature, even if in a fairly subtle way: knowledge that ‘X causes Y’ is true is 
frequently taken as “valid” (and enough) evidence for believing also that ‘X is 
an effective strategy to attain Y’ in a given situation. In what follows, I illustrate 
this problem in relation to the scientific research on the economic benefits of 
trade liberalisation, and suggest a potential way to attain the proper evidence 
to support the effectiveness of economic policy recommendations. 
In section 7.1, I offer some examples of the implicit intuition that testing 
causal generalisations is relevant because, if they are found to be true, then 
automatic policy implications would follow. In section 7.2, I offer a brief 
summary of the history of new international trade theory, only to point out why 
such a new theoretical development has not been able to settle the debate on 
the benefits of free trade in the theoretical arena. Sections 7.3 and 7.4 describe 
the general hypotheses commonly studied in the empirical literature on the 
benefits of trade. Sections 7.5 and 7.6 contain the bulk of the discussion of 
variables and the econometric methods used in the existing empirical research. 
Section 7.7 discusses three methodological aspects of the empirical literature 
that I claim have negative (or at least ambiguous) consequences for policy 
purposes. In section 7.8, I build a link between this case study and several 
 137 
aspects already argued for in the previous chapters of this dissertation, and 
also illustrate a potential way of doing things better, i.e., a form of using more 
efficiently the available causal knowledge and evidence that economic science 
has to offer in order to improve the reliability of the process of policy making. 
 
7.1. FREE TRADE CAUSES ECONOMIC BENEFITS: A SCIENTIFIC GENERALISATION OR A POLICY 
GUIDELINE? 
Both theoretical and empirical studies on the economic effects of trade 
liberalisation usually devote a few lines or paragraphs to state their policy 
relevance. Such types of comments are often bold and brief, and occur in the 
introduction or the concluding sections of a study. The aim is to offer the reader 
at least a hint of the way in which the research and the results of the research 
could have some real-life policy implications. 
The various ways in which international economics articles are justified on 
(superficially argued) policy-relevance grounds have been exposed by William 
Milberg (1996). He identifies a number of rhetorical devices used by 
professional economists to make their articles look more “policy relevant”. 
Without going into the details of all distinct rhetorical moves, the point to keep 
in mind is that most of the scientific research on the economic effects of trade 
liberalisation embraces the idea that studying the topic is important because 
the results would have straightforward implications to guide trade policy. 
In an article summarising the theoretical progress in so-called ‘new 
international economics’, Robert Feenstra (2006) begins by reminding the 
reader of the main practical impetus behind the development of new trade 
theories: 
 
[T]he models of economies of scale and monopolistic competition were 
conceived with a very practical application in mind, namely, the gains that 
would result from large-scale tariff reductions. Whether from multilateral 
tariff reductions under regional trade agreements, these models predicted 
gains from trade over and above the gains from specialization in 
conventional models (Feenstra 2006, 617-618; emphasis added). 
 
This is a standard idea among the supporters of the new international 
economics: the suggestion that the theory is practically relevant because it 
explains why “tariff reductions” to international trade are good. The approach 
is commonly justified by claiming that a theory that includes economies of scale 
and monopolistic competition is not only intuitively more realistic, but also 
better supported by historical evidence, and therefore such approach allegedly 
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explains and predicts better than previous accounts the main benefits of trade 
liberalisation policies (see Feenstra 2006).  
In empirical studies, the policy-relevance motivation is commonly stated 
more concisely and essentially as follows: it is important to empirically test 
causal hypotheses on the effects of trade liberalisation, because implications 
for policy making would automatically follow. For instance, in a rather 
influential study, Francisco Rodríguez and Dani Rodrik (2001) state explicitly 
what they take as the main question motivating empirical research on 
international trade: 
 
Do countries with lower policy-induced barriers to international trade grow 
faster, once other relevant country characteristics are controlled for? We 
take this to be the central question of policy relevance in this area. To the 
extent that the empirical literature demonstrates a positive causal link from 
openness to growth, the main operational implication is that governments 
should dismantle their barriers to trade (Rodríguez and Rodrik 2001, 264; 
emphasis added). 
 
As I will emphasise below, Rodríguez and Rodrik’s article is in fact mainly 
devoted to provide methodological criticisms of the empirical research on the 
benefits of trade liberalisation. Still, the quote above shows that, even in an 
otherwise critical article, the authors are very much in agreement with the 
widespread conception within the discipline that the causal generalisation 
“trade liberalisation causes economic growth” is a crucial research hypothesis—
“once other relevant country characteristics are controlled for”—because to the 
extent to which it is empirically demonstrated, then the policy recommendation 
that “governments should dismantle their barriers to trade” would naturally 
follow.66 
In addition to academic articles, there are also specially commissioned 
policy-oriented research studies and reports put together by international 
organizations such as the World Bank, the OECD, the IMF, and the like, which 
are explicitly meant to inform and offer policy prescriptions to authorities in 
real economies. Usually presented in the form of systematic reviews, these 
institutional reports tend to summarise in a few lines the main conclusions of 
many different pieces of available scientific research. The final product is a 
                                            
66 To be clear, I am not claiming that Rodríguez and Rodrik (or any other theoretical or empirical 
international economist) ultimately believe that causal generalisations automatically warrant 
policy hypotheses. I only want to emphasise that whenever economists superficially justify the 
relevance of their scientific research by hastily stating the potential (usually abstract) policy 
implications of their results, they let the door wide open for confusion. 
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(selective) compilation of empirical results presented as an evidential base 
supporting the view that trade liberalisation is a beneficial trend to be followed 
by most national economies in order to prosper. Some examples: 
 
More open and outward-oriented economies consistently outperform 
countries with restrictive trade and foreign investment regimes (OECD 
1998, 36). 
 
Policies toward foreign trade are among the more important factors 
promoting economic growth and convergence in developing countries (IMF 
1997, 84). 
 
In this kind of reports, the jump from a scientific evidential base to the 
formulation of straight-forward policy recommendations is rather obvious. 
After all, one of the main services that such international organizations are 
meant to provide to policy makers is precisely some guidelines that could be 
straightforwardly implemented to improve socioeconomic performance (see 
also the case in chapter 4). 
The main (positive) goal of pointing out the existence of this confusion—
i.e., the unjustified jump from well-grounded scientific knowledge to the 
inference of policy recommendations—is to explore the potential ways to 
correct it. Thus, the constructive idea motivating this chapter is to explore in 
which ways policy recommendations can be better supported by well-grounded 
scientific knowledge so as to better warrant their effectiveness.  
 
7.2. NEW TRADE THEORY AND THE BENEFITS OF FREE TRADE 
During most of the 20th century, international trade theory was based upon the 
assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect competition, and the idea 
that the notion of comparative advantage was the crucial determinant of trade 
patterns among nations. Since its origins, the idea of comparative advantage 
has been presented as an argument intended to illuminate the benefits of 
international trade and the disadvantages of enforcing a closed economy (see 
Ricardo 1821 [1817], chapter 7; Mill 1909 [1848], book III, chapter 17).  
The basic argument states that trade between two nations is beneficial (to 
both the nations) even when one country would have an absolute advantage at 
producing all goods in relation the other country, as long as each country can 
produce certain goods in a more efficient way than other goods. In such a 
situation, each country would obtain greater “economic gains” from 
specialising in the goods it can produce most efficiently (and then buy the 
remaining of the domestically demanded goods from abroad), in comparison 
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with the gains each country would obtain from diversifying production and 
closing their borders for trade. 
After the first presentation of these ideas in the writings of David Ricardo, 
the theory of comparative advantage had further theoretical refinements during 
the 20th century (e.g., Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933; Stolper and Samuelson 
1941; Rybczynski 1955), yet the substantial assumptions of traditional trade 
theory, i.e., constant returns to scale and perfect competition, remained always 
at its core. However, trade models based on these assumptions and the notion 
of comparative advantage as the main determinant of trade patterns have been 
criticised as extremely unrealistic and empirically void. 
During the late 1970s, some international economists started developing 
models which abandoned the old assumptions of constant returns to scale and 
perfect competition, and which included instead the allegedly much more 
realistic assumptions of the monopolistic competition models (see, e.g., 
Helpman 1981; Krugman 1979, 1980, 1981; Lancaster 1980). These 
modifications gave rise to the “new trade theory”. In this new theoretical 
approach, comparative advantage is no longer the only or even the main 
determinant of trade patterns among countries; instead increasing returns of 
scale are taken as the main driver of international specialization. 
Broadly put, monopolistic competition models contain two key 
assumptions: First, firms included in an industry are able to differentiate their 
product from the products of each other, and thus each firm can be taken as a 
“monopoly” of the particular good it produces. Second, firms in the same 
industry take the prices of each other as given (in contrast to traditional 
oligopolistic models in which the pricing decisions of firms are 
interdependent). The name of these models comes precisely from the fact that 
each firm is assumed to behave as a “monopoly” of its own differentiated 
product, even if goods offered by rival firms within the industry are still similar 
to the extent that they can be substitutes of one another. Accordingly, firms 
can be represented as monopolists competing with each other, and the demand 
for each commodity is modelled as depending on the quantities and prices of 
all the non-identical substitutes produced by other firms in the industry.67 
Just like the classical account, new trade theory has also been used to build 
arguments in favour of free trade (e.g., Krugman 1993; Feenstra 2006), but the 
main point that its proponents customarily stress is that new trade theory 
provides a much more realistic account of how trade patterns among countries 
                                            
67 For a fairly simple account of these models, see Krugman and Obstfeld 2009, chapter 6; for a 
more advanced and formal approach, see Feenstra 2004, chapter 5. 
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actually developed. Nevertheless, the new allegedly more realistic theory also 
brought some tension to the scientific consensus on the benefits of free trade, 
since dropping the assumption of perfect competition precluded the possibility 
of securing Pareto optimal outcomes in the models. Thus while patterns of 
trade can be theoretically explained and modelled overall, firms and industries 
are heterogeneous and consequently the welfare effects of liberalisation need 
not be always beneficial for all.68 
As Krugman would later recollect, the same “new trade theory” that 
“legitimized imperfect competition” making arguments in favour of trade more 
realistic “also opened the door to possible arguments for government 
intervention” (Krugman 1993, 363). Indeed, as soon as the “new trade theory” 
was put forward and recognised, proposals about the protection of strategic 
sectors in the economy with the aim of achieving Pareto optimal outcomes also 
emerged (see, e.g., Brander and Spencer 1985).  
From an exclusively theoretical perspective, new trade theory provides no 
ultimate answer to the debate of free trade versus protectionism; the theory is 
in fact theoretically compatible with both types of policy positions: trade 
liberalisation can have economic benefits and yet “strategic” interventions 
could help contribute improving social welfare by inducing a more efficient 
distribution of those gains. The theory exclusively shows that, in a world of 
imperfect competition, increasing returns to scale, and other particular 
economic complexities, both policy strategies—free trade and protectionism—
are sub-optimal. Consequently, most of the serious academic debate on the 
benefits of free trade has moved from appeals to theoretical accounts towards 
arguments based on empirical evidence. But can the debate be settled then with 
empirical research? 
 
7.3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE BENEFITS OF FREE TRADE: WHAT ARE THE HYPOTHESES 
UNDER EVALUATION? 
For the most part, the empirical investigation of the benefits of free trade 
consists in econometric estimations of causal effects of a stylised variable that 
stands for “trade liberalisation” upon a set of other variables that are typically 
considered good economic indicators of economic gains (I will refer to them 
below). Even if all these studies analyse a number of different specific 
hypotheses, whenever they are used to argue in favour of free trade, typically 
their final outcomes are piled together as a supporting evidential base for a 
                                            
68 For a discussion on how trade liberalisation cannot secure Pareto optimal outcomes, see 
Driskill 2012. 
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general causal hypothesis such as: “Trade liberalisation causes economic gains” 
(see, e.g., Irwin 2009). Such a claim is of course too general to provide any useful 
understanding of the effects of trade liberalisation, or any specific guideline for 
policy implementation, so let us look in more detail at the specific hypotheses 
commonly studied. 
The hypotheses appraised in the empirical literature are typically of the 
generic form: 
 
‘(For P), TL causes Y’ 
 
Where P is the population of all countries or some large subset of countries, 
TL is a variable for “trade liberalisation”, usually defined as a dummy (more on 
this below), and Y can be any of the usual macroeconomic indicators of national 
“economic gains”, such as growth per capita, investment, income equality, 
prices, and the like, as measured by accepted international standards. The 
variables selected as the posited effects Y vary rather largely among different 
studies, which is unsurprising given the wide variety of notions that can fall 
under the term “economic gains”. 
The usual aims of empirical work are either to openly test the implications 
of current trade theory or to explore the potential effects of free trade using 
historical data. In new trade theory, for instance, monopolistic competition 
models can be used to formally derive the following hypotheses: expanding 
production of certain goods to a larger scale than domestic demand will 
generate efficient cost reductions, will increase the variety of available goods in 
the domestic market, and will reduce the level of prices in the trading countries 
(see Feenstra 2006). Consequently, a portion of empirical studies have been 
primarily designed to test whether increments in foreign trade actually have 
these implications, and thus in principle to test the validity of new trade theory.  
Other empirical studies in international economics focus on testing the 
direct effects of trade liberalisation on macroeconomic variables. These studies 
are still theory-based in very basic ways (as I will clarify below), still their 
primary goal is not to test the validity of underlying theories, but the causal 
influence of trade liberalisation (TL) on different observable economic variables 
(Y) in isolation from other disturbing and contextual factors. 
The following is a non-exhaustive list of some of the main economic gains 
(Y) that have been empirically evaluated and supported by existing studies: 
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1. TL causes increases in economic growth (GDP/capita).69 
 
2. TL causes increases in investment (INV).70  
 
3. TL causes increases of the proportion of trade with foreign countries 
(usually called “openness ratio”).71 
 
4. TL causes reductions of the prices of goods (P), given increasing returns 
to scale.72 
 
5. TL causes increases of the variety of goods available to consumers.73 
 
6. TL causes increases of economic competition which causes the self-
selection (and survival) of the most efficient firms.74 
 
7. TL causes convergence of wages, which leads to reductions of income 
inequalities.75 
 
8. TL causes reductions of unemployment (U).76 
 
9. TL causes transferences of foreign technologies.77 
 
 
7.4. MAKING CAUSAL GENERALISATIONS EXPLICIT FOR POLICY PURPOSES 
Obviously the hypotheses above have to be true (or believed to be true 
according to certain scientific standards) in order for any user of the science to 
even begin considering their policy implications. Since my aim here is to 
investigate the evidential requirements for achieving policy effectiveness (in 
addition to having access to well-established scientific causal generalisations), 
I will assume that the causal hypotheses studied and accepted in the empirical 
literature have been well-established and thus they can be trusted as true 
claims.  
                                            
69 See Edwards 1992; Dollar 1992; Sachs and Warner 1995; Greenaway, et al. 1997; Ades, et al. 
1999; Wacziarg and Welch 2008. 
70 Mainly via foreign direct investment (FDI); see Baldwin and Seghezza 1996; Wacziarg and 
Welch 2008. 
71 See Wacziarg and Welch 2008. 
72 See Harris 1984; Smith and Venables 1988; Badinger 2007. 
73 See Feenstra 1994; Hummels and Klenow 2005; Broda and Weinstein 2006. 
74 See Coe, et al. 1997; Bernard, et al. 2003; Eaton, et al. 2004; Trefler 2004; Feenstra and Kee 
2008. 
75 See Ben-David 1993; Frankel and Romer 1999; Winters, et al. 2004. 
76 See Krueger 1983; Milner and Wright 1998; Falvey 1999. 
77 Mainly foreign capital equipment and foreign research; see Keller 2004; Madsen 2007. 
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If a causal claim of the form ‘TL causes Y’ is taken as true, then in order to 
be able to make any potential policy recommendation one needs information 
about the following two aspects:  
 
a) The exact meaning of implementing a particular change in TL (a TL 
reform, or any other concrete policy intervention in TL). Users of the science 
and policy makers will need to know this to a certain level of precision in 
order to be able to properly intervene on TL in particular countries in an 
effective way. 
 
b) The meaning of the specific causal notion that has been tested and 
established as true in the relevant empirical research, since—as shown in 
chapters 3 and 5—different notions of causation allow or constrain the 
inferences about potential practical applications and concrete policy 
implementations of the scientific results. 
 
 
7.5. THE MEANING OF CHANGES IN ‘TRADE LIBERALISATION’ 
The first thing that comes to mind when one thinks of trade liberalisation is the 
elimination of taxes to international exchange. That is somewhat correct. Trade 
liberalisation reforms almost always include the reduction or elimination of 
commercial tariffs and quotas. That is also the way in which typical theoretical 
analyses and simulations conceptually study variations in trade liberalisation: 
one or a number of variables represent international tariffs so that their burden 
on the whole economy or on different economic sectors can be analysed. But 
when it comes to the real world, what exactly is the meaning of ‘trade 
liberalisation’? What kind of change in a real economy corresponds to a change 
in the ‘trade liberalisation’ variable? 
In order to do empirical research from available datasets, international 
economists have defined a variable usually labelled “openness”, which 
essentially measures the liberalisation level (in terms of the amount of 
restrictions to trade) in a particular country for a certain year. Since many 
countries have explicitly started up liberalisation reforms at some point during 
the last decades, researchers have mainly focused on characterising two 
essential aspects of liberalisation, namely: some definite criteria for what 
counts as an “open” (or a “closed”) economy, and precise liberalisation dates for 
all countries that have launched a liberalisation reform.  
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The openness criteria, on the one hand, allow for straightforward 
comparisons, typically cross-country comparisons, of several economic 
indicators (Y) between “close” and “open” economies, for fixed periods. On the 
other hand, reliable data on liberalisation dates allows for comparisons of the 
economic trends and development within each particular country “before” and 
“after” liberalisation reforms were implemented. 
The most famous and still widely used openness criteria was developed by 
Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner (1995). The authors constructed a dummy 
variable (using an ‘international comparisons’ dataset by Summers and Heston 
1991) and classified countries as either “close” or “open” based on five different 
dimensions. Accordingly, a country is taken as “closed” if it displays at least 
one of the following five economic features (i.e., the dummy variable takes the 
value of 0 for a country in a particular year if at least one of the five features 
below is true for that country in that particular year): 
 
1. Average tariff rate level of 40% or more. 
2. Nontariff barriers covering 40% or more of all trade. 
3. Black-market exchange rate at least 20% lower than the official exchange 
rate. 
4. State monopoly on exports. 
5. Socialist (centrally-planned) economic system. 
 
Collecting precise liberalisation dates is less straightforward, since usually 
different procedures are employed. A relatively simple method is to use an ex-
ante approach and consider, for instance, the statements of intent made by 
countries when a World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) is granted. The 
date in which the loan begins is then taken as the starting point of a 
liberalisation reform (see, e.g., Harrigan and Mosley 1991; World Bank 1993; 
Greenaway, et al. 2002).  
The alternative is to use an ex-post approach, in which a set of economic 
characteristics are evaluated in a number of countries along a certain period in 
order to determine significant changes in their openness conditions. For 
example, following this approach, Dean, Deasi, and Riedel (1994) inferred 
liberalisation dates for 32 countries from the 1980s to the beginning of the 
1990s by analysing in detail their socioeconomic history and focusing on four 
variables: changes in average tariffs, changes in quotas, export taxes, and 
foreign exchange restrictions (Dean, et al. 1994, 11-14). Similarly, in the study 
by Sachs and Warner (1995) mentioned above, the authors inferred 
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liberalisation dates for 111 countries using their own slightly different 
openness criteria.  
An additional variable related to liberalisation that is commonly included in 
empirical studies is the openness ratio. This is a measure of the volume of 
foreign trade of a country relative to its national product, thus it is simply 
calculated as a ratio of the imports plus exports to the GDP (in a particular 
year). Note that the “openness variable”, as defined for example by the Sachs-
Warner criteria, essentially measures the amount of trade barriers a country 
has in place, whereas the “openness ratio” refers to the amount of foreign trade 
a country experiences.  
Changes in liberalisation levels as reflected in the “openness variable” need 
not coincide with changes in the “openness ratio”, for example, a reduction in 
the level of trade tariffs (a change in the openness variable) may or may not 
result in an increase of the actual volume of foreign trade (openness ratio). The 
openness ratio could be used as a measure of the actual causal efficacy of a 
trade liberalisation reform on traded volumes. While the volume of foreign 
trade (openness ratio) may change for other reasons different from changes in 
the level of foreign-trade barriers. 
There is no definite agreement on the best way to measure “trade 
liberalisation”, so a plurality of accounts remains (see Rodríguez and Rodrik 
2001; Greenaway, et al. 2002). I will simply emphasise here a particularly 
problematic issue from a policy-making perspective in relation to the 
measurement of variable TL. It could be the case that the posited cause “trade 
liberalisation” is measured in some clear and explicit way, and yet be entirely 
uninformative about what exactly a policy maker is supposed to change or 
intervene upon in order to affect TL in a desired way. For instance, assume the 
Sachs-Warner criteria is accepted, then how do one intervene on TL? Should 
tariffs be reduced, should non-tariff barriers, should the monopoly of the state 
on exports be dissolved? Which of the five dimensions in the measurement has 
to be affected and in which way in order to attain a desired change in Y? Should 
it be a combination of changes in all five dimensions? 
 
7.6. EMPIRICAL METHODS AND IMPLICIT CONNOTATIONS OF CAUSATION 
The two most common empirical approaches to estimate the effects of trade 
liberalisation are cross-sectional and time-series analyses. 
Cross-sectional analysis (also called cross-country analysis when units are 
countries) has been widely used in trade and economic growth research, 
especially during the 1980s and 1990s. In this type of studies, a set of 
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explanatory variables (containing TL) and a dependent variable (Y) are included 
in the specification of a regression equation and the influence of each variable 
on the selected Y is estimated in a particular year for all sampled countries. 
Using matching techniques, it is possible to compare a group of countries that 
have experienced a significant trade liberalisation reform (TL = 1) with a group 
of countries that have not (TL = 0). Assuming the model specification is correct 
(i.e., assuming that the regression equation includes variables for all relevant 
causal factors that have an effect of Y in addition to TL), then the result is an 
estimate of an average causal effect of TL on Y, inferred from cross-sectional 
comparisons between countries that were liberalised or non-liberalised during 
the same period.  
Time series analysis offers, in contrast, estimates of the causal effect of 
trade liberalisation (TL) within one and the same country throughout any 
number of consecutive years. Using data on “liberalisation dates”, it is possible 
to evaluate trends and significant “jumps” in the evolution of the economic 
indicators as a consequence of trade-liberalisation reforms within a single 
country. In such cases, TL is set to 0 for all years before the liberalisation date 
of a particular country, and 1 afterwards. The result is an estimate of an 
average causal effect of TL on Y, inferred from differential comparisons of the 
same country’s variations in Y from one year to the next one throughout a set 
of consecutive years. 
Empirical studies can also combine both cross-country and intertemporal 
analyses whenever panel datasets are available. A panel dataset encompasses 
information on a relatively large number of socioeconomic characteristics of 
different countries for different years. Applying the openness criteria to 
distinguish liberalised and non-liberalised countries, plus information from a 
panel dataset, it is possible to estimate in the same study separate regression 
equations for different groups of countries. For instance, using a sub-sample 
including only countries that have experienced trade reforms allows before-
and-after comparisons of the effects of TL; while using a sample including 
liberalised and non-liberalised countries allows for comparisons between the 
different trends followed by open and closed economies (see, e.g., Greenaway, 
et al. 1997). 
Different studies differ from one another in rather small technical details. 
However, it is fair to say that the empirical research on trade liberalisation 
provides results mainly of the two kinds described above: 1) estimates of causal 
effects obtained from comparisons across different countries at the same time, 
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and 2) estimates of causal effects from within-country comparisons at different 
times.  
The immediate consequence of using different methodological approaches 
is, not surprisingly, that the estimated causal effects are always different. The 
specific assumptions required by each approach (for instance, assumptions 
made about country homogeneity, or about potential confounders, or about 
uniformity background characteristics, and so on) would normally determine 
to a certain extent the meaning of the resulting causal notion under evaluation 
(see chapter 5). But if the testing methodology of choice affects the meaning of 
the causal concepts under evaluation, do these different methods test the 
validity of the same causal hypothesis or rather different ones altogether? Let 
me try to answer this question by analysing the methods employed and their 
assumptions in more detail. 
 
7.6.1. Controlling for confounders to test causal generalisations 
To get valid evidence for a causal hypothesis like ‘TL causes Y’ some inferential 
method that allows control for all (or as many as possible) potential 
confounders that could have an effect on Y is required. This is a traditional 
approach of scientific inquiry, i.e., to investigate about the workings of causal 
relations in isolation (see Mill 1843, 3.8; Mäki 1992a; Reiss 2008). 
In cross-country empirical studies on the effects of trade liberalisation, one 
of the main ways to control for potential confounders consists in including all 
the relevant variables in the regression equation. The standard procedure to 
decide which variables are included is to look at what accepted growth theory 
has to say. Typically, the starting point is a ‘core’ new growth theory model “of 
the type which has now become standard” (Greenaway et al. 2002, 234).78  
For example, in the already mentioned highly-quoted article by Sachs and 
Warner (1995),79 the authors used Barro’s (1991) growth specification as a 
baseline for their first regression, and after a few variations they end up with 
the following variables: 
 
Dependent variable: 
Y: Real GDP per capita 
                                            
78 In the empirical international trade literature, a “standard” specification refers to one in line 
with the models put forward by Romer (1990) and Barro (1991), and the specification-search 
results of Levine and Renelt (1992). See Hoover and Perez 2004 for a detailed discussion of 
different specification-search methodologies to find robust determinants of economic growth 
for cross-country regressions. 
79 5474 citations in Google Scholar; 223 in Web of Science (by February 2016). 
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Explanatory variables: 
X1: Sachs-Warner openness dummy variable (TL) 
X2: Ratio of real gross domestic investment to real GDP (INV) 
X3: Population density 
X4: Secondary-school enrolment rate 
X5: Primary-school enrolment rate 
X6: Ratio of government consumption to GDP 
X7: Extreme political repression and unrest 
X8: Number of revolutions per year 
X9: Number of assassinations per capita per year  
 
Controlling for this list of variables, Sachs and Warner’s cross-country 
analysis provided an estimate of a positive causal effect from TL to GDP per 
capita, using data on 111 countries for a period from 1970 to 1990. The 
estimate of a magnitude of 2.44 means that on average countries classified as 
open have experienced an economic growth of 2.44 percentage points higher 
than countries classified as closed.80 
In 2001, Rodríguez and Rodrik published a very influential critical review—
already mentioned in the first section—on the state of the empirical research 
on the economic effects of trade liberalisation.81 They reviewed in detail some 
of the most important articles at the time (Dollar 1992; Sachs and Warner 1995; 
Ben-David 1993; Edwards 1998; Frankel and Romer 1999; and more briefly: Lee 
1993; Harrison 1996; Wacziarg 2001) and discussed thoroughly a number of 
methodological issues in the literature. According to the authors, the nature of 
the relationship between TL and growth had not been properly assessed and 
remained “far from being settled on empirical grounds” (Rodríguez and Rodrik 
2001, 266). 
The two main criticisms were directed to the Sachs-Warner openness 
criteria, and to the use of cross-country analysis. On the first issue, they 
conclude that the Sachs-Warner openness indicator “yields an upward-biased 
estimate of the effects of trade restrictions” (Rodríguez and Rodrik 2001, 282), 
and that ultimately it is “so correlated with plausible groupings of alternative 
                                            
80 The same set of control variables has been used with a few variations in subsequent —
empirical research, see, e.g., Dollar 1992; Ben-David 1993; and Edwards 1998. Greenaway et al. 
2002 used the same model specification in order to test the robustness of TL on GDP per capita 
to different ways to obtain liberalisation dates; and Wacziarg and Horn Welch 2008 replicate 
Sachs and Werner’s result using the exact same econometric specification and a new dataset. 
81 3766 citations in Google Scholar; 120 in Web of Science (by February 2016). 
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explanatory variables […] that it is risky to draw strong inferences about the 
effect of openness on growth based on its coefficient in a growth regression” 
(Rodríguez and Rodrik 2001, 292). On the reliance on cross-country regressions, 
they argue that the static estimates of cross-sectional analysis could mask 
dynamic variation of causally relevant characteristics of countries, which in 
turn could make the estimate non time-invariant. And overall they claim that: 
 
For the most part, the strong results in this literature arise either from 
obvious misspecification or from the use of measures of openness that are 
proxies for other policy or institutional variables that have an independent 
detrimental effect on growth. When we do point to the fragility of the 
coefficients, it is to make the point that the coefficients on the openness 
indicators are particularly sensitive to controls for these other policy and 
institutional variables (Rodríguez and Rodrik 2001, 315). 
 
As a consequence of Rodríguez and Rodrik’s criticisms, subsequent studies 
reduced their reliance on cross-country estimation in favour of other within-
country estimation techniques that could be used to analyse the effects and 
trends over time of trade reforms, without relying so much on choosing the 
adequate controls for comparing heterogonous countries. Panel data analyses 
in which cross-country estimations were complemented and combined with 
within-country estimation techniques started to appear. In particular 
adaptations of methods following the design-based logic of randomisation (and 
of the potential outcomes framework), such as difference-in-differences and 
fixed effects analyses have since then become more popular.  
One of the most influential empirical studies, after Rodríguez and Rodrik’s 
(2001) critique, has been Wacziarg and Horn Welch’s (2008) “Trade 
liberalization and growth: new evidence”.82 The authors do three things in this 
article: first, they update the Sachs-Warner openness classification using a more 
comprehensive database; second, they use a more complete database to 
replicate (and revise) Sachs and Warner’s cross-sectional positive results; and 
the “third and most important goal is to exploit the timing of liberalization in 
a within-country setting to identify the changes in growth, investment rates, 
and openness [ratio] associated with discrete change in trade policy” (Wacziarg 
and Horn Welch 2008, 189). 
Using an extended dataset (from the 1970s until the end of the 1990s) for 
141 countries with corrected liberalisation dates, Wacziarg and Horn Welch 
tested the robustness of cross-sectional analysis estimates for different 
                                            
82 1296 citations in Google Scholar; 175 in Web of Science (by February 2016). 
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decades. They found that the Sachs-Warner results did not hold for the 1990s 
because relevant country characteristics indeed vary through time, confirming 
thus some of Rodríguez and Rodrik’s concerns about the potential fragility of 
cross-country estimates.  
The authors then used the same dataset to estimate the within-country 
effects of trade liberalisation (TL) on GDP per capita, investment, and volumes 
of trade relative to GDP (openness ratio), and found that, in contrast to the 
cross-country results, “the results based on within country variation suggest 
that over time the effects of increased policy openness within countries are 
positive, economically large, and statistically significant” (Wacziarg and Horn 
Welch 2008, 189). 
The specification of the regressions in the analysis of within-country effects 
is entirely different from those use in the cross-country analysis in many 
technical respects. But the main difference to be noticed here is that, in contrast 
to adding explanatory variables to control for confounders, in the within-
country methodology there are no added variables. Instead, the estimates 
derive entirely from the average differences in the level of Y from one period 
to the next using variations in the dummy variable TL to capture the difference 
between pre- and post-liberalisation periods.  
No confounders are explicitly controlled for since essentially what these 
methods attempt is to measure an average causal effect of all the changes from 
one period to the next, i.e., the differences in Y from time t1 to time t2, and then 
from t2 to t3, and so on, for all years in the dataset for each country, then a final 
general estimate is calculated as an average over all country-specific causal 
effects. For instance, to estimate the within-country effects of TL on GDP, 
Wacziarg and Horn Welch used the following equation: 
 
log yit – log yit-1 = αi + βLIBit + εit 
 
where yit is GDP per capita in country i at time t and LIBit (their variable for 
TL) takes the value of 1 if t is greater than the liberalisation year.83 Using this 
equation, then their estimate for the period from 1950 to 1998 was of 1.42 
percent points of average difference in growth between liberalised and non-
liberalised countries. 
Wacziarg and Horn Welch’s results are presented as revised results on the 
positive economic effects of TL, after taking into account the methodological 
                                            
83 Residuals are modelled so as to include country and time fixed-effects, see Wacziarg and Horn 
Welch 2008, 199-202. 
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concerns pointed out by Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001). Their within-country 
analysis purportedly complements cross-country findings by offering an 
account of how economic variables like growth and investment have evolved 
from year to year in countries that experienced liberalisation reforms and in 
countries that remained closed.  
While this move apparently deals with within-country variation concern, 
difference-in-differences analysis assumes that by averaging over the 
differences in Y of all different countries from which some liberalised at some 
point (i.e., switched from TL = 0 to TL = 1) and others did not, this can be treated 
as the outcome of a random assignment to TL = 0 or 1 and consequently an 
average causal effect can be estimated. This amounts to following the logic of 
the potential outcomes framework (see chapter 5, section 5.5), plus an 
additional assumption often called “parallel trend assumption” which states 
that the average change observed in the “control” group (of non-liberalised 
countries) represents the counterfactual trend for the “treatment” group (of 
liberalised countries) if there were no “treatment”. So ultimately, the causal 
effect is a difference between the observed value of Y in liberalised countries 
and what the value of Y would have been with parallel trends had there been no 
liberalisation.  
Similarly, fixed effects techniques explicitly assume that a number of causal 
relevant causal characteristics are time-invariant during different periods for 
the same country thereby making the before-and-after comparisons 
meaningful. Using fixed-effects amounts then to secure a similar situation to 
the one expected when a “temporal stability” assumption is made in the 
potential-outcomes framework (see chapter 5, section 5.5). 
 
7.6.2. Different causal notions and different practical relevance 
All methods—cross-country or within-country—have their respective merits 
and deficiencies depending on the context of the case at hand. Cross-country 
methods have the advantage of allowing the researchers to control explicitly 
for potential disturbing factors (which is useful insofar as reliable background 
knowledge about those factors is already available), but if countries have a high 
variability over time the estimates will be biased. Within-country methods have 
the advantage of exploring trends that different countries experience before 
and after trade reforms have taken place, and trends followed by countries that 
have remained closed, but causally relevant heterogeneity across countries 
could always be hidden in the final average results.  
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Let us take as a given that the empirical methods used to test the causal 
effects of free trade are indeed good means to control for potential errors or 
cofounders whenever properly implemented. Therefore, one can take the 
existing empirical evidential base (as many economists do) as valid evidence for 
the causal generalisation “trade liberalisation causes economic growth”. Is the 
evidence also enough to act upon the causal hypothesis on the benefits of trade 
liberalisation? 
As discussed in chapter 3, causal claims can have different practical 
implications depending on their specific meaning. Economists have never been 
explicit about the causal theory they endorse whenever they evaluate causal 
hypothesis about macroeconomic variables. Still by looking at the empirical 
studies it seems fairly clear that the causal notion under evaluation could be 
analysed in terms of a probabilistic theory of causality (see also chapter 5).  
Mechanistic causal information is also sometimes employed, but mainly in 
the form of background knowledge in order to facilitate the estimation of 
probabilistic results. For example, brief explanations about the underlying 
mechanism are sometimes quoted to justify the chosen model specification of 
the regression equations. Some other times—as I will describe briefly in the next 
section—mechanistic background information is called upon in order to explain 
away exceptions and outliers of the general results. Thus, mechanistic causal 
information plays at most an indirect role in supporting posited probabilistic 
causal claims (see Reiss 2015; Lehtinen 2016). 
Within a probabilistic theory of causality, there is still room for a number 
of distinct causal concepts related to different definitions and criteria about 
what is to count as a causal relation.84 As can be noticed from the methods 
described in the previous section, the criteria used in the empirical research on 
the benefits of free trade resembles Dupré’s (1984) notion of a “fair sample” 
approach to probabilistic causality (see chapter 5, section 5.2). Moreover, some 
of the techniques employed are explicit attempts to analyse the existing panel 
datasets as if they were the result of randomised experimental designs, and 
thus the causal concepts estimated in these studies are types of average causal 
effects (ACEs). 
It should be clear, however, that the specific causal notions referred to by 
the resulting estimated average causal effects are heavily determined by the 
method (cross-sectional or within-country analysis) employed, and by the 
assumptions required to achieve those estimates. The meaning of the claim “TL 
                                            
84 See the discussion on conceptual causal pluralism in chapter 3, section 3.2, and on distinct 
causal criteria in the probabilistic account in chapter 5, sections 5.2 and 5.4. 
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causes Y” can vary significantly depending on the method employed and the 
assumptions made to establish it, which is another way to say that its potential 
policy implications may vary significantly as well (see chapter 3). 
As I have suggested in the previous chapters, different causal concepts need 
not have the same practical relevance. In this case, the methods and 
assumptions made so as to estimate the causal effects of trade liberalisation 
determine (enable and constrain) the potential inferences about practical 
applications that can be made from the results. Even if the available empirical 
evidence is valid enough to allow us to believe in the truth of the posited 
scientific causal hypothesis “Trade liberalisation causes economic gains”, this 
still does not answer the question: Is one allowed to act upon it? Shall we 
implement a trade policy reform in our country in order to grow faster? I will 
elaborate in the next section on the problematic implications that these 
empirical results can have for policy makers trying to infer effective policy 
recommendations. 
 
7.7. STUDY-SPECIFIC HYPOTHESES VERSUS CAUSAL GENERALISATIONS  
There are three aspects of the empirical studies supporting the economic gains 
of trade liberalisation that I want to point out.  
The first is that there is no single variable that accurately measures ‘trade 
liberalisation’. This has been the focus of most methodological discussions 
among economists working on empirical international economics. From a 
scientific perspective, the aim has been to conceptualise the best compound 
variable that could account for what economists consider a close economy (e.g., 
Sachs and Warner 1995). In many cases, it is a search for the best proxy variable 
for TL (see World Bank 2008). This has resulted in several empirical evaluations 
of the robustness of the economic effects to different measurements of TL (see 
Greenaway, et al. 2002). As long as the proposed measures are shown to be 
reasonable indicators (or signs) of trade liberalisation reforms, they are taken 
as acceptable proxies to test generalisations.  
From a policy-oriented perspective, however, the main problem is that there 
is no clear way of intervening on a multidimensional variable such as the one 
currently in use. What exactly should a policy maker do in order to induce a 
change on the Sachs-Warner notion of TL? Under that understanding of TL, any 
policy intervention should include a combination of changes on at least “the 
level of tariffs”, “non-tariff barriers”, and “the black market exchange rate”. 
Nevertheless, the existing empirical evidential base is completely silent about 
which precise combination of changes in the different dimensions of TL should 
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be implemented to induce a desired effect in the level of economic growth or 
any other relevant outcome variable. Thus, even if the variables currently in use 
to stand for TL levels were acceptable to test the validity of causal 
generalisations, they would still be rather ambiguous in relation to the purposes 
of policy makers. 
Secondly, any coefficient obtained using cross-country and within-country 
methods, regardless of how statistically significant and unbiased, ultimately is 
an average-causal-effect type of causal concept inferred from a large and wide 
number of comparisons of different sorts at the unit-country level. Now, from 
a policy-making perspective, these results (even if they could very well 
represent the best valid evidence for believing in a causal generalisation like 
“TL causes Y on average in a certain positive magnitude”) tell nothing about the 
particular policy strategy that should be implemented in a particular economy 
to effectively achieve the desired change in Y. Well-established empirical 
estimations of average causal effects could be taken as valid evidence for 
scientific causal generalisations, but they only amount at best to be prima facie 
evidence for specific policy recommendations (see chapter 6, sections 6.3, 6.4, 
6.5, and 6.6). 
As I have suggested before, these econometric techniques are not perfect 
tools to control for the influence of other relevant causal factors, and are 
vulnerable to ignore underlying heterogeneity of background conditions or of 
single-unit causal effects. Most of the intrinsic methodological problems with 
such estimation techniques are rather well-known by econometricians and 
empirical economists. The merit of many contributions often consists of some 
technical improvement to deal with such methodological problems, e.g., 
sensitivity tests, multiple regressions to test for robustness of different 
approaches and specifications, or case-study approaches to deal with (or 
explain away) single-unit heterogeneity. 
Similarly, the authors of the empirical literature seem to be aware of the 
fact that the specific conceptual and methodological assumptions in the 
econometric techniques restrict in different ways the inferential power of their 
results. Rodríguez and Rodrik’s (2001) critical article is a straightforward 
example of this awareness, but also other studies less methodologically focused 
and that are explicitly meant to support the positive economic effects of trade 
liberalisation are usually careful to add here and there qualifications about the 
interpretation of their results outside the abstract scientific realm. For instance, 
the existence of concurrent policies is commonly recognised as one of the 
potential constraints for the effectiveness of concrete trade policies in the real 
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world (Wacziarg and Horn Welch 2008, 206-207; Greenaway et al. 1997, 1886; 
and Greenaway et al. 2002, 233).  
In relation to the potential heterogeneity of single-unit effects that can 
always be hidden in the general average estimates, for example, Wacziarg and 
Horn Welch (2008) write after presenting their positive results: 
 
[T]he extent to which per capita income growth changed after trade reforms 
varied widely across countries. While the average effect obtained in the large 
sample is positive, roughly half of the countries experienced zero or even 
negative changes in growth following liberalization. […] generalisations 
about the factors that may explain these differences are difficult to draw. 
The institutional environment of countries, the extent of political turmoil, 
the scope and depth of economic reforms, and the characteristics of 
concurrent macroeconomic policies all seem to have a role to play, to 
varying degrees in different countries. While this article paints a picture that 
is highly favorable to outward-oriented policy reforms on average, it 
cautions against one-size-fits-all policies that disregard local circumstances 
(Wacziarg and Horn Welch 2008, 189-190). 
 
Unfortunately, none of these type of qualms seems to make it to the public 
debates or the policy-making arena. Even in semi-academic divulgation texts, 
such as the popular Free trade under fire, Douglas Irwin (2009) summarises the 
recent empirical results (including Wacziarg and Horn Welch’s results) in favour 
of trade liberalisation, with no mention of all the qualms and potential biases 
of average results. Instead, he flatly concludes that “despite shortcomings in 
method and measurement, cross-country and within-country studies support 
the conclusion that economies with more open trade policies tend to perform 
better than those with more restrictive trade policies” (Irwin 2009, 54). 
Even if econometricians and many economists know and understand fairly 
well the inherent “shortcomings” of their methods, ignoring these 
shortcomings when communicating economic results to the users of the science 
could turn into potentially dangerous misuses of these results. This can happen 
whenever the results are not properly communicated to (or properly 
understood by) policy makers together with all the specifications and 
qualifications inherent to the particular estimation techniques employed in the 
empirical evaluations. 
The third aspect to be noted is what can be called the “saving-the-
generalisation attitude”. In the empirical research on the benefits of TL, the 
more general a result is (for instance, by using the largest available dataset), the 
better. Then when there are any potential exceptions to an established causal 
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generalisation, the scientific priority is to save the truth of the generalisation 
by explaining away the outlaying cases.  
This attitude is compatible, to some extent, with the methodological 
distinction (I have argued for in chapter 1) between doing economic science and 
doing economic policy, and the fact that these two endeavours have distinct 
aims. Broadly put: the “science” aims at studying causal relations in isolation 
(in the abstract) and at establishing causal generalisations, whereas the “art” of 
policy making aims at finding the most effective means to achieve specific 
effects in specific situations, not in general or on average, but in concrete unit-
level cases (see chapters 5 and 6). 
Empirical economists are in principle simply doing their jobs when they 
focus on establishing average results that are as general as possible. 
Nevertheless, it is entirely unjustified to suggest that such causal 
generalisations can be straightforwardly useful for guiding or supporting 
effective policy recommendations, as it is suggested in some of the quotations 
presented in the first section of this chapter.  
As mentioned before, systematic reports put together by international 
economic organisations usually follow the same “generality attitude” when they 
put together compendiums of empirical studies as the evidential base that 
supports the general hypothesis that “trade liberalisation causes economic 
gains”. However, each empirical study refers to a certain specific hypothesis of 
the form “trade liberalisation causes Y” (were Y stands for any of the specific 
economic indicators listed in section 7.3). Furthermore, every single study could 
refer to a specific causal connotation which is determined to a great extent by 
the estimation technique and its assumptions, the specification of the model, 
the specification of the relevant variables. Also the particular data sets 
employed in the study certainly determine the population of application.  
Again, there is in principle no problem with considering the particular 
empirical studies with different specific hypotheses about, say, the effects of 
trade on economic growth, as “valid evidence” for the causal generalisation 
“trade liberalisation causes economic”. However, without the proper 
information and understanding about the precise way in which the available 
empirical evidence is obtained for each of the study-specific hypotheses, policy 
makers would be in danger of inferring ineffective, or plainly wrong, policy 
prescriptions to attain particular policy goals. The existing empirical literature 
conforms a valid evidential base for scientific causal generalisations, but only 
prima facie evidence for policy action. So how can one get valid evidence for 
policy hypotheses? 
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7.8. ON THE METHODOLOGICAL CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND ECONOMIC 
POLICY MAKING 
Evidence plays different functions in the process of testing scientific causal 
generalisations and in the process of evaluating effective policy 
recommendations, because these two activities have different epistemic aims 
which require different appraisal procedures. Consider the following two 
hypotheses: 
 
h1: For P, trade liberalisation causes economic growth.  
 
h2: For country u, implementing a trade liberalisation policy will generate 
economic growth. 
 
The empirical evidential base of hypothesis h1 is at best prima facie evidence 
for policy hypothesis h2 about country u. To get valid evidence for h2, the 
method of isolation is no longer useful. The evidential base that could count as 
valid evidence for h2 requires putting together literally everything we know 
about the relevant disturbing factors that can potentially affect a specific policy 
intervention intended in country u. That is, all sorts of specific contextual 
conditions of country u: institutional, geographical, political, the socioeconomic 
situation of its inhabitants, the composition of its economic sectors, cultural 
features, relevant historical events, a detailed account of concurrent planned 
policies, other countries’ trade policies, and so on and so forth. 
A good place to start would be to make explicit the assumptions used to 
justify the empirical base supporting h1. The assumptions required to make 
work the evidential methods used to test the generalisations can be used as a 
starting point for a list of features that have to be further tested in order to 
secure the effectiveness of specific interventions. 
Consider, for instance, some of the basic assumptions commonly made in 
econometrics based on the potential-outcomes framework (as discussed in 
chapter 5, section 5.5): 
 
Temporal stability: The value of a single-unit effect is assumed to be 
independent of when the cause is produced and measured in any particular 
unit of P (see Holland 1986, 948). 
 
The framework assumes that the response on the same unit to the same 
cause would be the same response over time. Simply put, it does not matter 
when any particular unit is exposed to the posited cause (or to its alternative), 
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the response will be the same for that same unit. In relation to trade 
liberalisation, this assumption has to be questioned. One of the problems with 
existing empirical evidence has been precisely that the effects of TL on 
economic growth seem to vary depending on the decade in which the TL reform 
was implemented (see Wacziarg and Horn Welch 2008, 202-206). Empirical 
economists have developed new techniques to analyse these time variations 
when they calculate average effects, however further understanding on the 
specific causes of this time variation will be useful for country-specific policy 
purposes. 
 
Stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA): the value of the causal 
effect of each unit ui is assumed to be independent of any changes in the 
causal exposures to TL of any of the other units in P (see Morgan and 
Winship 2007, 37-40).  
 
If this assumption does not hold, then the estimated causal effect could 
change depending on how many members of P are exposed to the causal 
variable. Again, this is a useful assumption when estimating average causal 
effects, but it seems particularly problematic specially in relation to trade 
liberalisation. There are some studies, in fact, showing that the effects of trade 
liberalisation for some Asian countries in the 1960s were positive and high, in 
part because the majority of countries in the region at that moment had closed 
economies. Whereas, the effects of trade liberalisation for Latin-American 
countries in the 1980s and 1990s had ambiguous effects, especially for the 
countries that started liberalisation policies after most economies were already 
open. Trade liberalisation is simply a variable for which the SUTVA does not 
apply, since the specific causal effect will always depend on what the other 
trading countries (at least in the economic region of country u) will do. 
Whether the two assumptions just mentioned (or any other similar 
assumption made for the purposes of empirical testing of causal 
generalisations) are true or not about real countries determines how much 
economists can trust the truth of the causal relation in general. In as much as 
the assumptions are not true about a particular country (even if the average 
causal effect is positive for P), then it is necessary to perform additional 
explorations of the conditions which could preclude (or enable) the realisation 
of the intended effect in that particular country.  
A reasonable place to begin the local empirical investigation for potential 
disturbing factors is the list of (observable) variables that were controlled for 
in the empirical investigations using regression analysis. Assuming there are 
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good reasons to believe the specifications used were correct, then policy makers 
can take seriously some of the parameters (or at least the signs) estimated in 
such equations and run further more localised empirical investigations. Local 
and regional studies are required to explore the actual mechanisms that can 
constrain (or enable) the intended actual effect in the particular country in 
which a liberalisation policy is to be implemented. 
Consider the list of variables (see section 7.6.1) that were controlled for in 
the empirical studies by Sachs and Warner (1995) and by Wacziarg and Horn 
Welch (2008). Following those accounts, one can draw a causal diagram like 
D1.85 
 
Diagram D1 
 
 
All the variables in this diagram in addition to TL have an effect on GDP per 
capita. They were explicitly controlled for in the empirical tests. An evaluation 
of the potential effectiveness of a trade liberalisation policy in a particular 
country will require an evaluation of all these causal relations in the local 
context of the intended policy. Moreover, it will be useful to search for any 
additional information about the cloud-shaped set labelled “unknown variables 
Z” (which include such things as institutional framework, cultural aspects, or 
potential influences from concurrent policy reforms), perhaps coming from 
                                            
85 Causal diagram D1 shows the main variables controlled for in cross-country regressions in 
typical empirical studies on the benefits of trade liberalisation. The sources are the works cited 
in the previous sections of this chapter. 
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experts in other disciplines, e.g., sociology, psychology, political sciences, 
environmental sciences, history, and so on.  
The point is that the methods employed to estimate the average causal 
effects are intended to isolate the causal relation from all other potential 
influences of disturbing factors. But it is precisely information about all those 
potential disturbing factors that is now required to evaluate the effectiveness 
of a particular policy hypothesis in a particular country. 
There is also empirical evidence supporting (to different levels of success) 
the general suggested mechanisms of new trade theory (see Feenstra 2006). On 
the basis of that research, a similar picture like that of D1 can be drawn and 
used as another guideline for local empirical investigations in relation to the 
implementation of concrete trade liberalisation policies. 
 
Diagram D2 
 
 
On the basis of the diagram above, a policy maker should have to evaluate 
the status all the relevant nodes (and the values of variables W) and to evaluate 
any existing evidence on the specific causal effects that such variables have (or 
have had) on the causal relation under consideration, i.e., TL causes GDP per 
capita. As it has been discussed by some authors (see, e.g., Driskill 2012) 
increases in economic growth are never automatic improvements on welfare. 
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This is reflected in the right-bottom corner of diagram D2. New international 
trade economics provides some insights on the possible mechanisms that could 
lead to welfare distortions, but the point here is that depending on the concrete 
policy aims, all the relevant nodes and causal connections in diagrams D1 and 
D2 should be evaluated at a local level. 
 
Diagram D3 
 
 
Local and regional studies have become more popular after the year 2000. 
These studies show (ex post) some of the contextual variables that have had a 
distorting effect in particular regions after trade liberalisation reforms have 
been implemented (see, e.g., Easterly, et al. 2003; Baylis, et al. 2012). Among the 
disturbing factors typically mentioned are: not sufficient investment in 
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education; not sufficient innovation, and infrastructure; poor quality of 
national institutions; and (the previously mentioned) the state of specific 
complementary policy reforms (fiscal, energetic, communications, and the like). 
Without trying to be exhaustive, D3 above is my attempt of compiling in a 
causal diagram most of the relevant causal interactions in relation to trade 
liberalisation that can be found in the existing empirical literature. A careful 
analysis of all the nodes and posited causal connections is required in order to 
get valid evidence for supporting a concrete trade liberalisation policy 
intervention in a particular country. 
 
7.9. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
I have analysed in detail some of the most influential studies in empirical 
international economics on the benefits of free trade. The studies show that 
there is valid evidence of a positive average causal effect from a variable 
defined as “trade liberalisation” to other well-known economic indicators such 
as GDP per capita, investment, and so on. Nevertheless, I have argued that there 
are at least three methodological aspects of this literature that make the results 
ambiguous or inadequate for policy purposes. 
1) The variable that is used to measure trade liberalisation is rather 
ambiguous from a policy-making point of view. It is usually defined as a 
multidimensional variable that allows measurement, yet it is not clear how a 
feasible policy intervention (let alone the right one) is supposed to be derived 
or inferred from it.  
2) The specific assumptions about the causal criteria and about the 
controlling of background conditions that are implicit in the econometric 
methods used restrict the inferences that can be made about concrete policy 
applications of the empirical results. It is unclear the precise way in which a 
causal claim about the existence of an average causal effect of a certain 
magnitude is supposed to be applied in the design and implementation of a 
policy reform for a particular country. 
3) The general scientific results obtained in these studies are sometimes 
complemented with analyses of outlying cases, sensitivity analyses, robustness 
tests, nevertheless in most cases the aim is to save the established truth of a 
causal generalisation, i.e., to explain away the exceptions such that they can be 
ignored. From a policy-making perspective, an attitude much more useful 
would be to offer a clear and explicit delimitation of all the relevant factors, 
contextual characteristics, and background conditions that interact and 
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concurrently enable the occurrence of a causal effect. Such information could 
be used as a basic guideline for policy applications. 
A final and significant observation is that most empirical economist 
working on the research reviewed here seem to be very well-aware of the 
implicit assumptions and the related limitations that such assumptions impose 
to making practical inferences about what would happen in specific country 
economies. Nevertheless, the clarifications, qualms, and qualifications required 
to properly understand the empirical results seldom reach the actual users of 
these research results (or at least the systematic reports often used to inform 
of the available scientific results). There is a huge amount of information 
implicitly and explicitly contained in the specifics of empirical testing 
methodologies (just as it is also sometimes implicit in the details of theoretical 
studies), such information properly organised and presented can be of really 
great practical value for policy makers trying to attain practical goals and 
effective policy strategies in real and particular socio-economic situations. 
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SUMMARY 
 
The idea that knowledge about causal relations can be exploited for the 
attainment of practical goals has been commonly taken for granted in the 
literature on causation. However, there is rarely any elaboration on what exactly 
the practical relevance of causal knowledge amounts to. The way causal 
knowledge can be exploited for practical purposes is typically understood as 
follows: if ‘X causes G’ is true, then bringing about X “will be an effective 
strategy for G in any situation” (Cartwright 1979, 432). Leuridan, Weber, and 
Van Dyck (2008) have labelled this position the “standard view on the practical 
value of causal knowledge” (p. 298).  
While overall the standard view is taken as given, little attention has been 
paid to the details of what the practical relevance of causal knowledge actually 
amounts to. What kind of practical power is causal knowledge in fact capable 
of conferring? How exactly is one meant to make use of causal knowledge for 
the effective attainment of practical goals in specific situations? Is the same 
kind of practical power present in all forms of causal knowledge? How different 
evidence and evidential techniques used to test causal relations affect practical 
relevance. Are all the methods used to evaluate causal relations appropriate to 
support or evaluate practical recommendations as well? A serious philosophical 
effort to investigate this kind of questions is still missing. 
The present dissertation is an attempt to begin providing such a 
philosophical account of the practical relevance of causal knowledge in 
economics. The focus is on the notions of ‘causation’ and ‘evidence’ in the 
process of using economic science for policy purposes. Overall, the result is a 
contribution to the methodology of economic policy-making. 
In chapter 1, I argue that the twofold positive-normative distinction in 
economics has led methodologist to focus either on issues related to conceptual 
analysis of economic science and its methods or on the ethical and welfare 
consequences of economic approaches. Still, the ways in which economic 
science is used (or misused) to achieve policy goals have been rarely analysed 
and essentially ignored by most philosophers of economics. I explain this 
situation by referring to the classical threefold distinction in economics as 
proposed by J. S. Mill and J. N. Keynes. They recognised three distinct epistemic 
activities related to economics: scientific economics, normative economics, and 
the art of economic policy-making. After reassessing the classical and the 
modern accounts of this distinction, I argue that a revised version of the 
threefold classical distinction can offer significant benefits to the study and 
understand of the methodology of economics. The aims of scientific inquiry are 
very distinct from the aims of policy making, thus the criteria of success and 
the methods required also significantly differ. This chapter serves as an account 
of why a more detailed methodology of policy making would be beneficial, and 
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also makes explicit the questions that motivate and are analysed in the rest of 
the dissertation. 
In chapter 2, I discuss the notions of ‘practical relevance’ and ‘effectiveness’ 
in relation to causal knowledge. In the standard view, the notion of ‘practical 
relevance’ is confined exclusively to one of its possible meanings, namely a 
specific form of intervening power, while in fact causal knowledge can 
contribute to the attainment of practical goals in many different and equally 
important ways. I discuss how predictive power and intervening power relate 
to each other and to causal knowledge. The complexity of the notion of practical 
relevance becomes clearer by distinguishing between the ‘practical potential’ of 
causal knowledge (which depends on its predictive and intervening power), and 
the notion of ‘effectiveness’ (which refers to the actual accomplishment in 
relation to concrete practical goals). The aim of this chapter is to argue that 
practical potential is not sufficient for the effectiveness of causal knowledge. 
In chapter 3, I discuss the relation between causal pluralism and practical 
relevance. ‘Causality’ has many different meanings, some of which are mutually 
exclusive. The philosophical literature provides us with theories of causality 
put in terms of regularities, probability raising, counterfactual dependence, 
physical processes, and invariance under interventions. In addition, there are 
distinct causal concepts referring to dissimilar configurations of causal factors 
within a given causal structure. These include for instance net cause, 
component cause, average cause, preventer, and so forth. As a result, a generic 
causal claim of the form ‘X causes Y’ can have a variety of meanings and 
interpretations. A proper disambiguation of the meaning of causal relations 
should complement any attempt to use causal knowledge for practical 
purposes. The aim of this chapter, then, is to show that a proper philosophical 
account of the practical relevance of causal knowledge should make clear how 
different notions of a causal claim relate to different forms of practical 
relevance. 
In chapter 4, a case study is used to illustrate the main points made in the 
previous chapter. The OECD research on unemployment in the 1990s was 
presented to the members of the OECD as an up-to-date scientific study 
including the available theoretical and empirical findings from economic 
science on the causes of, and the effective strategies against, the problem of 
unemployment. Most of the findings were stated in the form of causal 
generalisations. It is not clear, however, what the precise meaning of these 
causal claims is. The example shows (1) that the meaning of causal claims is 
not always clear when they are intended as guides for policy; (2) that the 
ambiguities in the meaning of a causal generalisation are of different types and 
come from distinct sources; and (3) that it is rather unclear which precise policy 
recommendations are to be implemented in particular targets, given that the 
results of the OECD study are mainly about average causal effects. 
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In chapter 5, I discuss how it is possible to infer effective strategies for 
particular country-cases from causal generalisations. I start by exploring the 
existing philosophical literature on the relation between general- and unit-level 
causation. I argue that most proposals fail to offer a clear and useful account. I 
then show how the potential-outcomes framework commonly used to establish 
causal generalisations in economics and other social sciences relies on a 
number of conceptual and methodological assumptions close to those used in 
probabilistic accounts, which at the same time enable and constrain the 
inferences that can be made from general results to the unit level. Causal 
generalisations are typically presented to non-academic audiences as scientific 
results without any definite provisos about how they are meant to apply to 
individual members of a population, or what the specific requirements of the 
background context of application are.  
In chapter 6, I suggest that causal generalisations and their practical 
relevance are inferentially connected to certain features of the evidential base 
employed to established them, and then elaborate on such features. An 
evidential base is the set of all the evidence that supports and allows an 
epistemic agent or community to believe that a piece of scientific knowledge is 
true. The first part of this chapter is devoted to critically review the existing 
philosophical literature on the so-called evidence-based movement and Nancy 
Cartwright’s “evidence for use” approach. I argue that the methodological 
worries related to the evidence-based movement and of Cartwright’s account 
are not really useful to understand the evidential requirements relevant to most 
policy purposes in economics. In contrast to many other sciences, randomised 
controlled trials (RCTs) are not the gold standard of evidence in economics. 
Empirical evidence and evidential techniques used in economics mostly come 
from econometrics, which has a number of specific methodological 
consequences for economic policy-making. In the second part of the chapter, I 
discuss the basic problems of policy inference in relation to economics. 
Following Christopher Hitchcock, I identify different types of causal claims so 
as to characterise more precisely both: causal generalisations about large 
populations and policy hypotheses about particular units. I then propose an 
account of evidence to support policy hypotheses that is distinct from, and yet 
grounded on, the typical ways in which empirical economists obtain evidence 
for causal generalisations. 
In chapter 7, I illustrate what I have said in the previous chapters by 
analysing in detail the empirical literature in international trade economics that 
studies the benefits of free trade. A huge amount of empirical research has been 
produced to test the hypothesis that (more) trade liberalisation causes (more) 
economic improvements (in terms of growth, investment, employment, and the 
like). I analyse the evidence and evidential methods employed. Three 
methodological issues emerge: (1) the lack of definite referents for the relevant 
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causal relata, and specially for the posited causal variable “trade liberalisation”; 
(2) the use of econometric methods as a “gold standard” of scientific evidence, 
which always come with a built-in conception of causality; and (3) a tendency 
to seek generality over specificity in the results of the research. The pursuit of 
generality has been originally intended to enhance the confidence in the truth 
of purported policy-oriented causal generalisations, but it now seems to be 
backfiring by leading to scientific results in the form of broad causal 
generalisations with no clear ways to be applied in specific real cases. Even if 
the existing empirical evidence could be taken as acceptable to support that 
there is “some” causal relation between trade liberalisation and economic 
benefits, the existing evidence is not conclusive at all to support concrete policy 
recommendations for individual countries and their specific socio-economic 
conditions. 
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SAMENVATTING 
 
De literatuur over oorzakelijkheid doet vermoeden dat kennis van causale 
verbanden zonder al te veel problemen gebruikt kan worden voor praktische 
doeleinden. Maar het is helemaal niet zo duidelijk welke epistemische status 
dergelijke praktische kennis precies heeft. De praktische relevantie van causale 
kennis wordt typisch als volgt begrepen: als de propositie ‘X is de oorzaak van 
G’ waar is, dan zal het doen plaatsvinden van X “een effectieve strategie zijn 
voor G in alle situaties” (Cartwright 1979, 432). Leuridan, Weber, and Van Dyck 
noemen deze positie “het standaardbeeld van de praktische waarde van causale 
kennis” (2008, 298). 
Welk praktisch gewicht brengt oorzaakskennis nou precies met zich mee? 
Hoe moet zulke causale kennis gebruikt worden ten behoeve van praktische 
doelen in specifieke situaties? Is dezelfde graad van praktische relevantie 
verbonden met alle soorten causale kennis? Verschillen in het gebruik van 
empirisch bewijs en bewijsmiddelen bij het testen van oorzakelijke verbanden 
hebben gevolgen voor de praktische relevantie ervan. Zijn alle middelen van de 
evaluatie van causale relaties geschikt voor het ondersteunen van praktische 
aanbevelingen? We ontberen een degelijk filosofisch perspectief op dit soort 
vragen. 
Dit proefschrift doet een poging om zo’n filosofische benadering van de 
praktische relevantie van causale kennis op het gebied van de economie te 
ontwikkelen. De aandacht gaat vooral uit naar de begrippen ‘oorzaak’ en 
‘bewijs’ in de economie bij beleidskwesties. Zo ontstaat een bijdrage aan de 
methodologie van economisch beleid.  
In Hoofdstuk 1 laat ik zien dat methodologen door het tweevoudige feit-
norm onderscheid in de economie hetzij in zijn gegaan op conceptuele kwesties 
in economie en zijn methode, hetzij op welvaartsvraagstukken en op de 
ethische consequenties van economisch denken. Tegelijk is de vraag naar het 
gebruik (of misbruik) van economische kennis voor beleidsdoeleinden 
genegeerd. Ik verklaar deze stand van zaken met behulp van een drievoudig 
onderscheid in soorten van epistemische activiteit zoals bedacht door J. S. Mill 
en J. M. Keynes: wetenschappelijke economie, normatieve economie en het 
ambacht van economische beleidsinterventies. Na een herbezinning op de 
klassieke en moderne versies van dit onderscheid kom ik met een herziene 
versie. Ik beweer dat deze interessante voordelen biedt voor het begrijpen van 
de aard van de economie. Het doel van wetenschappelijk onderzoek is zeer 
verschillend van het doel van beleid. Dan mag je verwachten dat de 
succescriteria en de methoden die ervoor nodig zijn ook uiteenlopen. Dit 
hoofdstuk verhaalt dus vooral wat een zekere detaillering in de methodologie 
van economisch beleid oplevert om daaruit de vraagstelling van dit proefschrift 
af te leiden en te motiveren. 
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Hoofdstuk 2 gaat in op de begrippen ‘praktische relevantie’ en 
‘doelmatigheid’ in verband met causale kennis. In het standaardbeeld krijgt 
‘praktische relevantie’ uitsluitend de betekenis van één specifieke interventie-
mogelijkheid. Maar causale kennis kan bijdragen aan praktische doelen op tal 
van manieren die alle even belangrijk mogen heten. Ik bespreek het verband 
tussen verklarende kracht en interventievermogen. De notie van praktische 
relevantie blijkt complex en de distinctie tussen de begrippen ‘praktische 
relevantie van causale kennis’ en ‘doelmatigheid’ helpt die complexiteit te 
analyseren. De eerste hangt af van verklarende kracht en interventievermogen, 
de tweede gaat over het feitelijke succes bij het bereiken van concrete 
beleidsdoelstellingen. Het doel van dit alles is om te adstrueren dat louter het 
vermogen om iets te bereiken in de praktijk onvoldoende is voor het vaststellen 
van de doelmatigheid van causale kennis. 
In hoofdstuk 3 bespreek ik de relatie tussen causaal pluralisme en 
praktische relevantie. Veroorzaking is een notie met meerdere betekenissen en 
sommige van die betekenissen sluiten elkaar uit. Zo kennen we theorieën van 
oorzakelijkheid in termen van regelmatigheden, van waarschijnlijkheidsgroei, 
van contrafactuele afhankelijkheid, van fysieke processen en van invariantie 
onder interventies. Bovendien verwijzen onderscheiden concepten van 
oorzakelijkheid naar diverse configuraties van causale factoren binnen één 
gegeven causale structuur. Denk aan netto-oorzaak, samengestelde oorzaak, 
gemiddelde oorzaak, preventie-oorzaak en dergelijke. Zo kan een causale 
bewering van de vorm ‘X veroorzaakt Y’ een hele reeks van interpretaties 
genereren. Een poging om causale kennis te gebruiken in de beleidspraktijk 
moet met een beduidende desambiguering gepaard gaan. Het doel van dit 
hoofdstuk is dan ook om te tonen dat een zinnige filosofische benadering van 
de praktische relevantie van onze kennis over de oorzakelijke structuur van de 
wereld vereist dat de diverse mogelijke interpretaties van een bepaalde causale 
uitspraak in samenhang gebracht worden met verschillende vormen van 
praktische relevantie die aan de orde kunnen zijn. 
Hoofdstuk 4 illustreert het voorgaande met een case study. De OECD 
presenteerde een onderzoek over werkloosheid in de negentiger jaren aan 
OECD-leden als wat toen de meest recente theoretische en empirische 
economische inzichten waren over de oorzaken van werkloosheid en over 
maatregelen ertegen. De meeste conclusies waren geformuleerd in termen van 
causale generalisaties. Het is echter onduidelijk hoe deze conclusies precies 
begrepen moeten worden. Preciezer gezegd, het voorbeeld onthult (1) dat de 
betekenis van causale claims vaak niet helder is als deze bedoeld zijn om beleid 
te schragen, (2) dat de resulterende ambiguïteit van de generalisaties voortkomt 
uit meerdere bronnen en (3) dat – gegeven het feit dat steeds een concept van 
‘gemiddelde oorzaak’ aan de orde is – mistig blijft welke beleidsaanbevelingen 
nou precies gedaan worden. 
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Ik kom in hoofdstuk 5 toe aan de vraag hoe doelmatige beleidsstrategieën 
voor landen af te leiden zijn uit causale generalisaties, die verwijzen naar de 
veronderstelde werkzame principes. Eerst ga ik na wat de literatuur te zeggen 
heeft over de relatie tussen wetmatige en singuliere causaliteit. Ik kom tot de 
conclusie dat de meeste uitwerkingen niet voldoen als het gaat om helderheid 
en bruikbaarheid voor beleidskwesties. Vervolgens laat ik zien hoezeer het 
kader van ‘potentiële uitkomsten’ – dat veel gebruikt wordt om causale 
generalisaties in economie en andere sociale wetenschappen te formuleren – 
berust op conceptuele en methodologische veronderstellingen die in de buurt 
komen van wat we vooral in probabilistische benaderingen terugzien. Deze 
aannames scheppen wel de mogelijkheid om uit de werkzame principes 
conclusies te trekken op het niveau van een enkele casus, maar beperken die 
tegelijk ook. Het is typerend dat men de causale generalisatie presenteert aan 
niet-academisch publiek zonder enige voorbehouden met betrekking tot de toe-
passing ervan voor afzonderlijke elementen uit een populatie. Of er is geen 
indicatie van wat vereist is van de contextuele factoren van een interventie.  
Hoofdstuk 6 presenteert het idee dat causale generalisaties en hun 
praktische relevantie logisch verbonden zijn met bepaalde eigenschappen van 
de bewijsbasis die wordt ingezet om die generalisaties vast te stellen. Dit is alles 
wat een epistemische actor of gemeenschap doet geloven dat bepaalde 
wetenschappelijke kennis waar is. Ik onderzoek de eigenschappen van die 
bewijsbasis in dit hoofdstuk nader. Eerst bespreek ik de filosofische literatuur 
rond de zogenaamde evidence based beweging; met name Nancy Cartwright’s 
evidence-for-use benadering. Ik laat zien dat de methodologische kwesties die 
in deze benaderingen aan de orde gesteld worden te weinig te bieden hebben 
als het gaat om een beter begrip van de voorwaarden die aan deugdelijk bewijs 
gesteld mogen worden voor het voeren van economisch beleid. In de economie 
zijn Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs) niet de Gouden Standaard; dit in 
tegenstelling tot veel andere wetenschappen. Economisch empirisch bewijs en 
bewijsvoeringtechnieken zijn vooral afkomstig van de econometrie en dit heeft 
nogal wat specifieke methodologische consequenties voor economisch beleid. 
In het tweede deel van dit hoofdstuk bespreek ik de fundamentele problemen 
die spelen bij het afleiden van de kennis die nodig is voor economisch beleid. 
Ik identificeer de soorten van oorzakelijke uitspraken in navolging van 
Christopher Hitchcock om zowel causale generalisaties over hele populaties als 
beleidshypothesen betreffende enkele eenheden preciezer te karakteriseren. 
Ten slotte volgt een verhandeling over bewijsvoering voor beleidshypothesen 
die verschilt van maar gebaseerd is op de typische manier waarop empirisch 
georiënteerde economen bewijs verzamelen voor causale generalisaties. 
Hoofdstuk 7 illustreert wat in het voorgaande is gezegd met behulp van een 
detailanalyse van de empirische literatuur over de voordelen van vrijhandel. 
Zeer veel onderzoek toetst de hypothese dat handelsliberalisatie economische 
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voordelen biedt in groei, investeringen, werkgelegenheid en dergelijke. Het 
bewijs voor deze hypothese en de gebruikte bewijsmethoden worden aan een 
analyse onderworpen. Er komen drie methodologische kwesties naar voren: (1) 
er is een tekort aan referenten voor de relevante causale relata, met name 
‘vrijhandel’, (2) het gebruik van econometrische methoden als Gouden 
Standaard voor bewijs draagt onvermijdelijk reeds een concept van causaliteit 
in zich en (3) er is een neiging om algemene uitspraken de voorkeur te geven 
boven specifieke claims over de onderzoeksresultaten. De neiging te 
algemeniseren komt oorspronkelijk voort uit het streven de waarheidswaarde 
vast te kunnen stellen van de causale generalisaties die voor beleidskeuzen 
bedoeld zijn. Maar deze wens verkeert inmiddels in zijn tegendeel. 
Wetenschappelijke resultaten hebben de vorm gekregen van brede 
generalisaties die geen heldere clous opleveren voor toepassing in specifieke 
gevallen in de werkelijkheid. Zelfs als gegeven empirisch bewijs voldoet om te 
geloven dat er een of ander oorzakelijk verband bestaat tussen 
handelsliberalisatie en bepaalde nastrevenswaardige economische voordelen, 
dan nog geeft dat bewijs de regering in een bepaald land – immers met geheel 
eigen socio-economische condities – onvoldoende uitsluitsel over het te volgen 
beleid. 
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